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CHAPTER ONE 
GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL AGENCY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis analyses the effects of gender equality legislation on the political agency of women 
in Kenya. Specifically, it investigates the transformative nature of legislation on power relations 
between men and women in public participation exercises. This is done to highlight the 
disparity between the rhetoric of politico-institutional reform and empirical reality on the 
ground, in light of the global trend towards constitutional and legislative amendments to 
increase the percentage of women in the political sphere. Dahlerup (2005) reports that in 2015 
alone, more than 40 countries introduced electoral quotas by amending constitutions or 
introducing different types of legislation. Data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) shows that currently, gender quotas have been adopted by more than 100 
countries worldwide,1 through either reserved seats, political party quotas, legislated candidate 
quotas, or a combination of these. 
These efforts reflect the global debate on the political representation of women, which falls 
within the human rights framework and is guided by multiple legal instruments covering 
various aspects of women’s rights. Derived in law, these laws are grounded in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which provides international legal 
recognition for g equality through Article seven: ‘‘all are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.  All are entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.’’ The 1976 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights are also key legal instruments in the debate on women’s rights and 
together with many others across countries and regions, culminated in the 1981 Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Ratifying these 
rights instruments, which chapter six outlines in the case of Kenya, conveys agreement with the 
outlined concept, thus conferring legitimacy upon them (Renteln, 1985). 
In the pursuit of women’s rights, equity and equality have been adopted as core strategies to 
promote fairness, with the former focusing on equality of outcomes, and the latter on equality 
 
1 Gender Quotas Around the World https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas  
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of opportunities. Gender equality and women empowerment was thus the third of eight United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with increasing the proportion of seats held 
by women in national parliaments as one of its targets. Post-2015, women empowerment is now 
fifth of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with two of its targets relating to 
the involvement of women in politics and public affairs. Target 5.5 is to ensure women’s full 
and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision 
making in political, economic and public life, and target 5.C is to adopt and strengthen sound 
policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment 
of all women and girls at all levels. These provisions undoubtedly point to the policy relevance 
of women’s political empowerment. 
Women’s empowerment thus involves bestowing previously unavailable bargaining power 
upon them and increasing their ability to make choices (Kabeer, 2005). Policy debates have 
therefore sought to establish mechanisms that would ensure that women are substantially 
represented in the political realm. Why is this necessary? 
1.2 Gender Equality Legislation and the Political Representation of Women 
The increased representation of women is an important quest, as representation is founded on 
the need to make the invisible visible in public, in order to elevate their existence (Habermas, 
1989: 7). The elimination of women’s historical exclusion from the political sphere therefore 
addresses the gender imbalance that has masculinised politics, while at the same time creating 
opportunities for increased benefits from the input by women. Beyond policy making, the 
increased presence of women in the political arena increases the symbolic effect of their 
leadership. In Rwanda for example, evidence shows that the increased presence of women in 
political positions is influencing public perceptions on women’s leadership, prompting debate 
on what these changes in the historically male-dominated arena mean for gender relations 
(Burnet, 2008; Kagaba, 2015).  
The promotion of gender equality is thus touted for its cross-cutting benefits. For instance, it 
has been argued to have economic benefits, since investing in the education of women and 
tapping into their talents boosts a country’s competitiveness (Kabira, 2016). In addition to the 
benefits to economic growth and genuine democracy, Goetz (1998) points out that gender 
equity in politics and policy making is crucial in redressing gender inequality, as it paves the 
way for women’s increased involvement in public affairs.  
Krook (2008) therefore explicates that the global trend in legislative and constitutional 
amendments can be attributed to the realisation by states that incorporating women in public 
 3 
 
life through political institutions is strategic for improving their socio-economic well-being. In 
effect, these efforts are aimed at improving the percentage of women in the public sphere, 
classically understood as the coming together of private individuals to openly discuss matters 
of public concern (Habermas, 1989: 27).  
The uptake of constitutional and legislative amendments therefore points to a consensus that 
the increased representation of women bears a lot of potential for positive change, an argument 
promoted by Krook (2008), Lovenduski and Norris (2003) Kaimenyi, et al. (2013) and Kabira 
(2016) among others. For instance, Goetz (1998) points out that having more women in politics 
is a good indicator of a society’s democratic freedoms. Further, increased political agency by 
women is argued to directly increase focus on issues affecting women (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). 
Goetz (1998) however cautions that this argument should not be regarded as a translation into 
improved well-being for women and gender sensitive policy making. Nonetheless, from the 
perspective of feminist standpoint theorists, acknowledging and redressing gender inequality is 
the most expected change from the increased political representation of women (Lovedunski 
and Norris, 2003). This is because their presence legitimises their concerns and widens focus 
on their interests. Beyond legitimisation, it also improves their political efficacy (Hayes and 
Hibbing, 2017) due to increased civic engagement.  
In exploring the political representation of women, and as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, 
it is important to note the different forms that this can take, and the differential effects of each. 
Hanna Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation identifies four strands of representation: 
formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive (Pitkin, 1967 in Kurebwa, 2015 and Hayes 
and Hibbing, 2017).  
Formalistic representation focuses on the rules and regulations that precede and initiate 
representation and constitutes two variants: authorisation and accountability (Kurebwa, 2015). 
This form of representation is therefore institutionalised, with representatives gaining power 
mostly through the formal process of elections and direct appointments. On the other hand, 
symbolic representation looks at the influence of representation on the behaviour and attitude 
of constituents. Concern is therefore not on who representatives are, what they do, and policy 
congruence, but rather, what constituents perceive of them (Hayes and Hibbing, 2017). The 
symbolic representation of women is therefore twofold: response to the increased presence of 
women in public decision-making bodies, and the perception of women as players in a male 
dominated political environment (Kurebwa, 2015).  
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Under descriptive representation, representatives gain their mandate based on similar 
characteristics ‘‘such as race, sex, age, class, occupation, gender, ethnicity or geographical area’’ 
(Kurebwa, 2015: 52), and substantive representation goes beyond the numbers, to evaluate 
policy contributions by women in political positions. Lovedunski and Norris (2003) reiterate 
suggestions by feminist theorists that the political presence of women denotes that they are not 
just there as women, but that they also work for other women. Substantive representation is 
therefore concerned with whether women make a difference in political leadership. 
However, all forms of representation are equally important, as the discussion in chapter six will 
show. Kurebwa (2015) highlights that a causal connection exists between these components of 
representation, and they can therefore not be treated separately. Taking this integration into 
account makes representation a process that is both formal and informal, as its design relies on 
formally set procedures, while informal socio-cultural factors influence the success of its 
operationalisation. Undeniable however, is the ripple effect of what representation as a mark of 
dedication to equity and equality might have on society. Goetz (1998: 243) highlights that: 
‘‘It is a matter of concern for economic development policy because unequal gender 
relations create market distortions by raising transaction and information costs. Gender 
equity is also a welfare issue; it is about enhancing the quality of human and social 
reproduction through women's improved education or health. But more than that, it is a 
matter of social justice and social transformation aimed at redistributing resources and 
social value more equally between women and men, a process which includes 
undermining the gendered public/private segregations which marginalise women in the 
worlds of politics and economic production.’’ 
Several studies have thus demonstrated the varied effects of the different forms of 
representation on the status of women. The Impact of Gender Quotas by Franceschet et al. (2012) 
highlights that different strategies adopted to promote descriptive representation influence the 
kind of women elected, and consequently, substantive and symbolic representation. In their 
examination of politics of presence in the UK parliament, Lovenduski and Norris (2003) note 
that the increased number of women has raised expectations on their political role, with 
concerns being on how this would affect the political culture and policy agendas especially 
regarding the interests of women. In India, Kabeer (2005) finds that there has been a positive 
effect on the increased role of women in local government through reserved seats. She reports 
that this approach has not only encouraged political participation, but also influenced the 
allocation of 10% of development funds for women’s development needs. Across Latin 
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America, Sacchet (2008) reports that quotas have influenced the political culture, by 
incentivising collective action and the politicisation of gender issues through critical alliances.  
In Uganda and South Africa, Goetz (1998: 257-258) finds that the explicit efforts to support 
women’s participation have yielded high numbers in the political representation of women, but 
the process is being ‘‘slowed by the masculinity of party politics, elite bargaining, and the 
functioning of state bureaucracies.’’ This echoes observations on Kenya, where Wambui (2016) 
reports that women representatives for each of the counties have been accused of serving their 
interests and those of their parties, and not necessarily championing the interests of women.  
These studies have one thing in common: a general focus on actors and institutions, be it at the 
national level, or the local government level in cases of decentralisation such as India. Much 
attention has therefore been paid to the role of women as individual actors. What has not been 
sufficiently investigated however, is women as both individuals and a collective group. 
Specifically, there is limited research into experiences of equality legislation among women in 
non-representative positions, and in environments where formal institutions are distant and 
power relations are strongly mediated by informal institutions. While acknowledging the 
growing interest in informal institutions within comparative politics and institutional analysis, 
Waylen (2014) nonetheless notes the need for further research and analysis on the role of 
informal institutions in institutional transformation. This study therefore seeks to highlight the 
reality of gender equality legislation among women outside the borders of formalistic 
representation, by demonstrating the influence of informal institutional norms and practices on 
the outcomes of formal institutional policy goals.  
This study acknowledges that the ability to have influence is mediated by power relations, with 
influence and power being directly proportional. Celis and Lovenduski (2018) note that 
empirical studies on gender equality and representation have yielded two kinds of power: 
positional and active. They describe positional power as relating to the holding of positions in 
political institutions that grant access to resources that could either be symbolic, material or 
even strategic. With relational power, they describe it as the ability to act, making it both 
individual and relational. The two forms of power also have a strong correlation, as the 
‘‘meaning or value of positional power is dependent on the extent to which it enables active 
power’’ (Celis and Lovenduski, 2018: 154). This strengthens the relationship between power 
and agency, making it a crucial factor for consideration on actors’ actions as well as their ability 
to act. In the context of political participation, the acknowledgement of power relations is 
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instrumental in understanding the choice of action by both men and women in their dual 
capacities as individuals and members of specific social groups. 
Kagaba (2015) provides insight on the outcomes of this duality, in her study on the experiences 
of gender equality legislation in rural Rwanda. Her study draws attention to the role of culture 
in shaping responses, which has resulted in gender dilemmas characterised by different 
expectations on principles and practices of equality at home and in public. She therefore 
highlights the key role played by the norms and practices of informal institutions in shaping the 
reality of gender equality legislation as a formal state agenda. 
This relationship between formal and informal institutions is well captured by feminist 
institutionalists, as chapter two will demonstrate. They argue that the gendered nature of 
institutions is the result of the connectedness of formal and informal norm functions, an 
assertion that the empirical chapters of this study will reveal. Norm functions are also mediated 
by the differentiating categories of class and socio-economic influence, factors that are 
highlighted in the empirical chapters, but one whose in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
The central aim of this study is thus to understand how gender norms and gender relations 
influence equality, since the underrepresentation of women is rooted in norms and practices 
that make it difficult for women to expel the political dominance of men. Focus will therefore 
be on the interconnectedness of formal and informal institutions, and how they work to either 
promote or curtail women’s political agency and shape outcomes on gender equality. This study 
is therefore timely as it not only contributes to the ongoing debate on gender and politics, but 
also fills the gap on effects of the changing nature of political processes at the local level.  
1.3 Study Propositions and Research Questions  
As the discussion so far demonstrates, this thesis builds on arguments and findings from a 
variety of scholarly fields and discussions, while also seeking to make contributions to these 
fields. The main contribution however, is in the field of gender and politics, with a focus on the 
role of institutions in influencing equality in the public sphere. While I acknowledge the 
benefits of reaching into the theoretical depth of one field, I also believe in the value of 
combining views from different fields, especially in discussing the complex and interconnected 
nature of gender and institutions.    
The absence of a single viewpoint from which to explore this relationship and its effects is 
therefore substituted by a diversity of discussions in other fields that are of great relevance to 
 7 
 
this study.  I therefore aim to demonstrate that complex phenomena are best explored through 
a combination of relevant theoretical and thematic approaches. However, the conceptual 
argument is underpinned by a feminist institutionalist framing, which acknowledges that 
institutions are inherently gendered (Lovenduski, 2011; Findlay, 2012 and Kenny, 2014 among 
others). This framework is therefore important in investigating how norms and processes within 
institutions produce and reproduce gender power dynamics to influence the political position 
of women. 
The study is therefore guided by the assumptions that: 
i. Men and women do not act in isolation, and their attitudes are shaped by their 
socialisation (Goslin, 1969: 2; Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993: 147; Kivoi, 2014: 175). 
ii. Informal norms influence conduct in the political sphere (Kabeer, 2005: 14; Celis and 
Lovenduski, 2018: 157). 
iii. The gendered nature of institutions has contributed to the marginalisation of women in 
politics (Mackay, 2008: 132; Mackay et al., 2010: 580; Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 
602) 
iv. Legislative amendments alone are insufficient at guaranteeing outcomes such as gender 
equality (Fraser, 1990: 74; Sunstein, 1995: 2050; Soss and Schramm, 2007: 122; 
Kameri-Mbote, 2016: 64). 
v. The achievement of gender equality relies on the modelling of approaches that pay 
respect to contextual realities (Fraser, 1990: 76; McNulty, 2015: 1140). 
Bearing this in mind, and noting the objective of the study, I seek to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How do institutional norms and practices influence the agency of women in 
public/political spaces? 
2. What is the effect of gender equality legislation on women’s decision-making authority, 
and how does this influence perceptions on their political agency? 
3. How do institutional frameworks influence the successful realisation of gender parity in 
public participation? 
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1.4 Situating the study: The Context and the Problem 
The questions raised above will be answered through a focus on experiences of gender equality 
legislation by citizens at the local level in Kenya. In August 2010, Kenyans voted for a new 
Constitution. One of the key aspects of this legal instrument is the protection and promotion of 
women’s rights with clear provisions for gender equality in the sphere of politics and public 
decision making. The state is therefore bound to exercise authority in the promotion of women’s 
political welfare. Article 81 (b) of the 2010 Constitution specifies that not more than two-thirds 
of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender. As a party to the legislative 
amendments, Kenya provides a vantage point on investigating the transformative nature of 
gender equality legislation. 
To achieve this, I check on how women exercise their political rights, considering the 
perceptions of women’s agency in a predominantly male political environment. While the other 
forms of representation play an important role especially in their interconnectedness, I 
hypothesise that true transformation is a product of the normative environments that influence 
symbolic representation. This is because symbolic representation focuses on responses invoked 
by representatives and actors in their communities, as determined by the degree of acceptance 
and value judgements on their agency. Arguably, this makes symbolic representation the most 
decisive factor in the quest for equality especially from a sustainability perspective since it is 
perceptions on the political role of women that ultimately influence the acceptance and support 
for equality in politics.  
As will be demonstrated in chapters four to seven, the successful realisation of gender equality 
relies heavily on the public’s acceptance of women’s political agency. Public legitimacy is 
gained where agency is accepted, appreciated, and promoted. The question therefore becomes: 
how does gender equality legislation operate in environments where the political agency of 
women is not necessarily accepted, appreciated or promoted? This study focuses on the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions, and how this influences the political 
agency of women. Formality here is hinged on the codification of norms and practices that 
characterise institutions (Waylen, 2017), with an understanding that there is room for 
interaction and power play between the formal and the informal. 
This study therefore departs from this position, by investigating this relationship in the context 
of gender equality legislation in Kenya. It probes the argument that legislation is key in 
transforming the male-dominated sphere of politics and decision-making within it, creating 
room for the increased representation of women and closing the gender gap.  Informed by norms 
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and practices in the public sphere, it highlights the disconnect between policy and practice in 
Kenya’s gender equality legislation. As chapter four will highlight, gender equality legislation 
in Kenya is expected to apply in a universalistic manner, with disregard for the heterogeneity 
of the over 40 ethnic communities across the country. Taking the patriarchal nature of the 
Kenyan political sphere into consideration, one can envisage challenges in the acceptance of, 
and adherence to norms that are in opposition to the life of institutions that govern power 
relations and decision-making protocol.  
Considering arguments on the role of legislative amendments in promoting the equality status 
of women, for example, one would expect that the representation of women in the political 
realm would improve, to at least meet the statutory minimum. This is however not the case. The 
underrepresentation of women in Kenyan politics prevails, as chapter four will demonstrate. 
The incongruity between legislative requirements and actual representation is however not 
unique to Kenya. Despite an increase in the percentage of seats won by women, there has been 
no significant change as ‘‘women occupy less than a quarter of all legislative seats around the 
world’’ (Celis and Lovenduski, 2018: 150).  It is therefore clear that legislative amendments 
alone cannot guarantee gender equality in the political arena, an inconsistency I explore in 
chapter seven. 
What makes this more difficult in the case of Kenya is that the Constitution does not provide a 
formula on how the two-thirds gender rule is to be realised. As a result, both the 11th and the 
current 12th assemblies have failed to agree on exactly how this is to be achieved, meaning that 
the national assembly is in violation of the Constitution. Chapter four expounds on some of the 
reasons for this failure, which include the disregard for women as a special interest group, 
cultural politics of public decision making, and a clear lack of political will as demonstrated by 
boycotts when it comes to voting for bills proposing formulas to achieve the two thirds gender 
rule set. 
As earlier mentioned however, this study is not concerned with representation and participation 
at the level of formalistic representation, even though it refers to this in discussing the debate 
on the political position of women in Kenya. Rather, it focuses on the politics of women’s 
political participation in non-representative, general democratic processes. This is done with 
due recognition of the fact that a formula for ensuring gender equality is not only lacking for 
the national assembly, but understandably also for open public forums. One could argue that 
this oversight points to weak formal institutions, but I shall let the empirical evidence shape the 
conclusion.  
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Explored within the context of devolution, also introduced by the new Constitution, the study 
analyses the institutional environments that influence the effectiveness of legislative 
amendments on gender equality. As chapter six points out, a key argument for devolution is 
that it facilitates citizen-led development by providing platforms where citizens can directly 
influence policy decisions. This aligns itself with the goal of political empowerment, which 
allows women to influence decisions in the male dominated sphere of politics. 
In the interest of time and resource constraints, plus the existence of a normative environment 
whose organisation does not support women’s political agency, I situate this analysis in the 
Maasai community. Generally, the community plays a big role in the embodiment of traditions 
in a largely modernised country and inhabits areas around national parks. These two 
characteristics make them important actors in the critical tourism sector of the country’s 
economy. The conscious engagement of community members in the design and implementation 
of public policy processes is therefore vital. 
Known for its patriarchal social organisation (Llewely-Davies, 1981; Spencer, 1993; Coast, 
2001; Hodgson, 2001 and Kibutu, 2006 among others), the Maasai community provides an 
informative lens on the reception and effect of formal state norms in environments where 
informal norms dictate the logic of appropriateness on gender roles in public affairs. Gender 
relations are interactive, defined along socio-economic factors such as age, wealth and 
leadership skills (Spencer, 1993; Coast, 2001, Hodgson, 2001). Social organisation is therefore 
hinged on age and gender, as these define the rules of engagement and logic of appropriate 
conduct. A key aspect of this organisation is age-sets and age grades. Initiation through 
circumcision ascribes men to an age-set, but the same is not available for women who are 
instead promoted to a higher grade upon marriage. Whereas an age-set includes a group of peers 
from a broad range of ages, age grades are used to formally categorise men according to their 
status. The acquisition of wealth in the form of livestock, women and children therefore 
translates to an improved status for a man. This marks the difference between men and women, 
since generally, the position of a woman remains dependant on the male figure in her life, in a 
system that embodies the strong influence of informal norms and practices. 
Maasai men have maintained formal authority in the political realm, a reality detailed in chapter 
four. Strengthened by the colonial and immediate post-colonial processes, this dominance 
demonstrates that formal and informal institutions can coexist, working to complement each 
other. This has informed observations on the patriarchal oppression of Maasai women 
(Llewelyn-Davies 1978; Spencer 1988), especially in so far as they lack influence in decision 
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making (Taeko, 2014). This can be inferred from the position of women always depending on 
that of male figures in their lives, as well as men being the ultimate decision makers, as chapters 
five to seven will demonstrate.  
In discussing cultural wealth, Bourdieu (1973: 488) argues that its inheritance from past 
generations ensures that it really belongs only to those who can appropriate it for themselves. 
This logic can be extended to our understanding of political power among the Maasai. In the 
case of political participation therefore, even though it is, by principle, a right to be enjoyed by 
everyone, Maasai men have the historically advantaged position of having been the key political 
actors in the community. This position is cemented with age, and especially enjoyed by those 
who are wealthy within the community. As chapter four will demonstrate, the consolidation of 
political power among men was reinforced through commodification and the codification of 
customary norms during the colonial era, which effectively established men as decision makers. 
Maasai men are therefore better positioned to navigate formal processes to their own benefit, 
unlike women who have to play catch-up due to their limited political efficacy.  
This situation is however not unique to the Maasai. Kimani (2014) points out that the poor 
performance of Kenyan women in the political arena can be attributed to the country’s 
patriarchal culture and the electoral system. He explains that the country’s politics rely heavily 
on social capital, yet the processes of accumulating economic, cultural, and political capital 
continue to be more favourable to men than women irrespective of men’s demographic 
characteristics. In the Kenyan clientelist political environment, the employment of social 
connections is necessary for resource mobilisation, a prerequisite for accessing political power. 
This has been made possible by a socialisation process that has allowed for the reproduction of 
power in favour of men. I adopt the concept of socialisation here, understanding it as both the 
process of role development, as well as enculturation, characterised by the intergenerational 
transmission of (political) culture (Goslin, 1969: 488).  
Among the Maasai, the community has managed to maintain a social structure where rights and 
privileges are contingent on the fulfilment of certain social roles, a practice that places the 
community’s priorities over those of an individual (Howard and Donnelly, 1986). This 
socialisation process has propagated the absence of women from decision making, as men play 
a ‘gatekeeping’ role that perpetuates the exclusion of women. A look at the political history in 
chapter four shows that it was not until 2013 that a Maasai woman was elected into parliament. 
As will be established, this was not an easy feat, as many in the community regarded this a 
violation of the social order and role definition that characterises Maasai identity. This makes 
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clear the connection between socialisation as a process within informal institutions, and 
attitudes towards women as actors in the space of politics and formal institutions.  
Social structures and their normative environments can therefore be seen to play a big role in 
influencing positions of power and political behaviour. In their assigning of roles, defining 
logics of acceptable conduct and determining consequences, these environments distribute 
power in ways that promote either equality or subordination. My research therefore delves into 
power relations and socio-normative structures as key factors in the determination of women’s 
political agency. As a unit of analysis, the Maasai community provides an informative lens into 
the relationship between Kenya’s patriarchal culture (Nzomo, 1997; Kimani, 2014) and policies 
on politico-institutional transformations intended to promote gender parity. 
Studies on women in the Maasai community have tended to take on a socio-cultural dimension 
into position, power, and gender relations in the private and public spaces (Spencer, 1993; 
Hodgson, 2001; Kibutu, 2006). It is important to note however, that the Maasai public space 
that has been widely researched is one which Ekeh (1975: 92) characterises as primordial. This 
is because it is a public sphere constituted by private persons, in this case, members of the 
Maasai community, driven by interests of the community as an entity governed by socially 
shared but unwritten rules. Chapter two will expound on the nature of this public sphere.  
The traditional2public sphere thus differs from the civic public sphere, where persons come 
together not necessarily as members of a specific community, but as citizens under a certain 
level of state administration with codified rules and procedures. By investigating the agency of 
Maasai women in the civic realm therefore, this study highlights the normative relationship 
between members of the Maasai community and rules of the state. Most importantly, it sheds 
light on whether and how norms and practices in the traditional public sphere as an informal 
institution, influence attitudes and practices in the formal civic space (and specifically, the 
realisation of gender equality as a formal institutional goal).   
While the study takes on a civic-politico perspective, the scholarly body of socio-cultural 
perspectives plays an important role in our understanding of power relations and attitude 
 
2 The term ‘traditional’ is used here and throughout the thesis, with due acknowledgement of the debate on the 
legitimacy of what can be regarded as truly traditional due to colonial and post-colonial reconfigurations. Owing 
to this, political science and sociology discourses employ the term ‘neo-traditional’, as it encapsulates the 
deliberate revival of old norms, practices, and institutions in contemporary political contexts. In this study 
however, ‘traditional’ refers to that which respondents regard and present as such. It is therefore applied without 
engaging the contestation over culture and memory, but as an operating reality and reference point. However, these 
contestations are reflected in the questioning of the status quo, but its underlying mechanisms remain beyond the 
scope of analysis in this study. 
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transfer that ultimately determine Maasai women’s political agency. These studies have 
demonstrated the differentiated positions occupied by Maasai men and women, as well as the 
gendered role definition that shapes the community’s organisation structure. I therefore 
approach the analysis into Maasai women’s political agency with the understanding that norms 
and power relations are gendered, a perspective that guides studies on institutions from a 
feminist perspective (Goetz, 1998; Ostrom, 1999; Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Mackay et al., 
2010; Krook, 2010 and Lovenduski, 2011 among others).    
1.5 Rationale for the Study 
In Gender, Justice, and the Problem of Culture among the Maasai of Tanzania, Hodgson (2017) 
notes that contemporary expressions and experiences of justice are informed by legacies of 
certain colonial policies, as well as national and international initiatives. Within the scope of 
this study, legislative and constitutional amendments on gender equality constitute these 
initiatives. For the Maasai, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya is yet another opportunity to redefine 
power relations and influence perceptions towards the political agency of women. The reality 
of this is explored in the context of public participation under devolution, as provided in Chapter 
11 of the Constitution. 
Citizen participation under devolution is operationalised in the framework of the 2016 County 
Public Participation (CPP) Guidelines. These guidelines focus on four areas of public 
participation: legislative process/policy and law making; planning and budgeting for county 
public services; implementation/delivery of county public services and performance 
management and oversight through monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning.   
In this study, the analysis of public participation is limited to participation in planning and 
budgeting for county public services.  This focus aligns itself with the objective of the study, 
by allowing for an investigation into whether the budgeting process is gender responsive. The 
Kenyan National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) notes that budgets ‘‘have the 
potential to either increase or reduce the burdens and/or vulnerabilities of different social groups, 
or to improve their capacities and capabilities’’ (NGEC, 2014: 1). This is because, participation 
in public service deliberations provides a platform where citizens can be initiators of discourse 
on their development needs, as opposed to the other three areas of participation which take 
place post-initiation by agencies of the county governments. Gender responsive budgeting 
therefore involves enhanced accountability and responsiveness to commitments on reducing 
gender inequalities (NGEC, 2014), which are key contributors to achieving gender parity. 
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For the Maasai therefore, participating in planning and budgeting provides a platform for 
political interaction among men and women. By design, this process opposes the gendered role 
definition that characterises the Maasai social order, through its equal distribution of power 
over decision making to both men and women, as opposed to just men. While this contributes 
to the achievement of equality as envisioned, it also becomes subject to resistance, as the 
empirical evidence will later demonstrate. I am therefore keen to investigate how, and to what 
extent, contextual realities contribute to gendered political inequality among the Maasai, and 
how these determine participation in the political sphere in view of gender equality legislation. 
In answering the research questions, this study contributes to the field of legal sociology. This 
is realised through the provision of empirical evidence on the influence of legal norms on social 
change, and how agents, their interests and culture converge to either promote or derail 
institutional transformation. By using the case of Maasai women in Kenya, I am guided by the 
understanding that their documented historical marginalisation from political affairs, which will 
be explored in-depth in subsequent chapters, makes them resourceful subjects in checking on 
the power of law to influence social norms. In presenting a single story on the matter, I am 
guided by the assumption that clarity of a subject matter is sometimes best observed from a 
least-varied locus. Even though the study focuses on one community therefore, it sheds light on 
the patriarchal political scene in Kenya (Kimani, 2014) as well as other similar communities 
across Africa with similarly gendered socio-political structures. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The different arguments in this study are interconnected in their focus on understanding how 
the current constitutional provisions on equality influence the political agency of Maasai 
women. However, they each interrogate different concepts, to make clear the connection 
between formal and informal norm structures and how they influence the political agency of 
women. This will be made clear from chapters five to seven, where the empirical evidence from 
focus group discussions and interviews are presented. 
Overall, the study is presented in eight chapters. In the next chapter, I discuss the processes and 
mechanisms of influencing social norms in institutional set-ups. This discussion is grounded on 
feminist institutionalism, with its focus on formal and informal institutions and how their 
respective normative environments influence gender relations. The chapter therefore sets the 
pace for understanding how societies operate in determining attitudes and behaviour towards 
gender equality. Chapter three follows this discussion, by providing a detailed description of 
the methodology employed in carrying out this research. The chapter explains the rationale 
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behind the recruitment of respondents, the different methodologies employed for the different 
groups of respondents, and the data analysis process. 
In chapter four, I adopt a historical perspective to explore the debate on gender equality in 
Kenya. I outline the journey towards the institutionalisation of gender equality in the country, 
as influenced by pre-colonial set-ups, and the subsequent colonial and post-colonial state 
policies on the political representation of women. Included in this narrative is how the different 
policies have influenced the position of Maasai women against that of their men as political 
actors in Kenya.  
From the outcome of this historical probe, I proceed to chapter five where I explore the 
challenges and barriers that Maasai women face in political participation. The chapter therefore 
demonstrates how their exclusion in political affairs is located within the global debate on socio-
cultural as well as institutional realities that shape gender norms and politics of presence in the 
civic public sphere. The chapter presents the political agency of Maasai women as the outcome 
of a normative environment whose dictates on appropriateness and the ensuing consequences 
in case of violation make it increasingly difficult for the women to find a voice in the political 
realm. Further, challenges within formal institutions make it difficult for women to claim or 
exercise their political rights in a manner that would offset unfair socio-cultural norms.  
Bearing in mind the reality presented in chapter five, chapter six investigates how the 
constitutionally mandated public budget participatory process influences the representation, 
inclusion, and political participation of women. It demonstrates how formal and informal 
institutional norms merge to influence the agency of women in the realm of politics, defying 
Habermas’ (1989) claim on the neutrality of the public sphere. The chapter achieves this by 
evaluating how the public participation exercises are actualised, and whether these mechanisms 
contribute to the political empowerment of Maasai women.  
Chapter seven explains the discrepancies between policy and practice on gender equality in 
Kenya. Through the lens afforded by the experiences of the Maasai, it sheds light on why and 
how policies interact with actors and interests to influence the operationalisation and outcome 
of policy actions. In so doing, it investigates the effectiveness of social engineering, understood 
as the promotion of desirable norms by legal structures, as a pathway to achieving gender 
equality.  
In chapter eight, I summarise by presenting major findings of the study, and how these highlight 
inadequacies in Habermas’ (1989) assumptions on the nature of the public sphere. The chapter 
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shows how these inadequacies link women’s political agency to the debate on universalism 
versus cultural relativism, as influenced by the interconnectedness of norms and practices in 
formal and informal institutions. In the end, I draw key conclusions on how the reproduction of 
gender inequality through cultural reproduction necessitates engagement by institutionalists 
with behavioural change scholarship, to enrich our understanding of formal and informal norm 
functions, and their role in institutional transformation. I also highlight the need for further 
research on why and how male dominance persists, despite various legislation and the global 
trend towards equality. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INSTITUTIONS, NORMS AND GENDER  
In this chapter, I focus on how gender norms configure and are configured within institutions. 
Norms are hereby understood as rules with ‘‘some degree of binding authority over actors’’ 
(Meyer, 2008: 791). The discussion therefore explores how different norm environments 
interact: how actors and their actions influence individual decisions on public participation. 
Situated in the Kenyan political context, the terms ‘public’ and ‘public participation’ take on 
the definitions provided in the 2016 County Public Participation guidelines. Public therefore 
refers to ‘‘residents of a particular county; professional associations; community based 
organisations; and rate payers of a particular city or municipality’’ and public participation is 
the interactive process ‘‘where individuals, governmental and non-governmental groups 
influence decision making in policy, legislation, service delivery, oversight and development 
matters’’ (CPP, 2016: vi). The premise of this purpose-driven action is to promote increased 
public engagement in decision-making processes under a devolved governance structure.  
The adoption of a decentralised form of governance in Kenya provides a platform for 
representation and inclusion of different social groups in decision making processes. 
Decentralisation, as a governance tool, is driven by the assigning of functions previously 
conducted from a central point, to lower level sub centres, with the underlying logic that ‘‘it 
enlarges subnational participation in decision making over interventions, and consequently 
enhances their local relevance and citizen participation in implementation’’ (Nyanjom, 2011: 
2). Chapter six delves deeper into the decentralisation discourse, while looking at the realities 
of this in Kenya, where devolution, as a form of decentralisation, is operationalised.  
Of great importance to the debate on the promotion of equality, is the argument by Johnson 
(2001) that, as both a goal and outcome of decentralisation, public participation at the local 
level can lead to improvements in self-identity and worth, helping to break down customs of 
inequality and discrimination. This is for example captured in Nanivadekar’s (2006) report on 
changes in self-esteem among Indian women from seeing one of them serving in local 
government. Mackay (2008: 133) however warns that the inclusion of the marginalised might 
just be a spin on ‘‘politics of recognition’’ that ignore ‘‘politics of redistribution’’ as far as 
power and resources are concerned. Successful inclusion is therefore dependent on a tight 
coupling between the formal adoption of new rules and ‘‘institutional practices, norms, and 
outcomes’’ (Mackay et al., 2009: 254). The setting of new rules is, by itself, decidedly 
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insufficient to ensure inclusion and meaningful engagement of targeted social groups. 
Normative structures that condone or even propagate their exclusion need to be reconfigured as 
well. 
Section one of this chapter thus begins by exploring the debate on the gendered nature of 
institutions, and how this perpetuates power inequalities between men and women. I then 
unpack the discourse on the setting of formal rules geared towards reconfiguring gender norms. 
The discussion continues in section two by highlighting the importance of incorporating gender 
as a category of institutional analysis. In section three, I focus on the interconnectedness 
between formal and informal institutions and their rule sets, and how these shape attitudes and 
behaviour towards equality. Ekeh (1975) notes that this interconnectedness is embedded in the 
strategic positioning of individuals as public actors in ways that perpetuate the concentration of 
power in a particular group of agents. As I will show in chapters six and seven, this perspective 
is crucial in understanding power relations among the Maasai, which helps make sense of the 
attitudes and reception patterns towards constitutional norms on gender equality within the 
community. This discussion is followed by the development of a conceptual framework for 
analysing the interconnectedness between formal and informal institutions in section four, to 
explain the point of departure in exploring the political participation of women under study. 
Section five concludes by explaining why I choose to adopt a micro level perspective to 
understanding  the dynamics of gender and politics. 
2.1 Gender in Institutions 
As alluded in chapter one, the social construction of gender signifies differences and power 
relations between men and women. Mackay et al. (2010) expound that gender operates at the 
interpersonal level, as well as being a feature of institutions and social structures in which 
individuals find themselves. This is especially evident when we consider institutions as ‘‘rules, 
norms and strategies adopted by individuals operating within and across organisations’’ 
(Ostrom, 1999: 23). Understood this way, institutions span formal and informal parameters, as 
determined by the rules in use in a particular context.  
Terming institutions as gendered in the political realm therefore means that notions of 
masculinity and femininity are intertwined in political institutions (Ostrom, 1999). 
Consequently, efforts at reforming institutions require an understanding of how these notions 
of masculinity and femininity influence gender relations, to (re)produce inequalities that 
necessitate change. Dominant discourse on these transformation efforts revolves around the 
deliberate creation of spaces where women can exercise their agency in environments that 
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promote equality. The adoption of legislative amendments to promote the political agency of 
women has thus become the most common form of institutionalising gender equality. The 
operationalisation of this in Kenya will be explored in chapter seven. 
According to Platteau et al. (2017), the use of legislative amendments to reconfigure gender 
equality can be understood as a process of social engineering. They describe this to be the 
deliberate use of legislation to promote a change in social norms and customs that work against 
the interests of a certain group of people. Legal parameters introduce incentives for compliance, 
in what Benabou and Tirole (2011: 1) refer to as the practice of ‘norms based interventions’ 
that signal a change in societal values.  In the context of gender equality therefore, social 
engineering efforts are geared towards the promotion of the equality status of women, in a bid 
to address the negative consequences of their historical marginalisation. Chapter seven 
evaluates the outcome of this approach in Kenya and specifically among the Maasai. 
Setting quotas has become the most common approach towards promoting women’s equality 
by increasing their representation in political spaces. So critical is their role in promoting gender 
equality, that Mansbridge (2005:622) consents that ‘‘significant representation by gender 
cannot be achieved in any existing polity without some form of quota.’’ Numbers provide a 
pathway to first of all achieving descriptive representation, while at the same time setting the 
pace for substantive and symbolic representation as described in chapter one.  There is evidence 
that the creation of quotas and special seats for women shifts attitudes towards the acceptability 
of women as political agents (for example by Tamale, 2001 and Tripp, 2001 on Uganda). This 
symbolic representation is especially important in societies that grapple with patriarchy and its 
effects on the perceptions and position of women in leadership. Beyond politics, visible female 
leadership also improves the status of women at the household and immediate community level, 
as evidenced by a study on Rwanda by Burnet (2011). 
The formation of critical alliances for the politicisation of gender issues (Sacchet, 2008) is at 
the heart of the ‘critical mass theory’ which is grounded on the belief that ‘‘greater numbers of 
women in politics are required before individual female legislators can begin to ‘make a 
difference’ in gendered policy debates’’ (Childs and Krook, 2008: 734). Gender quotas are 
therefore increasingly seen as an important instrument to achieve balanced gender 
representation in politics. Quotas have become instruments of fast-tracking the inclusion of 
special interest groups such women into the political sphere, by acting as exogenous shocks 
(Baldez, 2006) that loosen entrenched norms that associate men with politics.  
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Their application has however not escaped criticism, with debates focusing on whether it 
matters more to have additional women in parliament than having greater participation by 
women within local government structures where they can interact more directly on matters 
directly affect their lives (Kabeer, 2005). An insistent focus on numbers also means that quota 
systems are subject to manipulation in order to sustain the status quo. As Baldez (2006) notes, 
party leaders might find quotas preferable, as they would be able to handpick candidates. Citing 
the case of India, Nanivadekar (2006) details how the introduction of gender quotas at the local 
level has given space to many political activists, but also allowed male politicians to step aside 
for their close relatives. As a consequence, the quotas have created a conducive environment 
for state-driven feminism characterised by proxy women representatives at local government 
bodies. 
These experiences reify concerns that women elected through quotas may not pursue women-
friendly agenda (Krook, 2006). Additionally, they confirm concerns by Baldez (2006) that 
gender quotas can work to strengthen undemocratic candidate selection processes within 
political parties. By so doing, the new women entrants are forced to play by the old rules, 
frustrating reforms within political parties, and strengthening the status quo. The wider effect 
of this on the political agency of women is that quotas contribute to the delegitimization of 
female politicians as political actors (Krook, 2006), even in cases where they get into political 
office through traditional candidate recruitment processes. 
The alluded interconnectedness between political agency and power relations points to the 
social and relational nature of agency. As Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 973) point out, agency 
is centred on ‘‘the engagement (and disengagement) by actors of the different contextual 
environments that constitute their own structured yet flexible social universes.’’ Chapter five 
delves deeper into the conversation on gendered norms and political agency. The successful 
implementation of a social engineering process geared towards the promotion of agency 
therefore requires an understanding of individuals’ experiences within the different 
contexts at play. Merry (2003a: 381) emphasizes that legislative amendments require 
institutional environments ‘‘in which those endeavoring to exercise rights, and thus 
redefining their previous relationships, find positive reinforcement for this change.’’ The 
affordance of platforms where women could challenge power relations therefore offers an 
informative starting point into an understanding of the relationship between agency and 
institutions, in both their formal and informal guise. An understanding of this interaction is key 
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in shedding light on the mechanisms of reproducing gender inequality in the Kenyan political 
environment. 
The debate on principles of equality and representation reveals the deep normative institutional 
barriers to gendering institutions (Krook, 2006). This means that equality cannot be approached 
without due consideration for rules, practices and norms that characterise and govern formal 
and informal institutions. Promoting the political agency of women thus necessitates reforms 
and cooperation between these institutions, to ensure that there is positive reception and support 
for the increased representation of women.  For this reason, Krook (2006) opines that the 
continued focus on resources and motivations versus abilities and qualifications to explain the 
underrepresentation of women is insufficient. She explains that this perspective fails to consider 
the influence of institutional norms and practices that impede women’s political agency, even 
where they have the necessary qualifications and additional motivation to serve. As Platteau et 
al. (2017: 19) expound, ‘‘the process through which victims of unfair customs can change the 
perception they have of themselves’’  is crucial in social engineering. Change can therefore not 
be achieved only from ‘external’ efforts. Equality debates can therefore not be comprehensively 
tackled without interrogating the influence of both formal and non formal normative 
environments.  
This realization has allowed for the proliferation of institutionalist perspectives, to incorporate 
the important role that institutions play in influencing the political agency of women. With the 
understanding of institutions as rules and norms that individuals abide by (Ostrom, 1999), this 
study conceives institutionalism as ‘‘a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the 
relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and change’’ 
(March and Olsen, 2005: 4). In this regard, institutions generate notions of order, which then 
influence the actions of political agents, thereby defining their roles. Depending on the point of 
focus, institutionalism can take on different forms, as will be discussed shortly. 
2.2 Institutionalist Perspectives on the Political Agency of Women 
Arguably any good institutionalist should realise the importance of gender 
relations to the configuration of institutions. (Lovenduski, 2011: vii) 
By allowing for a greater understanding of the co-constitutive nature of politics, new 
institutionalism allows for the incorporation of the crucial value of gender relations (Mackay et 
al., 2010), especially how actors influence change in institutions, and how the institutions then 
use rules, norms and policies to influence actors’ behaviour. Following March and Olsen, 
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Lovenduski explains that new institutionalism allows for the consideration of actors’ roles and 
interests in specific institutional contexts, thus offering ‘‘a conceptual toolkit that includes 
formal and informal institutions, critical junctures, path dependence, feedback mechanisms, 
logics of appropriateness, and, more recently, institutional convergence and layering’’ 
(Lovenduski, 2011: ix).  
Meyer (2010) further explains that institutionalism can either take a realist or phenomenological 
form: in the realist form, the assumption is that actors are autonomous from the limitation of 
institutional rules that could be the source of either empowerment or constraint. On the other 
hand, phenomenological institutionalism acknowledges that actors and their activities can be 
constructed by institutionalised systems (Meyer, 2010). This study takes on the 
phenomenological form of institutionalism, as it is shaped by the reality of institutional norms 
and their influence on individual attitudes and behaviour, which in this case relate to gender 
equality. 
Other than being either realist or phenomenological, institutionalism can be categorised as 
either old or new, with new institutionalism expanding the definition of institutions beyond 
organisations, structures and formal rules, as is characteristic of old institutionalism. New 
Institutionalism falls into three broad categories of historical, sociological and rational choice 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996), with differences in perspective stemming from the subjects ‘‘whose 
behaviour is being structured’’ (Steinmo, 2008: 126 in Lovenduski, 2011: x).  
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as ‘‘the formal or informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political 
economy’’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 6). For historical institutionalists, interest lies in the 
structure of institutions and their outcomes, focusing on the macro level. Most scholars of 
gender and politics align themselves with this approach, for reasons that will be explained in 
the next subsection. Conversely, rational choice institutionalism argues for the centrality of 
individuals and their strategic calculations (Koelble, 1995). Rational choice institutionalists 
thus view actors as calculative, seeking to maximise their individual preferences. As chapters 
five, six and seven will demonstrate, political agency as exercised by Maasai women is guided 
by a logic of appropriateness that defies a rational choice perspective. Accordingly, Mackay et 
al. (2009: 255) emphasise that institutional forms must be analysed in terms of the ‘‘culturally 
specific ways that they take on particular forms,’’ and not in terms of their rationality and 
efficiency. 
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Sociological institutionalism focuses on political interactions that link the micro with the 
macro-level (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The definition of institutions under this approach 
goes beyond formal rules, to include norms and procedures, as well as cultural scripts to guide 
appropriate behaviour (March and Olsen, 1989). Sociological institutionalists thus recognise 
the interactive character between individuals and institutions. This approach captures the 
essence of this study where, even though I am interested in the experiences of equality by 
Maasai women as a collective group, I seek to achieve this by understanding individual 
experiences juxtaposed against social norms in the Maasai community and legal norms of the 
Kenyan state. 
In this analysis, I follow Lovenduski to conceptualise institutions as the configurations of ideas 
and interests which are expressed as the ‘‘formal rules, compliance procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure relationships between individuals in various units of the polity 
and the economy’’ (Lovenduski 2011: viii). This view on institutions allows for the 
consideration of both formal and informal practices, and their influence on individual behaviour 
and responses towards their environment. An analysis of women’s political agency is therefore 
enriched by recognising that institutional rules, norms and practices play a role in shaping 
gendered institutional configurations.  
The adoption of institutionalist research strategies by feminist scholars therefore adds gender 
as a concept of institutionalism, thereby gendering institutionalism by enabling the 
understanding of the embeddedness of gender in the formation and sustenance of political 
institutions (Lovenduski, 2011). This is especially important when one considers that in itself, 
‘‘gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as two 
significantly different categories, men and women, and organising social relations of inequality 
on the basis of that difference’’ (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004: 510). Recognising the gendered 
nature of institutions thus allows for an understanding of power relations, a dimension that is 
not made explicit in other institutionalist approaches. Chappell and Waylen (2013) explain that 
gender operates within institutions nominally and substantively: Nominal operations are 
characterised by men’s historical and continued power dominance in politics, while substantive 
operations are linked to gender biases, informed by social norms on acceptable notions of 
femininity and masculinity. This makes gender a crucial aspect in the study of institutions, 
necessitating an approach that incorporates both. 
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2.2.1 Feminist Institutionalism 
Feminist Institutionalism is a neo-institutionalist approach that focuses on "how gender norms 
operate within institutions and how institutional processes construct and maintain gender power 
dynamics’’ (Lowndes, 2010: 65). It conceptualises gender as deeply embedded in the formation 
and sustenance of political institutions. I therefore adopt this approach in order to incorporate 
both perspectives of gender and institutions in achieving the objective of this study. Mackay 
(2008) highlights that feminist institutionalism is an especially useful perspective in the study 
of institutions, because male dominance has resulted in the reinforcement of masculinist 
ideologies as conventional gender-neutral norms and practices. As a result, the masculine nature 
of institutions is blanketed, making it difficult to realise existing gender gaps. A focus on norm 
functions within institutions is therefore important, since the unequal power relations in society 
are reflected, reinforced and structured within institutions to inform gender regimes (Krook and 
Mackay, 2011). To adequately understand and explain institutional power relations therefore, 
it is imperative to incorporate a gendered lens. 
Feminist Institutionalism allows scholars to contribute to political studies in two broad ways: 
explaining gendered outcomes including the current state of affairs and predicting future 
developments on identified gender regimes (Lovenduski, 2011). Lovenduski highlights that 
both contributions require the acknowledgement of context specifity, evidence collection and 
analysis, and a theorisation of political relationships which are, according to feminists, gendered 
in a way. Using evidence on the gendered nature of politics among the Maasai, I highlight my 
contribution to this body of political studies in chapter eight. 
As part of new institutionalism, feminist institutionalism is also subjected to the theoretical and 
methodological divisions in the field (Findlay, 2012). While feminists disagree on whether the 
sociological, historical and rational choice approaches of new institutionalism are equally 
promising, many show preference for historical institutionalism (Lovenduski, 2011), because 
of its adaptability in explaining gendered outcomes in different contexts as sought by feminist 
scholars. The crucial matter however remains that not realising the value of gender relations in 
the configuration of institutions ‘‘risks ignoring crucial elements of ideas, interests, rules and 
processes, portents and causes of change and instances of agency, and hence impairs the 
institutionalist project’’ (Lovenduski, 2011: ix). How then can the impairment of institutionalist 
projects be avoided? I argue that the answer to this is to be found in the sociological view of 
new institutionalism. 
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By showing how repeated acts in interaction over time characterises institutions, sociological 
institutionalism effectively incorporates a historical underpinning. Mackay et al. (2009) note 
that sociological institutionalism concepts and ideas cross over to the other strands of 
institutionalism, helping to widen their scope of definition to incorporate norms, culture and 
informal practices. By incorporating the shared interaction between formal and informal 
institutions, sociological institutionalism allows for the conferment of ‘‘the same theoretical, 
empirical, and methodological status to both kinds of institutions’’ (Krook and Mackay, 2011: 
11). Considering Maasai men and women as actors in contemporary political institutions, 
sociological institutionalism, in its phenomenological form, allows for the acknowledgement 
of the fact that there is a prior exogenous historical origin to their institutional context, as posited 
by Meyer (2008). To understand these institutional contexts requires an exploration of 
isomorphism and decoupling processes within them. 
In analysing the formal structure of institutionalised organisations, Myers and Rowan (1977: 
346) point out ‘‘technical and exchange interdependencies’’ structure organisations to match 
their environments. Within the framework of feminist institutionalism therefore, isomorphism 
‘‘describes the process through which an organisation adopts features from other organisations 
in its institutional environment, often in an attempt to counter uncertainty and gain institutional 
legitimacy’’ (Mackay et al., 2009: 257-8). In the context of this study, this refers to the 
constitutional provision for gender equality in Kenya, as part of the global institutional 
legitimisation trend mentioned in chapter one. The institutionalisation of this trend in Kenya 
incorporates all three forms of isomorphic processes (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991): mimetic by 
copying other countries and being on the right side of the global agenda; coercive by obliging 
all public institutions to adopt gender equality principles; and normative by setting out 
minimum requirements such as the two thirds gender rule, as the minimum requirement for 
adherence to gender equality. As chapter six will demonstrate, policies and practice are not 
directly proportional, underscoring that institutions might be formally reflective of their 
environments, but differ in actual practice.  
The lack of coupling between policy and practice thus ‘‘enables organizations to maintain 
standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical 
considerations’’ (Myers and Rowan (1977: 357). In the context of gender equality legislation 
therefore, decoupling explains ‘‘how local authorities can adopt far-reaching equality policies 
that appear to have little impact in practice, namely that the relationship between policy and 
implementation is weak’’ (Mackay et al., 2009: 258). This will be discussed in detail in chapter 
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six, where I analyse the implementation of gender equality in participatory budgeting processes, 
as operationalised under devolution in Kenya. According to Meyer and Rowan (1991), a weak 
relationship between policy and implementation is the result of conflicts and loss of legitimacy 
from attempts to control and coordinate activities within institutions. Gender equality 
provisions might therefore remain largely symbolic and loosely coupled to other institutional 
goals, or even face resistance in implementation.  
The combination of isomorphism and decoupling as sociological institutionalism concepts 
therefore enriches the evaluation of gender policy against daily practice, which improves our 
understanding of the opportunities and challenges that Kenyan women face in their exercise of 
political agency. Incorporating sociological institutionalism into feminist institutionalism 
makes up for the shortcomings of the other institutionalist strands that narrowly conceptualise 
rational actors and formal institutions and practices. It is however important to note that on its 
own, sociological institutionalism is insufficient at tackling core issues of gender, power and 
change. Nevertheless, its adoption allows for the systemic identification and tracking of norms 
and cultural factors that are key in gendering institutions and practices within them (Mackay et 
al., 2009: 254). This makes sociological institutionalism a functional fit in this study, the core 
of which is to investigate the influence of culturally mediated gender norms on legal norms of 
equality in political engagement processes. 
2.2.2 Navigating the Inadequacies of Feminist Institutionalism 
While feminist institutionalism has clearly made significant contributions to gender and new 
institutionalism research, it still remains incapable of comprehensively tackling the 
constellation of matters related to inequality, power and change in socio-political environments. 
This is especially evident in an analysis such as the one in this study, where actions by and 
among individual actors are evaluated to make sense of institutional realities. Findlay (2012: 3) 
points out that feminist institutionalism exhibits three weaknesses: ‘‘its analysis of power, its 
conceptualization of change and agency, and its insular point of reference.’’ This criticism is 
also levelled at sociological institutionalism, as it also does not account for clashes and 
contestations of power among actors that have competing interests. Mackay et al. (2009: 260) 
argue that sociological institutionalism can be criticized for ‘‘tending toward a functionalism, 
which assumes a cohesive set of group norms, erasing or subsuming tensions, conflicts, and 
inequalities concerning gender.’’ This functionalism is evaluated in this study, through the 
focus on the reproduction of norms, and how they shape the composition of the public space, 
as well as notions of acceptable conduct therein.  
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Findlay expounds that while a focus on the micro and meso levels of institutions are a strength 
of the feminist institutionalist approach, it also is a source of weakness. This is because feminist 
institutionalism fails to engage with wider power structures, problematizing the understanding 
of marginalised social relations that include gender. This is a step away from early feminist 
work which factored in the macro level, through the lens of patriarchy and institutionalised 
male power, to consider gender equality as systemic and structural (Findlay, 2012).  
By aligning with new institutionalism and simplifying this structural analysis, feminist 
institutionalism departs from the crux of feminist political science, which is a comprehension 
of how power functions. The consequence of this, Findlay notes, is that feminist institutionalism 
finds itself focusing mostly on description over analysis, without answering the ‘why’ question. 
To avoid this simplification, I incorporate an analysis of norm formation and propagation, 
which reintroduces the patriarchal lens, to provide empirical evidence on how the political 
dominance of men is institutionalised.  After all, Kenny and Mackay (2009) argue for the 
modification of institutionalism, if scholars are to understand the institutional gendering process 
more deeply. 
On conceptualising the relationship between state institutions in terms of change and agency, 
Findlay (2012) notes that feminist institutionalism regards institutions as significantly 
autonomous. This contrasts society-centred perspectives such as pluralism and neo-Marxism 
which assume that actions of the state are driven by social forces, state decisions reflect the 
power of dominant forces in society, and that political institutions are almost never independent 
in shaping policy and political outcomes (Smith, 2008 in Finlay, 2012). Viewing institutions as 
independent drivers of change thus separates the state from the society in which it operates. As 
chapter seven however demonstrates, there is not much autonomy between state and society. 
Instead, constructions of gender are intertwined in the daily life of institutions, which makes it 
difficult to separate state agency from the influence of society. This phenomenon will be 
expounded on in the following sub-section. 
Further, in uncovering how institutions are gendered, feminist institutionalism regards the 
institutions as tools and mechanisms at women’s disposal (Findlay, 2012). The assumption here 
is that women have options and can engage in forum shopping to find an institutional 
environment that suits them. Forum shopping is the ‘‘practice of choosing the most favourable 
jurisdiction... in which a claim might be heard’’ considering such factors as ‘‘the convenience 
or expense of litigating in the forum…the probable or expected sympathies of a potential jury’’ 
and rules in use (Maloy, 2005: 27). 
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Chapters six and seven however counter the notion of institutions as tools and mechanisms 
available to women. Evidence shows that the logic of appropriateness remains subject to the 
much stronger consequences of non-compliance, as exhibited in the social costs of disregarding 
power structures in an individual’s immediate (informal) institutional environment. In the 
conclusion of this study, I explore perspectives that could be incorporated into feminist 
institutionalism, to promote its engagement with feminist political science, a strategy Findlay 
(2012) argues is necessary for remedying feminist institutionalism’s lack of diversification of 
influences. 
Despite its weaknesses, feminist institutionalism is undoubtedly critical in understanding 
women’s political agency, due to the combined benefits of institutionalism and feminism. 
Institutionalism enables us to capture continuity and change dynamics, which then allows 
feminist findings to better highlight contributions to political science. On the other hand, by 
introducing gender as a category of analysis, feminism enriches institutionalist analysis by 
allowing for a better theorisation of the gendered nature of formal institutions, the importance 
of informal institutions, and the power relations within and across both formal and informal 
institutions (Krook, 2010).   
As this study focuses on women’s participation at the local level, employment of feminist 
institutionalism offers an effective approach to understanding how formal and informal 
institutions interact to influence attitudes and behaviour towards women’s equality, and how 
this interaction then shapes the relational space in which women exercise their political agency. 
However, like Kenny and Mackay (2009) I am also convinced that institutional approaches 
need modification in order to highlight the process of gendering and re-gendering institutions. 
This is especially important in this study, where institutionalism alone does not sufficiently 
highlight the role of individuals and their varied interests within institutions, and how these 
shape their attitude and behaviour as part of both formal and informal institutions.  
Since the discussion has so far hinted at the important role that norms play in institutional 
settings, I take this as an invitation for the incorporation of an analysis of norm functions.  
Waylen (2018) notes that feminist institutionalism is increasingly interested in the operation of 
gendered norms as key components of informal institutions, as they influence political 
behaviour. This can be seen in the works of Chappell and Waylen (2013) who recognise the 
pervasive importance of informal rules and norms around gender, in debates on the promotion 
of gender equality. We can therefore not explain the effect of formal rules, as chapter seven 
seeks to do, without a better understanding of informal norms and practices. As both formal 
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and informal institutions are governed by different norm sets, I probe how norms operate in 
either sphere, how they shape attitudes and behaviour, as well as the subsequent power relations 
that determine the position of women. 
2.3 Formal and Informal Norm Functions 
As suggested in the discussion on institutions, norms can be classified as either formal 
(stemming from state laws), or informal (as dictated by customary norms). In practice, formal 
norms govern both formal and informal institutions, a function that informal norms do not carry 
out. A norm originating from the state is thus described as ‘‘a social norm interfacing the formal 
institutions of society with the informal ones’’ (Licht, 2008: 716). Generally therefore, 
promotion and adherence to what is legal, i.e. from formal institutions, is considered to be right 
and therefore desirable for individuals under the jurisdiction of these institutions. As for 
informal norms, they also signal what is desirable and right, but the effect of their application 
ultimately remains subject to the provisions of formal norms. Decoupling however points to the 
disparity between policy and practice (Mackay et al., 2009), and as chapter seven will highlight, 
the presence of formal norms does not always overrule informally mediated practices. 
Individuals develop attitudes and behaviour per norms promoted by both formal and informal 
institutions in their societies. This shapes a way of life, largely determined by an individual’s 
demonstration of belongingness to a community and respect for its institutional environment. 
Roland (2004) however points to a major difference between the two types of institutions: 
formal institutions are fast-moving, as legal rules could even change overnight, while informal 
institutions - norms, beliefs and culture - are relatively slow to change. Even though both 
institutions play a big role in shaping societal norms therefore, their flexibility in response to 
change influences the pace of attitude and behavioural change among individuals. 
Licht (2008) further elaborates that informal institutions are characterised by self-enforcing and 
repetitive rules whose content is considered common knowledge, and where social actors share 
similar values. These shared values are what then constitute social norms, which combine with 
shared beliefs and symbols to develop a culture. In the informal setting, private citizens observe 
each other’s behaviours, inviting sanctions and rewards which are however not verifiable by 
the government (Benabou and Tirole, 2011). These values and norms therefore act as a source 
of motivation and justification for action, with behaviour consistent with the norms signalling 
acceptability and vice versa.  
Notions of acceptability influence not only agency in the realm of informal institutions, but also 
attitudes in approaching formal set-ups. This makes political socialisation a product of 
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transmitted preferences and beliefs which are shaped by culture, hereby understood as 
‘‘customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation” (Giavazzi et al., 2013: 1257). However, additional personal 
experiences through different forms of exposure sometimes differ from behaviour learnt at 
home (Fernández and Fogli, 2005), and it is the synthesis of the enculturated and personal 
experiences that shapes individual belief systems. 
The slow pace at which culture changes however means that in the face of globalisation and 
modernity, culture continues to have a great influence on the attitudes and behaviour of 
individuals. In their assessment of cultural barriers to women’s leadership, Norris and Inglehart 
(2000) find that even after controlling for social, structural and political institutions, culture 
continues to maintain a significant influence on the proportion of women parliamentarians. This 
is echoed by Fox and Lawless (2011), who emphasise that traditional gender socialisation 
patterns remain one of the fundamental barriers to women’s representation. Attitudes and 
behaviour towards political affairs are therefore formed early in life, due to the internalisation 
of socialisation patterns as true and inherent in society (Kivoi, 2014). Women’s political 
exclusion is thus rooted in these social processes like gender socialisation, which influence 
political attitudes (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010).  
The political agency of women however transcends challenges of the private realm, as it is also 
determined by the culture of the civic space. In the formal realm, the enactment of laws is 
adopted by policy makers to signal good values, and their promotion, an advancement of the 
common good. An individual’s behaviour is therefore observed and verified by the government, 
through the enforcement of laws. However, the law ‘‘is not merely a price system for bad and 
good behaviour, it also plays an important role in expressing and shaping the values of 
societies’’ (Benabou and Tirole, 2011: 1). Through mimetic and normative isomorphic 
processes, it acts as a reflection of wider societal preferences, thereby shaping and reshaping 
norms and moral sentiments. In their expressive nature and through proper enforcement 
therefore, state laws carry the potential to influence what is considered socially acceptable 
(Kenny and Patel, 2017).  
The value of this potential is especially important in the discouragement of norms considered 
harmful to special interest groups. Often within the framework of human rights, such deliberate 
attempts are considered a form of ‘‘social engineering’’ (Platteau et al., 2017: 1) as will be 
explored in chapter seven. Legislative amendments to promote the political rights of women in 
Kenya can therefore be regarded as an attempt at re-engineering societal attitudes toward the 
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political agency of women, by deconstructing the social meaning of political action as 
inherently masculine.  
However, demographic and attitudinal factors have differing effects among men and women 
(Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). Studies on the impact of pro-women legislation have 
additionally established that laws generate ‘‘complex and indirect effects’’ especially when 
they touch on factors not targeted for change (Platteau et al., 2017: 16). The introduction of 
gender equality as a desirable norm is therefore bound to elicit heterogeneous reactions, 
considering the different power positions occupied by men and women as chapters six and 
seven will demonstrate. In such environments, attitude change could come about from either 
respect for the law, or the overall desire for behavioural change (Kenny and Patel, 2017) 
depending on individual traits and institutional mechanisms in place. 
When amendments are targeted at slow-to-change informal norms, compliance with the 
attitudes and behaviour being promoted ultimately depends on sanctions and incentives (Bilz 
and Nadler, 2014). This shows the interconnectedness of formal and informal normative 
environments, which, as this study will demonstrate, influences responses and ultimately the 
coupling of policies with actual practice. 
For a deeper understanding of the co-existence between formal and informal institutions and 
how norms function therein, I employ Ekeh’s (1975) inquiry on the relationship between the 
private and civic spheres in the context of post-colonial African countries. With this, I hope to 
make clear how individual attitudes and behaviours are influenced by their dual reality as 
members of a single community3as well as citizens of a country. 
The case of two publics and the institutional reproduction of norms 
Ekeh (1975) highlights that over the years, the private and public realms have been 
characterised as sharing a common moral foundation. This generalised western notion, he notes, 
cannot be applied in the African context where there are in fact, two public realms that have 
different moral linkages with the private realm. These are, ‘‘the public realm in which 
primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments determine and influence an individual’s public 
behaviour….and a public realm which is historically associated with colonial administration 
and which has been identified by popular politics in post-colonial Africa’’ (Ekeh, 1975: 92). 
Ekeh elaborates that the primordial shares the same moral imperatives with the private realm, 
 
3 In the context of African countries such as Kenya, this belonging is mainly defined along an ethnic identity. 
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while the civic public, is amoral in that it lacks the moral imperatives that operate in the private 
and primordial public realms. 
Individuals in the primordial public thus make contributions which are considered moral 
obligations to benefit the individual as a member of a particular public. Of particular interest in 
this scenario, is that the individual may give materially, but benefits are intangible and 
immaterial, in the form of ‘‘identity and psychological security’’ (Ekeh, 1975: 171). This 
description of the primordial public reflects Meyer’s explanation of the phenomenological 
nature of an institution, as one whose environment ‘‘operates more as a cultural or meaning 
system, penetrating actors far beyond their boundaries and constructing agency, identity, and 
activity (Meyer, 2010: 3). 
From this phenomenological nature, one can deduce a pattern of enculturation in the way that 
the primordial public is able to maintain governance of appropriate and expected conduct. This 
is structurally different from the civic public, which places great emphasis on economic value, 
chiefly because of its amoral nature. Also, characteristically different in the civic public is the 
fact that individuals seek to gain from it, without the moral urge to give back, as is the case in 
the primordial public. Ekeh explains that this is informed by the myth of abundance in the civic 
public, in contrast to a need for care and protection of the primordial public. Considering the 
value derivation from either public therefore, it is to be expected that individuals evaluate their 
actions against the expected outcomes and consequences thereof. 
This existence of separate sources of norms points to the reality of separate codes of conduct, 
or what could be considered as legal structures. The two publics are governed by different legal 
norms, introducing a plurality that could either promote or undermine the goals of either realm. 
In the context of this study, a key outcome of the interaction of these publics is socio-economic, 
cultural and institutional challenges to the political participation of Maasai women. As the 
forthcoming discussions will demonstrate, the Maasai social organisation and power structures 
perpetuate the exclusion of women from political processes, fuelling inequality. This is in line 
with the observation by Sage and Woolcock (2012: 3), that ‘‘the norms and procedures of many 
customary or traditional justice systems raise real concerns about gender equity, human rights, 
due process, and capture by the traditional elite.’’ One can therefore foresee a challenge in the 
alignment of the state-sponsored gender equality goals among the Maasai. 
However, hybridity in the source of governing norms does not always signify conflict. As Adler 
and So (2012) highlight, there is little conflict when the social, administrative and statutory sets 
of norms align; conflicts arise when there is competition between the sets of norms, and parties 
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base their claims on different normative orders. Even though the functional reality of this 
plurality and its effect on gender equality will be explored in chapter seven, I would like to 
point out here that it is not unthinkable that decision makers in the non-state realm maintain 
influence in the state realm, due to the masculine nature of both publics. The masculinisation 
of the Kenyan state will be discussed in the next chapter. 
This background is very important to the understanding of attitudes and behaviour towards 
gender equality that will be explored later. The possible absence of a tight coupling between 
formal and informal institutional norms means that government intervention, through social 
engineering, does not always translate to a positive outcome in changing attitudes of the public. 
In Rwanda for example, despite the country’s high score in achieving political gender parity, 
there is a crisis in the lived reality of gender equality legislation. Rwandan men complain that 
the political empowerment of their women is a threat to their masculinity (Kagaba, 2015), while 
women in high political positions contend with being powerless at home where they have to 
abide by expectations of their occupation and adoption of subordinate behaviour (Warner, 
2016). This draws attention once again to the variety of experiences due to the heterogeneity of 
agents in their value systems and interests, as will be explored in chapters six and seven. 
Considering the relationship between norms, expectations and interventions described so far, I 
now focus on positioning the political agency of women in this dynamic system of formal and 
informal institutions, with their differing viewpoints on the equality principle. 
2.4 Women’s Political Agency in the Kenyan Institutional Landscape 
As highlighted in chapter one, Kenya’s new constitutional provision on gender equality is 
grounded in the protection and promotion of women’s socio-political rights. Austen and 
Mavisakalyan (2016) argue that constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination 
formalises the individual and collective rights of women. This bolsters their exercise of agency, 
especially when there is a provision of platforms to exercise their voice. In Kenya, these 
platforms are in the form of public participation forums where citizens engage in decision-
making processes that articulate their socio-economic development needs. For women therefore, 
the benefits of a Constitution include equal opportunities for participation and access to political 
and public service positions.  
Being citizen-centred, the framework adopted in this study incorporates policy feedback as the 
consequence of actions by both state and individuals. As Bratton (1999) highlights, institutions 
are aggregates of individual preferences based on certain values and attitudes, which then 
impart on institutional culture. As part of institutions, individuals are socialised into collective 
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norms which they adopt as their own, through institutional rules and incentives for conformity. 
Analysing political participation therefore calls for understanding the complementary nature of 
attitudes and institutions (Bratton, 1999). 
According to Lovenduski, the first step in constructing institutional analysis is ‘‘mapping the 
formal architecture and informal networks, connections, conventions, rules, and norms of 
institutions’’ (2011b: x). The framework outlined in Figure 2.1 below, therefore incorporates 
attitudes and preferences as mediated by socio-economic conditions, as well as political 
interests, which happen to be gendered. These conditions and interests act as inter-dependent 
variables that influence the effect of public participation processes. Kenny (2014) emphasises 
that research must go beyond acknowledging the existence of gender bias in institutions, to 
identify gendered institutional processes and mechanisms, and what their gendered effects are. 
I outline these processes in Figure 2.1, factoring in agents, institutions and processes of political 
agency in the Kenyan context. 
I argue that public policies establish a political environment that shapes attitudes on the 
suitability of women as political agents. These government policies are informed by public 
demands for change as mediated by social movements, interest groups, and political parties. 
Once in place, public policies have a direct effect on the very attitude environments that were 
responsible for their adoption in the first place, denoting what I term as a primary feedback 
process. These have to operate alongside socio-economic realities particular to individuals 
involved. 
The opportunity for individuals to participate in political processes can therefore have effects 
on their socio-economic status, through the benefits of exposure and networking afforded by 
political participation processes. At the same time, outputs from participation processes can 
influence the political environment, by prompting revisions on policies relating to recruitment 
and styles of engagement. I consider these two to be secondary effects, and even though 
necessary to note, they are beyond the scope of analysis in this study. 
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This framework fits into feminist institutionalism by providing a lens into gendered power 
relations and the processes that influence them. In this regard, it fulfils the feminist 
institutionalist goal of identifying institutional change as shaped by changing gender relations, 
enabling a modelling of causality (Lovenduski, 2011). By placing ‘effect on women’s political 
participation’ at the centre, this model incorporates the outcome of the interaction between the 
law and social and institutional hierarchies. This process, which I later discuss as social 
engineering in chapter seven, determines the impact of legal policies on gender equality, 
thereby influencing the success of feminist institutionalism. 
This model guides the approach I adopt in engaging with the study and the presentation of 
empirical findings. 
 
 
 
Policy Agenda Political Participation Process 
e.g. - Voting 
- Attending public 
deliberations and debates 
- Involvement in political 
parties 
Outcome of political 
participation process 
Effect on Women’s Political Participation 
- Attitudes towards women as political 
agents 
- Political participation by women 
- Support and election of women 
candidates  
 
Contextual Realities 
- Economic status 
- Educational attainments 
- Political socialisation 
- Gender socialisation 
patterns 
- Personal traits e.g. 
cognitive ability 
Political Environment 
- Participation frameworks 
e.g. Constitution  
- Political parties 
- Interest groups 
Primary feedback process 
Secondary feedback process 
Figure 2.1 Model of women’s political participation 
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2.5 A ‘Microscopic’ Point of View 
…focusing on women parliamentarians, as individuals or groups, or even on 
parliament as a whole, does not enable a full appraisal of the complex policy 
process and multiple actors involved in contesting, negotiating and delivering 
substantive gains for women. (Mackay, 2008: 128) 
Unlike most works on feminist institutionalism, this study uses this institutionalist lens on 
individuals at the local level. This is a unique perspective from other studies that employ 
feminist institutionalism, which focus of candidate selection, party politics and representation 
in national parliaments (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: Matland 
1995; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Krook, 2010 among others). The study therefore provides 
a distinct perspective into the interaction of formal and informal institutions, at the level which 
informs socio-cultural norms and attitudes that are transferred to parties (where norms are 
shaped and mediated), and ultimately, representation in legislature.  
By focusing on the context of individual and group norm formation, this study aligns with 
sociological institutionalism by revisiting the idea of context-bound rationality as presented by 
Mackay et al. (2009). It also links itself to scholarship on behavioural change, which 
acknowledges the role played by norms and systemic biases (Waylen, 2018), offering new 
insights into gender and politics.  
Instead of researching how the top is formed, this research contributes to the knowledge of what 
informs the formation at the top.  Since political institutions are constituted by daily social 
practices of gender norms, the recognition of the reciprocal relationship between formal and 
informal institutions opens up possibilities for agency and change (Krook and Mackay, 2011). 
These possibilities then influence attitudes and behaviour towards the political participation of 
women, as well as experiences of individual women in political participation.  
While the research is fuelled by the desire to check what effect the Constitution as an institution 
has on citizens, I position this in the context of a primordial space with a strong structural 
background. I am interested in checking whether and how a change in rules influences 
normative systems and beliefs to (re)shape political environments. In the following chapter 
therefore, I describe the approach adopted in collecting this evidence from the Kenyan Maasai. 
 37 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLIGAL APPROACHES, APPLICATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 
This chapter outlines the approach adopted in conducting this study. As characterised by its aim, 
design and methods, the study is qualitative in nature. The qualitative aspect is defined along 
the differentiation offered by Creswell (2009), between quantitative and qualitative research. 
Instead of using numbers derived from close-ended questions as would be the case in a 
quantitative study, I use words to present data collected from open-ended questions. These 
questions then invite answers to meet the objectives outlined in the first chapter.  As Van 
Teijlingen (2014) points out, in addressing the ‘why’ question, we explore the purpose, context 
and meaning of phenomena. The exploration of human interactions in decision making 
processes is therefore bound to produce a narrative, ruling out the value of statistical data 
collection methods. Though mainly qualitative, the study however accommodates quantitative 
data whenever necessary, especially in the examination of quantifiable measures of compliance 
with constitutional mandates on equal representation. 
A qualitative approach allows for exploration in a manner that affords a deeper understanding 
of phenomena through the detailed description of findings. This affordance is useful in 
answering the first question of this study; how institutional norms and practices influence the 
agency of women in public/political spaces. This is because qualitative research is an inquiry 
process into social or human interactions through the construction of a holistic picture as 
informed by natural settings. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) note that the outcome of this inquiry 
process enables researchers to make sense of phenomena from the meanings they attach to them. 
Additionally, an in-depth qualitative approach allows for the uncovering of the informal 
dimension of political institutions (Kenny, 2014). This allowance enriches the engagement with 
question number two; how perceptions of women’s political agency are influenced by gender 
equality legislation on women’s decision-making authority. Explored through public 
participation, this question interacts with both formal and informal institutional norms, and how 
they influence the political agency of Maasai women. 
In the following section, I explain the rationale behind the choice of study subjects and research 
design. This is followed in section two by details on the approaches adopted in data collection. 
I then justify the sampling techniques applied, especially in phase one of the field work exercise. 
The outcome of this is shared in section four, with section five detailing the process of data 
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analysis. In section six I conclude the chapter with reflections on my experiences in the field 
work exercises and analysis process. 
3.1 Rationale for Selected Approach  
Certainly, there are limits to which findings from single case studies can be 
related to other settings. Yet while feminist institutionalists are sceptical about 
the prospects for generating a sort of “general theory of politics,” they remain 
interested in identifying common causal mechanisms (of power, of continuity, of 
change), which we can then explore in other contexts…These causal processes 
are often most visible at the level of single case studies, where we can see the 
ways in which the gendered rules of the game (both formal and informal) play 
out on the ground. (Kenny, 2014: 682) 
Focusing on Maasai women as subjects in one community among the more than 40 found in 
Kenya qualifies it as a case study. Adoption of the case study approach is informed by the added 
value of the design in developing new hypotheses and addressing causal complexity (George 
& Bennet 2005). Creswell (2014) further notes that a case study allows for the exploration of 
processes, activities and events. Studying the political participation of Maasai women interacts 
with all these aspects of a case study, especially in the examination of mechanisms and 
platforms of political engagement as outlined in questions two and three.  
By its very nature, a case study comprises more ‘‘details, richness, completeness, and variance 
– that is, depth – for the unit of study than does cross-unit analysis’’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 301). 
The ability to elicit in-depth knowledge is crucial especially when seeking to understand actors 
and their actions within institutions. In the study of gendered political institutions, Kenny (2014) 
emphasises that a case study enables the understanding of the complex ways in which gender 
plays out in different political institutions. To be able to do this within the specificity of an 
ethnic community further deepens our understanding of gendered political relationships 
(Lovenduski, 2011), refining the outcome of this study as grounded in feminist institutionalism. 
Adopting this approach therefore enriches my study on the political agency of Maasai women 
as a process that takes place within gendered institutions, both formal and informal. Being 
among the pioneering in-depth works on the political agency of Maasai women,4a case study 
 
4 Most studies on the Maasai are limited to the role of gender in matters relating to socio-economic and cultural 
rights, focusing on pastoralism, land use, and rites of passage. 
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approach gives room for the elaboration of causal mechanisms that influence the political 
agency of the women.  
It is important to point out that the use of a qualitative case study is adopted with due respect 
for the criticism that case study findings are not generalisable, which arguably limits their 
contribution to scientific development. The generalisability of findings, according to Myers 
(2000), is the degree to which they can be indiscriminately extrapolated from a study’s sample 
to an entire population. However, using the example of Wissenschaft, German for Science, the 
literal translation of which is ‘to gain knowledge’, Flyvbjerg (2011) deconstructs this non-
generalisability stance. He argues that generalisation is just one way of knowledge gain and 
accumulation, and the un-generalisability of knowledge does not bar its entrance into the 
collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or society. The legitimisation of 
scientific inquiry through formal generalisation, he reiterates, is limiting. He therefore points 
out that a purely descriptive study can be of great value since even though the knowledge may 
not be formally generalisable, it is transferable.   
Transferability here describes the extent to which findings can be applied beyond the context 
in which the study was done (Malterud, 2001), affording them external validation. This is 
especially true in this case whereby, even though the Maasai community is widely regarded as 
deeply patriarchal, its socio-cultural set up is very similar to that of the Samburu and other 
communities in Kenya and Africa at large. As chapter four will elaborate, patriarchy has played 
a key role in the political marginalisation of women in Kenya. Findings from this study can 
therefore inform the study of women’s agency in patriarchal communities, and even allow for 
partial generalisations which Myers (2000) argues may be possible for populations that are 
similar. Additionally, feminist institutionalists also contend that single case studies present the 
most visible forms of the causal mechanisms of power, continuity and change, within which 
formal and informal gendered rules play out (Kenny, 2014). Focusing on the Maasai therefore 
allows for an in-depth analysis of gendered dynamics of the transformation of political 
institutions, the outcome of which can be useful in the dynamic research on gender and politics. 
3.2 Data Collection Tools  
To achieve the objective set out in chapter one, I relied on multiple sources of data, both primary 
and secondary. Chappell and Waylen (2013) point out that in-depth interviews and participant 
observation are key methodological approaches to understanding how formal and informal rules 
support and contradict each other. For this study, I adopted interviews and observations to 
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collect primary data, while secondary data was collected from published files, documents and 
online reports.  
• Documents 
Public policy planning and implementation involve the creation of a variety of documents 
which can be used for programme evaluation. While the documents themselves are not the 
object of analytical interest, they serve as a source of information (Stockman, 2008). As written 
evidence, their use saves on time as no transcribing is required (Creswell, 2014). This approach 
was used to gather data on legal frameworks, policy plans and reports on gender equality. These 
included the guidelines on public participation, frameworks for gender equality in citizen 
engagement and legal rights and responsibilities of both citizens and government agents in 
public participation. Publications by scholars in the fields of development studies, governance 
and gender studies were included to position and either validate or negate presented findings.  
• Online reports 
These were mainly used to collect background and general information whenever it was 
necessary to supplement observations on ongoing debates. This was especially useful in getting 
up to date information on the ongoing debate on the yet-to-be-realised two thirds gender rule in 
Kenya. Applying receiver-based judgement on the accuracy, objectivity and trustworthiness of 
the sources (Metzger, 2007: 2078), I relied on online newspaper reports as well as policy briefs 
and responses from institutions focused on the gender equality debate. This ensured credibility 
while easing data collection on the status of the socio-political dynamics of this debate in 
Kenya. Their reliability is therefore comparable to print media which is subjected to 
professional review. Still, I used online sources, not as bases for my arguments or perspectives 
for analysis, but rather as supplementary sources of information to situate my arguments.   
• Interviews 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) as well as narrative and biographical interviews were applied 
in the study. I used narrative interviews to gather information from county government officials 
and local politicians in both Kajiado and Narok counties, while engagement with citizens was 
through nine focus group discussions (see list of respondents in Appendix V). These two 
approaches, Harrell and Bradley (2009) point out, provide in-depth information and are best 
placed to resolve any conflicting information, as they allow the researcher the opportunity to 
address them as and when noted. Being present allowed me to seek clarifications as well as 
probe for detailed information whenever necessary. 
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Through their pedagogic function, focus groups enable collective engagement which promotes 
dialogue. This leads to the achievement of a higher understanding of ‘‘issues critical to the 
development of a group’s interests and/or the transformation of its existence’’ (Kamberelis & 
Dimitriadis, 2011: 546). Use of focus groups in engaging citizens was therefore the best 
approach to gaining insight into the socio-cultural dictates of Maasai women’s public 
participation. I made sure that individuals compared and contrasted their experiences, to 
promote individual reflection and minimise ‘group think.’ This shed light into marginalisation 
as a collective experience, but one that was actually shaped by different individual and 
relational realities. As summarised by Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2011: 547) therefore, focus 
groups offer ‘‘unique insights into the possibilities of critical inquiry as deliberative, dialogic, 
democratic practice that is always already engaged in the distribution of economic, cultural and 
social capital.  
Particularly important for this study, is the fact that, by giving space to individual voices, focus 
groups allowed Maasai women, as traditionally marginalised political agents, to share their 
experiences in a space that promoted free dialogue. This was also facilitated by the use of both 
Swahili and Maa in the discussions, easing articulation and allowing for clarification. Details 
on how this worked out will be discussed in section 3.6. I acknowledge that my presence in a 
designated space instead of the natural public setting might have elicited biased responses, but 
I consider these biases as true representations because designated spaces provide freedom which 
is absent from natural settings where certain logics may be applied to comply with societal 
codes of conducts. Chapter six provides more detail on this.  
When interviewing county government employees and ward representatives, I used narrative 
interviews. Through their unstructured characterisation, narrative interviews emerge from a 
respondent’s situational context through cross examination (Muylaert et. al. 2014). By their 
nature therefore, they encourage informants to discuss something in a way that does not separate, 
but rather implicates them in the events under study. This technique, Bauer (1996) points out, 
gives a more valid perspective of the informer as there is minimal influence by the interviewer. 
This approach was useful in distinguishing policies on citizen participation against practice as 
administered by the government officials. I was able to get information on daily operations, 
including the challenges experienced and navigation strategies employed, which in most cases 
differed with reports from FGDs. More details on these issues will be discussed in the upcoming 
empirical chapters. 
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With the aim of capturing their personal experiences, I used biographical interviews in my 
conversation with women in political positions, both aspiring and elected. This was aimed at 
understanding their gendered experiences from engaging in a male dominated environment. As 
Roberts (2002) notes, remaining close to the experiences and views of the researched is a key 
feature of qualitative research. By including individual experiences and interpretations, 
biographical interviews aid in the understanding of major social shifts. This is because, Robert 
highlights, by giving insight into the cultural and structural setting, individual accounts 
introduce specificity to societal changes. Women politicians embody the challenges that women 
face in their quest for political inclusion since, unlike the rest of the women, they have chosen 
not to limit their political activity to sporadic public participation forums. Their narratives 
therefore provide a much deeper and clearer insight into the realities of women’s political 
engagement.  
Like in any method of inquiry, the cultural contexts within which questions and answers are 
understood can introduce challenges to a study. A researcher therefore needs to be able to 
understand the contexts from which respondents understand questions and answer them, which 
I was able to achieve in my position as both a Kenyan and member of the Maasai community. 
• Observations 
I employed observation as an instrument to capture and document participation exercises. As 
Creswell (2014) points out, observations give first-hand experience with the participants, 
allowing for the exploration of topics that may have been difficult for participants to discuss. 
Observations were therefore used as an insight into the engagement of women in public affairs 
through the participatory budgeting processes. My objective was to cross check with reports on 
the conduct of public participation forums from the focus group discussions and interviews with 
government officials. I therefore keenly observed the ‘air time’ women get, how many are 
actually selected to speak against the demonstrated wilfulness to participate, how they 
participated in the discussions, how men responded to their participation and the incorporation 
of their ideas in the outcome of the forum.  
This approach presents a limitation however, in relation to the significance respondents place 
on their actions, as this can differ from the researcher’s, raising questions on the validity of the 
observations made. Another challenge, Stockman (2008) points out, is that the object of 
observation continually alters during observation and since there could be multiple activities at 
a time, an unobserved incident becomes missed information. This was the case in my 
observation of women’s participation in group discussions, where I could not monitor all four 
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‘break-away’ groups5in the Loitokitok County Integrated Development Plan forum. I had to 
move from one group to another, which presented the risk of missing certain participation 
behaviour and/or responses. Nevertheless, I believe the fifteen minutes spent at each break-
away group provided sufficient information to validate my observations. 
3.3. Location and Sampling 
In their formation of attitudes and behaviour, socialisation processes influence individuals’ 
responses to questioning. This is common in surveys, where respondents are likely to answer 
according to what they perceive to be the expected response, and not really what they really 
think or feel. Stockman (2008) therefore warns that answers to questions asked may not always 
reveal the true value of the feature of interest. This is true for Maasai women, whose different 
geographical locations and socio-economic realities afford varied forms of exposure, which 
plays a big role in differentiating meanings and value assigned to political participation. Hence, 
I mitigated this challenge by collecting data from multiple sites across the two counties under 
study. Hine (2007) points out that a multi-sited approach allows for the pursuit of alternative 
ways of formulating the objects of study. I therefore collected data from Kajiado South and 
Kajiado West Constituencies in Kajiado County and Narok East Constituency in Narok County 
(see Appendix II on the administrative units in the research areas). 
To allow for in-depth discussions, I focused on specific areas that were more accessible in terms 
of geographical location and recruiting of respondents. Data was collected in three phases. In 
the first phase, from March to May 2016, I focused on getting answers on barriers to the political 
participation of Maasai women, and the mechanisms of their engagement in public participation 
forums. These discussions informed the evaluation of the effectiveness of public participation 
in promoting engagement and breaking barriers to the political inclusion of women.   
I collected data from three locations: Loitokitok Sub-County in Kajiado South, Ewuaso Kedong 
Ward in Kajiado West, and Keekonyokie Ward in Narok East. The reason why I focused on 
one higher level administrative level in Kajiado, Loitokitok Sub-County, as opposed to a Ward, 
is because my respondents were individuals that are politically active, and therefore easier to 
mobilise to discuss public affairs. Additionally, Loitokitok is my home area, making it easier 
to identify respondents that would be readily receptive and available for the focus group 
discussions. 
 
5 In order to discuss all the questions in Appendix III, participants were split into four smaller groups. More details 
on this forum are discussed in chapter six. 
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Convenience and judgement sampling were therefore adopted in Kajiado South. Respondents 
recruited under this approach are deemed knowledgeable on the topic (Harrell and Bradley, 
2009), and their selection is informed by the researcher’s knowledge of the individuals. 
Respondents were therefore selected from Rombo, Kuku and Entonet Wards which are close to 
the sub-county administrative town of Loitokitok. All the discussions took place at the African 
Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) office in Loitokitok town. 
Cluster sampling which focuses on one geographic area (Harrell and Bradley, 2009) was 
adopted in Kajiado West, where respondents were exclusively from Ewuaso Kedong Ward. The 
choice on this ward was informed by its proximity to Ngong town in Kajiado North 
Constituency. Ngong town is culturally diverse, being home to different social and ethnic 
groups. It is also just outside the Nairobi metropolitan zone,6and the key trade centre for 
residents of Ewuaso Kedong. I therefore chose the location in order to check whether the 
diversity of the ward’s geographic and trading neighbour has any influence on the attitudes and 
approaches to the engagement of Maasai women in public affairs. I met all three groups of 
respondents in Kimuka, Ewuaso Kedong Ward, at the home of a distant relative who, together 
with the wife, assisted in mobilising respondents from the area. 
The same sampling technique was adopted in Narok East, where respondents were drawn solely 
from Keekonyokie Ward. In addition to being close to Narok town where the headquarters of 
the Narok County Government is located, the area is one of the largest wheat farming zones in 
Kenya. It therefore provides a good case for studying whether engagement in large-scale 
economic activities and proximity to administrative headquarters have any effect on attitude 
towards power sharing between men and women, as well as information flow and service 
delivery from the county government. All discussions with the respondents took place at a small 
restaurant at the Nairagie-Enkare shopping centre. 
Even though the study places a lot of significance on women, I gave considerable focus on men 
because I believe that the pursuit of institutional transformation can only be effectively 
approached through collective engagement with all stakeholders.  In addition, I share 
Hodgson’s (2001) view that to fully understand women’s actions and ideas, the same must be 
examined in relation to those of the men in that society. Oyewumi (1997) further points out that 
while it is important to discuss impacts on specific groups of people, gender relations are not 
 
6 Some argue that it is part of the Nairobi metropolitan zone, due to the connectivity in trade and transport. 
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sum-zero. Effects on women can therefore not be separated from those on men as the two are 
intimately bound. This is especially true in gendered political environments, as is the case in 
Kenya and the Maasai community.  
Except for the first group of 12 female respondents in Loitokitok, all groups had eight 
respondents. Eight in the women only groups, eight in the men only groups, and a ratio of 1:1 
was applied in the eight-member mixed groups. The aim of this approach was twofold; to check 
on the degree of openness to discussion by women under different lenses (whether they 
responded differently in women only and mixed groups), and how the political agency of 
women was described by men and women in the singular and mixed group settings. 
A noteworthy outcome of this approach was how women reported on their political 
participation in the different focus groups; in the women-only groups, the discussions tended to 
be more critical of the government and the men, giving the impression that operations were far 
from being acceptable. In contrast, women in the mixed focus groups reported a neutrality7that 
pointed to there being an operational balance in how women were included in political affairs. 
Responses from men also tended to be non-critical, except for the few who either openly 
opposed the inclusion of women in political affairs on either religious or customary grounds or 
expressed dissatisfaction with women’s inclusion in political processes. 
The second phase spanned from January to March 2017, where I captured experiences of ward 
administrators and officials from departments tasked with issues of citizen participation, gender 
and culture in both counties. Narrative interviews were employed in the understanding of the 
dynamics and experiences of citizen engagement and gender relations from an organisational 
and policy perspective. Specifically, I investigated the mechanisms in place to ensure gender 
equality, how the public responded to these, and what efforts the governments were making to 
ensure equality and citizen-led development as envisioned by the Constitution. 
I also interacted with women representatives and one female political aspirant. The plan was to 
interview more aspirants, but it was difficult to secure appointments as they were preparing for 
the August 2017 general elections. The political campaign period also made it impossible to get 
an appointment with a key informant, Ms. Peris Tobiko, the first elected Maasai woman 
parliamentarian. Nevertheless, I managed to interview the Women Representatives from both 
counties, whose biographical narratives shed light on their political experiences. These 
 
7 With the exception of the mixed focus group in Loitokitok, which involved women that are actively involved in 
public affairs in different capacities. 
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experiences captured their journey towards political office, political campaigning, and the 
challenges in performance and delivery as women occupying reserved seats in the national 
assembly. 
The final phase effectively utilised the observation method, when I attended the 2017-2022 
Kajiado County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) forum. The organisation was such that 
the forums took place in one location at each of the five constituencies. I therefore attended the 
forum in my constituency, Kajiado South, which took place on 4th December 2017 at the 
Loitokitok Social Hall. A key area of interest was the composition and operation of the citizen 
forums, which allowed me to cross-check information provided by both citizens and 
government officials in the previous data collection phases. I therefore checked on the 
timeliness of notifications, breadth of notification outreach, location and capacity of the event 
venue, how individuals contributed to the process, and most importantly, respect for gender 
equality in the public participation process.  
 
Members of the public at the 2017-2022 Kajiado County Integrated Development Plan forum at the Loitokitok 
Social Hall. Photo taken on 04.12.2017. © Author. 
It was not possible to attend any CIDP forum in Narok County, as the timeline between public 
announcement and the main event made it impossible to travel from my university in Bayreuth, 
Germany. The announcement was made in The Standard newspaper and the county website on 
Monday 12th February 2018, with the forums scheduled for Wednesday 14th to Friday 16th. In 
Keekonyokie Ward, my study area in Narok East, the forum took place on Thursday 15th 
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February at the Nairagie Enkare Catholic Church. Despite my absence, I had a phone interview 
with a gentleman who attended the meeting in his capacity as a neighbourhood security 
chairman.  
3.4 Data Generated and Analysis 
The application of the qualitative methods above yielded nine focus group discussions, three 
from each location. Twenty-six women and twenty-four men participated in these discussions. 
The plan was to have an equal number of men and women, but as earlier mentioned, the first 
group discussion with women from different parts of Loitokitok Sub County had 10 participants 
instead of the eight throughout the rest of the discussions. A total of fourteen narrative 
interviews and three biographical interviews were also recorded. An unforeseen telephone 
interview to replace a planned observation brought the total number of respondents I interacted 
with to 93 as outlined in Appendix V.  
For ease of analysis, I transcribed all the information in English. Despite the unavailability of a 
transcription notation system capable of accurately and comprehensively providing a narrative 
of the original performance (Kowal and O’Connell, 2014), f4transkript was used for the English 
interviews. This way, the study limited itself to transcribing only the spoken words in the data 
collection exercise, leaving out how those words were spoken and any non-verbal aspects, as 
the other mostly relied upon components of qualitative analysis (Kowal and O’Connell, 2014). 
This bias is appropriate for the purposes of this study whose focus is on the communicated 
perceptions, opinions and experiences of respondents. I wrote memos after each interview to 
capture emerging patterns and inform points of discussion for subsequent interviews, in order 
to get more information on a subject matter. 
Even though the use of computer software to assist with qualitative data analysis is argued to 
undermine ‘‘the essentially humanistic approach of qualitative research’’ (Gibbs 2014: 279), I 
primarily used MAXQDA in organising the data analysis. The software program supports the 
coding of data into themes and allows for comparison in different scenarios. This was especially 
important in this multi-sited study, as it facilitated cross-examination of recurring themes and/or 
any discrepancies thereof, from transcriptions of interviews and focus groups. The ease in 
organising, searching and retrieving data made the analysis process faster. Thematic data 
analysis allowed me to identify themes that were relevant to the research objectives, resulting 
in empirical chapters five, six and seven.  
To aid in the contextual interpretation of data from the focus group discussions, I additionally 
employed in-vivo coding, to ensure that meaning was drawn from participants’ voices. In-vivo 
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coding helps highlight the use of specific words and phrases in the interactions of participants 
from a particular culture or microculture, providing information that might otherwise be missed 
with the use of other coding methods (Manning, 2017). Quotes from respondents used 
throughout the thesis were therefore chosen for their relevance to the identified themes, either 
as confirmations, deviations or contradictions. This approach gains more relevance in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
For data from the second and third phase however, I did not use MAXQDA. Instead, I analysed 
the data manually, which I found much easier especially because the guiding questionnaires 
employed in the narrative and biographical interviews (Appendix 1) already guided the 
identification of themes and sub-themes. In analysing these interviews and secondary data 
therefore, I adopted a qualitative content analysis approach, in order to contextualise feedback 
from the focus group discussions. A deductive approach to content analysis in the study was 
helpful in linking empirical findings to the feminist institutionalism framework. Mayring (2014) 
notes that the ‘content-analytical particularity’ aspect of qualitative analysis is a huge advantage, 
which is often overlooked in many quantitative contexts.  It was therefore useful in this study 
where, even though the study focused on one community, contextual realities differentiated 
reception, perception and practice on Maasai women’s agency. The process then highlighted 
how gender rules play out at both formal and informal institutional levels.  
Throughout the analysis, my interpretations were directed towards understanding what factors 
influence policy decisions, why actors behave the way they do, and how decisions are made.  
3.5 Verification 
Researcher biases and the reactivity of respondents are relevant threats to the validity of this 
study. Their relevance is occasioned by my inclination to select data that suits my position on 
the debate. Citizens and public officials could also provide information that could point to a 
direction they judge as positive either as a reflection of themselves or as a contribution to my 
research, even where the information might not necessarily be true. 
It was therefore important that I adopt strategies to ensure the validity of my findings. In certain 
instances, questions asked earlier would be reframed and asked later for clarity, and if need be, 
informants – especially public officials – would be asked to provide evidence of claims made, 
such as registers to verify women’s participation. In addition, during the interviews, a strategy 
of contrasting responses was employed, to verify the evidence provided and avoid 
misinterpretations or wrong assumptions. This was especially useful when dealing with 
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colleagues working together on matters of citizen engagement. The availability of transcripts 
of interview recordings helps to prevent misrepresentation of responses from my end. 
3.6 Reflections 
Due to the nature of the study as pertains respondent profiles, data was collected in three main 
languages: Maa, Swahili and English, depending on the convenience of respondents. 
Considering my basic command of the Maa language, I requested respondents to translate 
information provided in Maa to Kiswahili, to ensure that I did not misinterpret or lose out on 
any implied meanings. This was especially useful where words such as Elkirikoi were used. 
Generally, the word itself translates to wanderer, but in the context of women’s involvement in 
political affairs, it is used to mean prostitute. This tactic was however not well received by all 
respondents. In Ewuaso Kedong for example, the fifth FGD started off with an argument as to 
whose fault it was that my proficiency in the language was so basic that it necessitated 
translations. The men lamented that I am part of a generation that is abandoning their culture in 
pursuit of educational achievements. We discussed at length whose fault this was the parents, 
the education system or the increasing cultural diversity in previously predominantly Maasai 
regions like Ngong town. In the end, we agreed that even though it was an important matter for 
consideration, it was a discussion for another forum. They gladly obliged my request, and the 
interview went on smoothly. 
Cognizant of this and other issues that would come up, a few strategies were put in place to 
ensure that the discussions happened in an open and friendly atmosphere. In preparing for the 
fieldwork therefore, attempts were made to establish a good relationship with key informants 
and ‘gatekeepers’. These included leaders of local women groups, County Government officials 
and local politicians. An introduction letter from The National Commission for Science, 
Technology and Innovation was given to relevant stakeholders, specifically government 
officials, to provide disclosure on the purpose of the study, as well as establish legitimacy and 
foster cooperation. Consent forms were not necessary, but verbal consent was recorded, with 
the respondents’ identities being kept anonymous. We also agreed that the results of the study 
would be shared with the respondents. 
Particularly important to point out here is that my parents assisted in approaching informants 
outside of government, simplifying the recruitment process. As this exercise involved calling 
together older men, my father’s assistance provided an authority that made the exercise much 
simpler. Among the Maasai, it is not common that a child gets to speak to her parents’ age 
mates and their seniors on issues that question traditional authority and norms. Additionally, 
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the discussions touched on domestic affairs which are not only private, but also constitute 
‘inappropriate’ dialogue between myself and the age groups of most of my respondents.  
My father’s mediation, in his capacity as both an older Maasai man and a community mobiliser 
(through his professional activities in public health and in cooperation with non-governmental 
organisations), therefore ensured that men and women alike participated, regardless of age, 
education or occupation. With the women, mobilisation was additionally made easier by my 
mother’s position as a primary school head teacher and therefore known to many parents, as 
well as other women through networks from church and women groups’ activities. As a 
community insider, I was also better positioned to set up meetings at venues and on dates that 
would be less disruptive to everyday activities, and in an environment which supported the use 
of languages that informants (and myself) were comfortable with. This knowledge of local 
realities was useful in the setting up of interviews with the citizens. Knowing critical actors and 
gate keepers and how to approach them went a long way in not only securing quorum, but 
consent to provide (mostly) unfiltered information.  
My acknowledgement and respect for the social structure mean that I was not exempt from the 
normative structure of the Maasai community. By recognising what would be considered 
inappropriate, and therefore a possible cause of strain or even failure to my data collection 
exercise, I had to abide by the institutional culture on inter-generational communication. My 
knowledge on how to navigate the Maasai primordial public ultimately aided my understanding 
of how the civic public operates as it does, and what role the primordial public plays in this - a 
key element of this study. Ultimately, this helped me articulate the particularities of the ongoing 
institutional transformation of the political space in Kenya. Before outlining these findings, I 
provide a background to this transformation process in the next chapter, where I detail how 
Kenya arrived at a constitutional provision for gender equality.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONALISING GENDER EQUALITY NORMS IN 
KENYA 
This chapter contextualises the institutionalisation of gender equality in Kenya. A historical 
outlook on gender politics is important since placing politics in time helps to understand the 
emergence of a particular outcome (Kenny, 2014). In this study, the outcome that provides a 
point of departure is the 2010 Constitution and its focus on gender equality as a human right. 
Kenny emphasises that a historical perspective helps us understand how contemporary 
outcomes are shaped by the past, and how this process creates new opportunities, or closes off 
others, through continuous political contestations. 
Outlined in four sections, it begins by tracing the quest for gender equality from the struggle 
for independence to post-independence Kenya, the introduction of multi-party democracy in 
the early 1990s, and onto the present-day governance structure under a new Constitution. It 
therefore traces the configuration of women’s political agency, highlighting tactics ranging 
from deliberate exclusion and window dressing, to the inevitable adoption of gender quotas in 
a bid to reconfigure the gendered nature of public institutions in Kenya. Interwoven in the 
discussion are international agenda and movements in which Kenyan women were involved, 
and which then shaped their approaches to the fight for equality. Section two outlines the legal 
and institutional framework that governs gender equality rights, as informed by international 
agreements and treaties that Kenya is a signatory to, as well as the national constitutional 
framework. This is followed by a brief discussion on the current status of inclusion and equality 
in section three. Section four then summarises the interconnectedness between history, 
opportunities, challenges and responses to the institutionalisation of gender equality, and how 
these have influenced the equality status of women in Kenya.  The effect of different national 
policies on gender relations among the Maasai is incorporated in these sections, to highlight 
changing dynamics on the equality status of Maasai women. 
Summarily, the discussion highlights the effects of patriarchal norms, weak institutional 
mechanisms as well as shortcomings of the affirmative action agenda in Kenya. In fighting for 
equal rights for women, policy drivers have failed to engage women at all levels, the result of 
which is a gap in the position of women across the country. For Maasai women, this means that 
their engagement in political processes remains subject to customary norms on gender roles and 
power relations, due to the limited influence of formal institutional rules. 
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4.1 Historical Perspective 
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, women make up 
50.1% of Kenya’s population.8 However, political, economic and social considerations have 
limited their political influence in the country. Most women, especially in rural areas, play 
socio-economic roles that are mostly invisible (Gichuhi and Njeri, 2016) as men dominate 
decision making positions. This reality is shaped by patriarchal structures that concentrate 
authority on the men, with women expected to be submissive to this authority. Nzomo (1997) 
notes that with perpetuation over time, the constellation of gender stereotypes, male resistance 
to the political participation of women, limited resources and political structures and processes 
has significantly contributed to the under-representation of women in decision making 
processes and political positions.  
It follows therefore that Kenyan women still struggle to assert their agency in socio-economic 
and political environments. Theirs is a journey that has experienced many challenges, but one 
that has also introduced significant changes in the space occupied and role played by women in 
public affairs. According to Wambui (2016: 2) therefore, a look into Kenyan women’s political 
participation involves the unravelling of a complexity rooted in state structures, both historical 
and contemporary, ‘‘informed as much by colonialism, autocratic rule and recent democratic 
politics, as by social and cultural values steeped in patriarchy.’’   
In the following section, I analyse this complexity, by tracing the historical journey by Kenyan 
women for an increased role in the civic public sphere. 
4.1.1 Pre-Independence (up to 1962) 
In most African societies, history was, and in most cases continues to be, relayed orally instead 
of the more verifiable written context. Documentation on the status of women in pre-colonial 
Kenya thus began in the colonial era, through ethnographic studies on African communities. 
Incidentally, some argue that there was no place for women, with male councils of elders 
dominating, while others argue that some women had power, even over men (Owuor, 2016).  
Among the Kikuyu for example, Clark (1980: 358) reports that both ‘‘men and women, in their 
separate and overlapping, symmetrical and complementary tasks and activities, contributed to 
the political economy.’’ This came as a critique of observations that long distance trade and 
diplomatic missions required great mobility and were too risky for women. In countering this, 
 
8  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division 
http://countrymeters.info/en/Kenya Accessed: 03 01 2019 
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Clark (1980: 368) points out that Kikuyu women’s engagement in food processing and 
distribution made them ‘‘actors with control over resources vital in a system in which relations 
of production enter into political strategies and are built into the social relations of power.’’ On 
the other hand, literature on the Maasai community places high significance on male dominance 
and the inferior position of women (Llewely-Davies, 1981; Spencer, 1993; Coast, 2001 among 
others). A critical look into the community’s organisation however suggests that the complex 
social reality of the Maasai was not dominated by either sex, instead relying on a 
complementarity of roles (Hodgson, 2001; Spencer, 2003). Viewpoints on pre-colonial power 
relation can therefore be argued to be determined by informants and the interpretations of 
ethnographers in their relevant research communities. 
Among the Maasai, just like superiority and roles were defined along age and gender, so was 
political power. In the case of men, the trajectory was marked by their transition through age 
sets. Hodgson (1999) notes that women followed a similar path, gaining more power and respect 
through events in their lives.  Being mothers to warriors (morans) therefore earned them more 
respect as did their status as mothers-in-law, as this marked their increased contribution to the 
continuity of the society. Hodgson (1999) reports that women could initiate, attend and testify 
in legal proceedings, with their exercise of power being mainly indirect, through their sons and 
husbands. They could however openly share their opinions in gatherings that took place in their 
homes.  Even though men took on more roles in public administration, women, especially the 
elders and senior wives, retained direct authority over younger women and children. This was 
mainly through dispute resolution and maintaining peace at home and with other communities 
(Hodgson, 2001), in addition to negotiating their children’s marriage arrangements. 
Men and women therefore played key complementary roles, with each party having the 
autonomy to act based on mutual respect. Therefore, even though men were more present in the 
political sphere, women were central in rituals that marked life transitions, including birth and 
naming ceremonies, circumcision, age-set transitions for men, and peace ceremonies (Hodgson, 
2001). How then, did the influence of women become diminished? 
Colonialism and the Reconfiguration of Power 
The change in the status of women suggests an interference that reshaped power relations to 
magnify gender inequalities. Evidence of this is found in the effects of colonisation in Kenya. 
The indirect rule applied by the British colonial government allowed local African male leaders 
to redefine relationships and roles at the domestic level, especially in relation to the role and 
place of women in society. Wambui (2016) points out that in their position as local leaders, 
 54 
 
men facilitated the passing of discriminative laws which not only excluded women from the 
political space, but also subordinated them in the domestic realm. With power over the 
adjudication of customary laws, local chiefs and elders redefined customs to their advantage, 
especially in matters of gender roles, sexuality, marriage, divorce, adultery and property rights 
among others.  
Gender relations among the Maasai were not exempt from colonial reconfigurations. 
Customary rules of civic engagement and separation of powers among the Maasai can be traced 
to the incorporation of subjects into the state system under colonial administration. The pre-
existing complementary, interconnected responsibilities of men and women were divided into 
“spatially separated, hierarchically gendered domains of ‘domestic' and 'public/political' and 
the consolidation of male control over cattle through the commodification of livestock, 
monetization of the Maasai economy and targeting of men for development interventions” 
(Hodgson 1999: 43). This replaced communal land tenure by providing title deeds to male 
household heads, reflecting effects of policies such as the 1954 Swynnerton Plan aimed at 
intensifying the development of cash crop agriculture. 
Male political authority and economic control were reinforced through the expansion of bases 
of power and introduction of new forms of property relations. Hodgson (1999) reiterates that 
this led to the curtailment of access and participation in political decision-making processes for 
women, relegating them to the domestic concerns of home and homestead.  
Men’s political authority intersected with the advantaged economic position and patriarchal 
influences to perpetuate the disadvantaged status of Maasai women.  A lack of direct access to 
resources has thus affected the freedoms of expression and socio-economic development of 
Maasai women, limiting their capacity for action as chapter five will demonstrate. Colonialism 
therefore replaced the multifaceted property systems with a homogenous system of private 
property among the Maasai (Hodgson, 2001). Oyewumi (1997) reports on a similar outcome 
among the Yoruba of Nigeria, where the colonial system undermined the property rights of 
women and ignored their pre-existing role in public political decisions, as ownership rights 
shifted from being communal to private, and under male authority. In addition to not earning 
wages, women lost an avenue for wealth accumulation, spearheading present-day gendered 
wealth gaps. 
Further, the codification of customary law perpetuated and protected by the Native Authorities 
and Native Authority Courts in Kenya emphasised the authority of men and powerlessness of 
women (Wambui, 2016). This process disregarded pre-existing socio-political structures and 
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women’s positions in them, while at the same time ignoring challenges introduced by the 
colonial state structures. In reference to the case of the Yoruba, Oyewumi (1997) once again 
explains that there was nothing customary in the creation of customary law, since the British 
colonial government was ultimately the source of the codified customary law. Colonial 
administrators sought to develop a rational legal model guided by neutrality and consistency, 
by searching for ‘‘rules in each "culture" which they could learn, record, and then apply to the 
specifics of the various cases’’ (Hodgson, 1996: 109). They would therefore ‘‘at different times, 
for different purposes, acknowledge or deny the existence of contending non-state legal orders’’ 
(Porter, 2012: 166) by relying on elder men as figures of authority on culture and tradition. 
The exclusion of women in these processes allowed for the reinvention of laws to serve the 
interests of men, successfully masculinising the civic public sphere. It is in these codification 
processes that hybrid legal systems came to existence, characterised by the acknowledgment of 
governance under both state (new) and non-state (pre-existing) laws (Porter, 2012; Merry, 
2012). The influence of this plurality on gender equality legislation is explored in chapter seven. 
All these notwithstanding, cases of the active political role of women in societies across Africa 
is documented. With reference to the women in the Kingdom of Dahomey in present-day Benin, 
for example, Segueda (2015) explains that despite many hindrances and instances of 
discrimination in the pre-colonial era, women were complementary and not subordinate to men. 
The subordination of women came about from the organisation of colonial states. The 
imposition of taxes, for instance, forced men to seek jobs in settlers’ farms and urban areas, and 
women had to remain at home and take care of domestic needs by concentrating on human 
reproduction and subsistence farming to feed their families. While this made them de facto 
household heads, it further relegated them to the domestic space. This subjected them to the 
challenge of time constraints on political participation as will be further discussed in the next 
chapter. On the other hand, men got exposure to urban environments, and with it, increased 
socio-political awareness that facilitated their dominance in decision making. 
Additionally, steady income from wage employment made men sole providers, while the unpaid 
domestic contributions of women became undervalued. Oyewumi (1997) points out that this 
contributed to the valuing of men’s labour while the contribution of women became underrated. 
This was so, she explains, even though the wage earned by men was insufficient to meet all 
needs, and women were therefore responsible for ensuring the stability and continuity of their 
communities. Oyewumi employs a quote from Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped 
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Africa, to show just how significant this value system was (and continues to be in contemporary 
debates on the value of care and household work carried out by women).  
Since men entered the money sector more easily and in greater numbers than women, 
women’s work became greatly inferior to that of men within the new value system of 
colonialism: men’s work was ‘‘modern’’ and women’s work was ‘‘traditional’’ and 
‘‘backward.’’ Therefore, the deterioration in the status of African women was bound up 
with the consequent loss of the right to set indigenous standards of what work has merit 
and what did not. (Rodney, 1972: 227) 
This laid the groundwork for the change in the socio-economic and cultural position of women 
in society, not only marginalising them, but leaving them subject to state and patrilineal interests. 
The result of this reorganisation of gender roles was that patriarchy within traditional cultures 
reinforced the negative influence of colonialism.  
Another contributor to the restructuring of African societies was Christian teachings as 
introduced by missionaries during the colonial era. This happened through the push to abandon 
traditional practices that were deemed primitive and pagan. The complementarity of gender 
roles constituted these traditional practices and was therefore eroded in the quest for 
modernisation. In his discussion on imported religions, colonialism and the status of women in 
Africa, Segueda (2015) points out that the combination of Christian teachings on women’s 
submission to their men merged with the colonialists’ propagation of norms of female 
domesticity dominant in Europe at the time. Pointing to Germany for example, he notes that 
discourse on the role of a woman in society ‘‘was summed up and circumscribed by the three 
"K" words: Kinder (children), Kirche (church), and Küche (kitchen)’’ (Segueda, 2015: 11). 
This was the approach that was transferred to their African colonies, including Kenya’s 
neighbour, Tanganyika. 
A similar attitude is also found in the missionary and colonial approach by the British. Oyewumi 
(1997) notes that Christianisation was as an integral part of colonialism, and one where gender 
bias was also applied. She narrates that among the Yoruba of Nigeria, missionaries applied 
different forms of education for men and women. She points out that men ‘‘were seen as 
potential clerks, catechists, pastors, and missionaries in the service of the church. There was no 
place for women in these professions except as wives, as helpmates to their husbands’’ 
(Oyewumi, 1997: 129). This reflected the attitudes among the colonialists themselves, as 
demonstrated by the positions held by their wives as companions and housekeepers in their 
colonies, including Nigeria and Kenya. 
 57 
 
The transfer and adoption of such viewpoints on the position of women completely reorganised 
the socio-cultural space in colonial states (Anunobi, 2002), a process made even easier by the 
fact that all colonial masters, military and political leaders were men. Oyewumi (1997) explains 
that during the colonial era, access to power in Britain was gender based, and politics was men’s 
domain. As a political institution therefore, colonialism was not exempted from this bias. To 
further elaborate on this, she refers to the description of colonial rule by Albert Memmi, as ‘‘a 
manly or husbandly or lordly prerogative’’ (Oyewumi, 1997: 121). Being a British colony 
therefore, the Kenyan political scene adopted the exclusion of women. 
By the time Africans got involved in political representation in 1944, the slots were 
unsurprisingly given to men. When there was an emergence of Kenyan leaders in the 1950s, 
there was no women representation. There were no women in the elections of 1957, where the 
number of women voters was also significantly low. Citing the example of Machakos district, 
Owuor (2016) refers to a newspaper report that only 12 of the registered 9,000 voters were 
women, and even then, not all turned out to vote. 
All these disruptions notwithstanding, there is documented evidence of Kenyan women’s 
engagement in political resistance, from providing logistical support to the Mau freedom 
fighters and even getting directly involved in the fighting. Women spearheaded the 1920 Harry 
Thuku uprising, where they marched to demand that the colonial government release Harry 
Thuku, then a political prisoner (Kabira and Kimani, 2012). The case of Mekatilili wa 
Menza9from the Giriama community in coastal Kenya is one of the most celebrated cases of 
female political resistance in Kenyan history. She was a woman in a patrilineal society that did 
not allow women to speak in public, much like the Maasai. Mekatilili however took advantage 
of the special rights accorded to widows such as herself, allowing them to speak in public and 
contribute to decision making. She therefore adopted traditional performance and the aid of a 
traditional medicine man, Wanje wa Mwadori Kola, to legitimise her actions and gain support 
from the people, enabling her organisation of a rebellion against British colonialists. 
These cases demonstrate that despite male dominance, the  intersectionality of socio-cultural 
markers such as old age and widowhood in the case of Mekatilili, created spaces of exception 
which allowed women to find avenues of influence. Additionally, their authority over 
 
9 Badass women of history: Mekatilili wa Menza http://tuftsobserver.org/badass-women-of-history-mekatilili-wa-
menza/ Accessed: 12.02.2018 
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reproduction and agriculture gave them bargaining power which meant that they were not 
entirely passive bystanders to male authority.  
Towards independence, the British colonial government nominated Ms. Priscilla Ingasiani 
Abwao, the first and only woman to the 1961 legislative council (Kanyi, 2016). As the only 
woman in a team of 70, it is noted that she did not get to speak and was reportedly only 
successful at submitting a written memorandum on behalf of Kenyan African women. This 
signalled the disinterest to acknowledge the input by women during the struggle for 
independence, blocking any headway in discussing gender equality and representation in the 
post-colonial state. In 1962, she initiated the first women’s caucus and was involved in 
organising the Kenya African Women’s Seminar to discuss how women would benefit from 
the colonial government’s initiative to transfer government jobs to Kenyans (Ibid, 2016). At 
this point however, the colonial and religious influence on gender roles had already shaped the 
inequalities that largely prevail. 
4.1.2 Post Independence: The one-party state (1963 – 1992) 
Six months before the formal declaration of Kenya’s independence, the first general election 
was held. As registered voters, women put in the request to nominate women representatives to 
the East African Common Services Commission and external bodies such as the United Nations, 
as well as a 10% representation in the committee planning the independence celebrations 
(Owuor, 2016). These requests were disregarded by both the outgoing and incoming 
governments, once again signalling a non-commitment to the inclusion of women. Women were 
neither party officials nor contenders in the election, creating a blockade to their access to 
political party operations and structures. Their participation was limited to voting, an approach 
that has shaped the nature of women’s political agency throughout the years. 
Wambui (2016) highlights that the colonial indirect rule had groomed a generation of very 
powerful individuals who sought to centralise state power in the post-colonial African states.  
She explains that the rationale behind this was to homogenise the ethnically and religiously 
plural societies that characterised the demographics, to fit into the European idea of nation states. 
Kenya was therefore administratively subdivided into provinces, under which came districts, 
divisions, sub-divisions, locations and sub-locations in descending order. 
In 1983, the government begun a decentralisation initiative, dubbed District Focus for Rural 
Development, whose aim was to ‘‘change from top-down, sector based to integrated, 
participatory, bottom-up development planning’’ (Ndii, 2010: 4).  Development planning and 
coordination were delegated to district development committees which were tasked with 
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mobilizing civil servants, elected representatives and community leaders in the implementation 
of district development plans. This initiative was however regarded unsuccessful due to, among 
others: ‘‘its reliance on an institutional framework that did not facilitate meaningful local 
decision making and mobilization of resources…lack of adequate capacity in participatory 
planning among civil servants…and lack of people's awareness of and participation in planning 
and implementation of the strategy (Ndii, 2010: 4). These failures prevail under the devolution 
structure whose operation begun in 2013, as chapter six will later demonstrate. 
These post-independence political structures continued the entrenchment and legitimisation of 
patriarchal norms in a manner that curtailed the political leadership of women. This was made 
possible by the male dominance of the political space and one whose quest for hegemony 
informed the propagation of women’s subordination as a unifying factor. This was reinforced 
by the adoption of patrimonial politics, reflecting what Oyewumi (1997) describes as the 
hallmark of the colonial era; a public sphere where only men could participate. The male 
political class joined in the reconstruction of the image of an African woman that was happening 
across Sub-Saharan Africa (Wambui, 2016), where the ‘real African woman’ was domesticated 
and an embodiment of tradition, as opposed to her liberated and emancipated western 
counterpart. This discourse reinforced wifehood and motherhood at the expense of other socio-
cultural and economic roles of women. In the process, promises made to address equality 
concerns for women during the fight for liberation were ignored. 
The Post-Colonial Reinforcement of Patriarchy among the Maasai 
Development policies adopted after independence did little to improve the status of Maasai 
women. For example, Kibutu (2006) reports that the Kenyan government embarked on efforts 
to modernise the Maasai community, with the assistance of donors such as the World Bank. 
This modernisation rhetoric is reminiscent of colonialism’s belief in ‘‘the modern or 
progressive over the traditional or the savage’’ (Oyewumi, 1997: 121).  The Maasai land tenure 
system was for example regarded as outdated and requiring an update to reflect the politico-
economic environment. The government received a lot of funding to develop pastoral areas, 
and as a prerequisite, the World Bank demanded that communal land tenure be replaced by a 
system that was responsive to market forces.  This requirement that fit well with the colonial 
private property system. 
In 1968, the Land (Group Representatives) Act was introduced, marking the registration of a 
block of land by a group of pastoralists. This was aimed at promoting commercial ranching and 
discouraging nomadic pastoralism, thus integrating the Maasai into capitalism (Galaty, 1992; 
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Rutten 1992). A group ranch was to be an arrangement whereby ‘‘a group of people jointly 
have a freehold title to land and aim collectively to maintain agreed stock levels, to herd 
collectively, but to maintain individual stock ownership’’ (Kibutu, 2006: 137). This, of course, 
ruined the Maasai social structure and gendered organisation, as the management of the ranches 
was initially managed by influential individuals with political connections, and therefore driven 
by private interests. Even after this was revised, it had already set the pace for the concentration 
of power in a small group of individuals (Kibutu, 2006) a status that prevails today.  
In response to changing politico-economic realities in Kenya, the Maasai have significantly 
reduced sole-reliance on pastoralism. The group ranch system today is thus dominated by 
mixed-scale agriculture as well as tourism related ventures. Some areas are also set aside or 
sold off to industrial investors such as the Simba Cement plant in Kajiado South. However, 
even after the revision in the management appointees, group ranches continue to be run by 
individuals who seemingly do not care for the common good in their respective communities. 
This has caused disenfranchisement, as investment decisions are neither consultative nor 
transparent, and mostly benefit a few individuals. Complaints are widespread, as incidents of 
corruption become rampant in the face of socio-economic challenges faced by the 
community.10Group ranches are therefore at the heart of socio-economic and political dynamics 
of the Maasai community, a scope too wide for purposes of this study. However, the relevance 
of the effects of group ranches’ operations on the status of women will be highlighted in 
subsequent chapters.  
Setting the Pace for the Institutionalisation of Equality in Kenya 
Upon his election, Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta, embarked on a political philosophy 
that focused on community spirit called Harambee. It was driven by a vision of working 
together for the collective good, but the political struggles of women were still not on the agenda. 
A reflection of this is to be found in the Constitutions of 1963 and 1969, which presented a 
flawed Bill of Rights, an oversight that could be linked to the exclusion of women in the drafting 
processes. Looking at Section 70 of the repealed Constitution,11one is presented with a very 
logically spelt out provision for equality. It reads: 
 
10 Two dead in Kajiado as protesters, police clash over land https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/03/19/two-
dead-in-kajiado-as-protesters-police-clash-over-land_c1316301 Accessed: 15.10.2018 
 
11 2008 Revised Edition 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution%20of%20Kenya%20(Repealed).pdf 
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Every person in Kenya is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, or residence, 
or other local connection, political opinions, colour, creed or sex but subject to respect 
to the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.  
This is followed by circumstances under which discrimination would not be tolerated in Section 
82 (1):  
No persons shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue 
of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or public 
authority.  
It is upon scrutiny of this section that one notices the deliberate exclusion of one obvious ground 
for discrimination. In Section 82 (3), the repealed Constitution defines avenues for 
discrimination thus:  
In this section, the expression “discriminatory” means affording different treatment to 
different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, 
tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection, political opinions, colour or 
creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or 
restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are 
accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such 
description.  
Conspicuously absent is gender as a basis for discrimination. Austen and Mavisakalyan’s (2016) 
cross-country study on Constitutions and the political agency of women highlights that the 
constitutional building process offers opportunities for the protection of women. One could 
argue therefore, that the omission on gender discrimination noted above would not have been 
made if women were part of the constitutional drafting process.  
All these notwithstanding, women were mobilising themselves, and the National Council of 
Women of Kenya (NCWK) was gazetted in 1965 as the umbrella body for all women 
organisations in the country. NCWK is also the national chapter of the International Council of 
Women. Despite a lack of support, Kenyan women continued to be active in political 
engagement. They were represented in the First World Conference on Women in 1975, held in 
Mexico. The head of the Kenyan delegation, educationist Eddah Gachukia, was however of the 
opinion that the conference, by focusing on equality, did not really cater to the needs of the 
Kenyan women, who were mainly concerned with issues such as access to water (Owuor, 2016). 
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In effect, this signalled the gap between the struggles of the ordinary Kenyan woman and that 
of her global counterparts.  
Kenyan women continued with their global engagements and were also present at the Second 
World Conference on Women in 1980 in Copenhagen. The conference came a year after the 
adoption of CEDAW by the United Nations General Assembly. Owuor (2016) further details 
that as chair of Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO),12Ms. Jane Kiano led a team 
that helped bring the matter of Female Genital Mutilation to the global scene. Having carved a 
space in the global arena, Kenya hosted the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 
1985, where reflection was on the fact that regardless of the declarations from previous global 
conferences, the equality status of women was still problematic. By hosting this conference, 
Kenyan women were able to demonstrate that their goals were part of the global equality agenda. 
It is also at this time that the Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya (FIDA) was formed. 
FIDA went ahead to be a key player in the constitutional review process (Domingo et al., 2016) 
and continues to be a key player in the equality and women rights landscape in Kenya today. 
However, success at home was made difficult by the inability to unify all women’s organisation 
and have one voice. By 1987 for example, MYWO had been annexed by the ruling party, Kenya 
African National Union (KANU), a process through which the organisation lost its 
independence. The co-optation of MYWO into the ruling party made it difficult for women to 
be critical of the government, in addition to their lack of independence in agenda setting. Focus 
was then on issues such as nutrition, childcare, health and women’s morality. Individuals and 
organisations that disagreed with this approach were punished, as was the late Nobel Peace 
Laureate, Professor Wangari Maathai.13   
Prof. Wangari Maathai contested to be chair of the NCWK in 1979, a time when President Moi 
was trying to curb the political influence of the Kikuyu, an ethnic community that the professor 
belonged to. Even though she narrowly lost the bid to be chair, Prof. Wangari Maathai was 
chosen to be the vice chair of the NCWK and was later elected as chair in 1987. This prompted 
 
12  A development initiative by the colonial government, it was established in 1952 as a grassroots welfare 
organisation which mobilised women and created avenues for them to deliberate on how they could improve their 
livelihoods. It was guided by a conservative image of gender roles, with a goal to introduce women to modern 
techniques of home management. It however informed the beginning of women’s socio-political organisation, 
especially after leadership was transferred to an African woman in 1961 during the Africanisation process (when 
colonialists transferred power to Africans before independence). 
 
13 The Ecology of Public Space: from Uhuru to Taksim http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/node/456 Accessed: 
12.02.2018 
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MYWO to separate itself from the NCWK umbrella and become the government’s funding 
channel for women’s affairs, causing NCWK to experience financial constraints. Under NCWK, 
Prof. Wangari Maathai started the Green Belt Movement, to respond to the sustainability 
concerns of rural women, arising from environmental degradation. Their activities received 
global attention, earning Prof. Wangari Maathai numerous awards. The government of Kenya 
forced a separation of the Green Belt Movement from the NCWK, claiming that the two 
organisations should focus on environmental and women’s issues respectively.14  
The ‘disorganisation’ exhibited by the separation of MYWO from NCWK was used by male 
politicians to discredit women’s political leadership as they could seemingly not agree among 
themselves. Speaking at a predominantly-women seminar, President Moi caused an outrage by 
claiming that women could achieve so much, but their little minds would not allow them to 
achieve what they are expected to achieve.15 Despite all these however, women managed to 
unite in their solidarity and formation of strategic alliances that helped ensure that women’s 
issues became mainstream. 
4.1.3 From Multi-party Democracy to a New Constitution (1992 - 2010) 
The early 1990s witnessed the awakening of the fight for political empowerment by Kenyan 
women. This was a boost for democracy, which Dudley (2016) reiterates is hinged on 
incorporating voices of the majority. The awakening coincided with the international movement 
for women’s empowerment, giving a positive impact on the struggle by Kenyan women. The 
women’s movement in Kenya16made use of the international conventions outlined in Table 4.2 
in sub-section 4.2.1 below to advance their agenda. Increased consciousness among women on 
their socio-economic and political rights added momentum to the fight for equality. Kenyan 
women therefore received a major boost from the CEDAW and the 1985 world conference to 
review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, 
Development and Peace. These ensured the alignment of the fight by Kenyan women with the 
international agenda. 
Evidence of these efforts culminated in 1992 when the NCWK and the Africa Women’s 
Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) organised a National Women’s 
 
14 Detailed information on this can be found in Prof. Wangari Maathai’s memoir Unbowed. 
 
15 Outrage at Moi remark http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1209531.stm Accessed: 15.04.2018 
 
16 In-depth analysis on the role of this movement can be found in Regina Mwatha’s (2017) The Women’s Movement 
in Kenya, as well as Antje Daniel’s (2016) Organisation – Vernetzung – Bewegung. Frauenbewegungen in 
Brasilien und Kenia and Sonja Wölte‘s (2008) International, national, lokal. FrauenMenschenrechte in Kenia.  
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Convention to discuss how women could access political power. The convention focused on 
establishing an ‘‘institutional framework for gender mainstreaming and resulted in the 
establishment of the National Gender Commission, a ministry in charge of women affairs, 
children and social services, a presidential directive for 30% women’s representation in public 
service, establishment of women’s fund and publication of the Sexual Offences Act, among 
many other gains’’ (Kabira and Kimani, 2012: 843). Thus, 1992 became the year when the 
journey for the political inclusion of women under the current framework formally gained 
momentum.  
The following years focused on network building and gender mainstreaming in public 
institutions. The 1995 Beijing Conference, where Kenyan women actively participated, also 
created an opportunity for them to further articulate their agenda. In its recognition of women’s 
role in peace and security, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 
promoted the inclusion of women in all decision-making institutions and structures. This also 
boosted the efforts of Kenyan women, encouraging them to pursue legislation to ensure their 
presence in these institutions. They fought for a ‘critical mass’ of women to de-masculinise 
these institutions, making them more democratic and responsive to women’s needs (Kanyi, 
2016).  Data collection on women’s representation at all institutional levels was undertaken, to 
highlight the negative effects of their marginalisation. The women then decided on affirmative 
action as the pathway to rectifying the situation.  This process was however driven and 
dominated by a section of elite women – lawyers and those in academia – the prevailing effect 
of which is poor participation by women at the local level due to a lack of information and 
consequent engagement.  
In 1997, Phoebe Asiyo tabled a motion in parliament, to increase the number of women in 
decision making at parliament and local government to 33%. This effort demonstrated the belief 
in the quota system as a means to increasing the number of women in politics in order to change 
gender policy debates (Sacchet, 2008; Childs and Krook, 2008). The motion however failed, 
with some of the arguments against it being that men represented all citizens, the Constitution 
did not stop any woman from going to parliament, and most importantly, that there was already 
a woman heading the Ministry of Culture and Social Services (Kanyi, 2016). While an increase 
in the number of women in the political scene would be a sign of change, the available crop of 
women who could easily take up political positions were either socialised into ‘‘androcentric 
political ethos’’ (Wambui, 2016: 7), or too connected to the male political class to be of any 
help to the rest of the women in Kenya. In 1997 for instance, Zipporah Kittony, as chair of 
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MYWO, urged women to vote for then President Moi, since women were not yet ready to 
lead.17She went further to encourage Charity Ngilu, the only female presidential candidate then, 
to seek the ‘fatherly guidance’ of Mr. Moi, as this was what Kenyans needed. It is worth noting 
that she is a relative of President Moi. 
These challenges notwithstanding, there was a lot of mobilisation by women groups, involving 
grassroots organisations and making affirmative action a national movement. Key organisations 
involved in this process included MYWO, NCWK, FIDA, The League of Kenya Women Voters, 
the National Commission on the Status of Women, and Kenya Women’s Political Caucus 
(KWPC) among others (Domingo et al., 2016). 
When the ruling party – KANU – won the 1997 elections despite strong opposition, the debate 
on reviewing the Constitution began. Women lobbied to be part of the negotiations under the 
Women’s Political Caucus, where they negotiated for inclusion in drafting the law to review 
the Constitution. KANU opposed this, wishing instead that negotiations be led by MYWO even 
though the organisation was registered and therefore represented by the KWPC. This was 
informed by KANU’s recognition of its ability to influence what commissioners would be 
nominated to the review commission (Kabira and Kimani, 2012). These efforts were however 
not successful. KANU also wanted a parliamentary review process, which was rejected by 
religious and civil society groups who sought a people-driven review process. A citizen-driven 
process would ensure the inclusion of checks and balances that were not aligned with KANU 
politics, but in the interest of the population. 
The constitutional review process kicked off in 1998 courtesy of The Constitution Review of 
Kenya Act, 1998. Debates on the leadership of the process delayed it by two years, but the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) was finally constituted. It had 27 
commissioners, a third of whom were women from various backgrounds, a nod to the 
importance of including a critical mass of women in policy processes. These commissioners 
came together to lead consultations on what became famously known as the Wanjiku 
Constitution. Wanjiku is a female name from the Kikuyu community, and one that bears 
resonance to the ordinary mwananchi (Swahili for citizen).  Wanjiku therefore became the 
symbol of expectations by ordinary citizens. 
Another affirmative action motion was presented by Beth Mugo in 2000, seeking a 30% 
representation of women in parliament, and it was a success. In 2001, she tabled another motion, 
 
17 Saturday Standard, July 28, 2002 
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seeking representation of marginalised groups and women. The Attorney General amended the 
bill to have its contents reviewed by the CKRC, which then convened a conference to draft the 
Constitution in April 2003. The drafting continued to April 2004. Throughout, women were 
able to make contributions, as well monitor the progress, with key players such as the 
Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Kenya, Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
League of Women Voters, and the Institute for Education and Democracy paying scrutiny 
(Owuor, 2016). The 2005 draft Constitution was however rejected, with gender being one of 
the nine contentious issues (Kameri-Mbote, 2016), and the review process resumed in 2006.  
With the promise that the new Constitution would address the adequate representation of 
women in parliament and local government, a technical committee on women and marginalised 
persons embarked on educating their constituents. Women therefore followed the constitution 
review process very closely, to ensure that their needs were prioritised. Extra effort was required 
to counter the lack of support for the rights of women due to the patriarchal stereotypes of 
empowered women. In the end, affirmative action was successfully integrated into the draft by 
the Constitution’s committee of experts.  
When the Constitution was brought to a referendum on 4th August 2010, it was overwhelmingly 
voted for, and subsequently promulgated on 27th August 2010. 
4.1.4 Post Promulgation of the New Constitution 
Guided by the critical mass theory, affirmative action was adopted as the gateway to achieving 
gender equality in Kenya. This approach is designed to address the slow pace of change in 
women’s political participation in areas of historical under-representation. Dudley (2016) 
emphasises that the adoption of gender quotas guarantees equality in results, by ensuring that 
there is a substantial representation of women. It is also a nod to the normative isomorphic 
process of setting acceptable minimums (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) in the pursuit of gender 
equality. As chapter two has highlighted, quotas help in reversing the association of politics to 
men (Baldez, 2006), allowing women to break into the political space as has been demonstrated 
in Rwanda. 
To promote the involvement of women in decision-making processes, Article 81(b) of the 2010 
Constitution of Kenya provides that “the electoral system shall comply with the following 
principle: not more than two thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same 
gender.” To ensure compliance, Article 27(8) further demands that the state take legislative and 
other measures to implement the principle of Article 81(b).  
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A report by Steel et al. (2015) however shows that less than 19% of the 11th National Assembly 
and a mere 27% of the Senate comprised of women, meaning that there was no realisation of 
the gender equality principle in the first elections after the promulgation of the new Constitution. 
During these elections in March 2013, only 16 women were elected as Members of Parliament 
with none who vied for the governor or senator positions winning (Ndeta, 2013). As a result, 
Kenya had the lowest number of women parliamentary representatives compared with at least 
30% in all its East African neighbours, except for South Sudan. This was however an 
improvement from the previous 9.8% representation in the 10th national assembly. It was also 
the first time that a woman from the Maasai community was elected to the National Assembly.  
Regrettably, the 11th parliament not only failed to meet the gender representation requirement, 
but it was also unsuccessful at laying the legislative foundation on the same for the 12th 
assembly (Owuor, 2016).  An amendment bill presented to parliament to make it easier to fulfil 
the two-thirds gender rule failed to muster two thirds of the National Assembly’s vote. On 27th 
April 2016, the bill garnered 195 votes, with 28 MPs voting against it and at least 24 
parliamentarians refusing to vote or indicate their abstinence. Upon realising that the numbers 
did not meet the threshold to get the bill subjected to a second vote, the speaker of the National 
Assembly invoked standing order number 62 (2):  
Whenever a Bill or a special Motion the passage of which requires a special majority in 
the Assembly fails to obtain the required majority and the vote results in a majority of 
the “Ayes” but the “Noes” have not numbered at least one third of all the Members of 
the Assembly, the Speaker may, direct that a further vote be taken on the particular 
question, and the further vote shall be taken within five sitting days from the day the 
first vote was taken (National Assembly, 2013). 
A week later, on May 4th, the bill was once again rejected. This occurred despite extensive 
lobbying by the Kenya Women Parliamentarians Association, civil society organisations and 
calls for support by the executive and opposition leaders. Reasons for the rejection ranged from 
the argument that women in parliament were underperforming, male parliamentarians 
represented everyone thus no need for special treatment of women, and that with an already 
bloated assembly, bringing in more women was just a strategy to have people nominate their 
girlfriends.18  
 
18 Why Kenyan MPs shot down gender bill https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000200820/why-kenyan-
mps-shot-down-gender-bill Accessed: 06.05.2016 
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In this instance, the male dominated assembly evidenced that despite the constitutional 
milestone, patriarchal attitudes continue to influence acceptance of women’s political action. 
This validates the assertions by Nzomo (1997) on structural barriers to gender mainstreaming. 
The lack of political will to institute change means that the journey is far from over. Kenya’s 
performance, Nzomo (2011) highlights, is in sharp contrast to the country’s pioneering role in 
the region’s post-1990 multi-party women empowerment programs. This, she notes, raises 
concerns on the disparities between policy theory and practice.19 
After the 2017 general elections, there was a 2% increase in the representation of women elected 
to the 12th national assembly, but this representation remains below the constitutional one third 
minimum, and lags behind that of Kenya’s neighbours. This increase in representation is 
illustrated in Table 4.1 below, which highlights the representation of women in parliament since 
the first post-independence general elections of 1963.  
Improvements in the representation of women in Kenya are attributable to the 47 positions of 
women representatives (Maina, 2013), which effectively increase descriptive representation. 
The 47 positions are so determined by Article 97(b) of the 2010 Constitution. Substantive 
representation is mainly guided by provisions in Parts VIII and IX of the County Governments 
Act No. 17 of 2012, which set out guidelines for Citizen Participation and Public 
Communication and Access to Information respectively.  
Increasing the percentage of women in public life through political institutions is also pursued 
under Chapter 11 of the 2010 Constitution on devolution. This is made possible in the 
legislature and public administration of devolved governments, as well as through public 
participation. However, the system of male dominance, patronage and the financial resources 
required to actively participate in politics has created a barrier for a majority of women. 
Consequently, Kenyan politics remains a male domain, a dominance that plays out in legislative 
decisions on gender equality where officials continue to disregard the constitutional mandate 
for the critical mass representation. The ruling by the Supreme Court on the progressive 
realisation of gender equality by 27th August 2016 thus remains unfulfilled.  
 
 
19 Increased representation does not necessarily equate to the empowerment of women. This is evident in the case 
of Rwanda which ranks at the top globally on the representation of women, but women still face socio-cultural 
challenges linked to gender-based inequalities as Neeknaz Abari summarises here: 
http://www.representwomen.org/public_versus_private_realms_women_s_empowerment_in_rwanda Accessed: 
10.02.2018 
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Table 4.1 Women representation in Kenyan parliament, 1963-2017 
Term Period 
No. of 
Constituencies 
Elected Nominated Total  
Men Women Men Women Men Women Total 
1st  1963-1969 158 158 0 0 2 158 2 160 
2nd  1969-1974 158 157 1 10 1 167 2 169 
3rd  1974-1979 158 154 4 14 2 168 6 174 
4th  1979-1983 158 154 4 11 1 165 5 170 
5th 1983-1988 158 156 2 9 1 165 3 168 
6th  1988-1992 188 186 2 10 0 196 2 198 
7th  1992-1997 188 182 6 12 1 194 7 201 
8th  1997-2002 210 206 4 9 5 215 9 224 
9th  2002-2007 210 200 10 4 8 204 18 222 
10th  2007-2013 290 194 16 6 6 200 22 222 
11th  2013-2017 290 274 63 7 5 281 68 349 
12th  2017-2022 290 267 70* 6 6 273 76 349 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
*47 of whom are elected as Women Representatives for each county. 
An amendment to Article 9720of the Constitution has been proposed, to ensure that a special 
number of seats is determined after elections, so that no more than two thirds of elected 
members are of the same gender. This echoes the requirement under Article 177(b) that each 
County Government Assembly should consist of the number of special seat members necessary 
to ensure that no more than two-thirds of the membership of the assembly are of the same 
gender. This provision has created a de facto system where political parties nominate women 
after elections to fill the gender quota. 
While the same is being pursued at the national assembly, it is the amendment’s call for this to 
be realised in 20 years from the first general elections under the Act that raises concerns. If 
adopted, the push to ensure gender equality is postponed to 20 years after the 2022 elections, 
which effectively creates room for the continued political exclusion of women. It is also 
important to note that under Article 177(b) political parties are not motivated to nominate 
women for elective positions, and instead ‘hand out’ nomination slots to their proxies. By 
ending up as ineffective representatives, this strategy has done little to demonstrate women’s 
 
20 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2018 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2018/ConstitutionofKenya_Amendment_Bill_2018.pdf  
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capacity to take on political leadership and push agenda relating to gender equality and the 
specific needs of women, reflecting elite (male) captured in India by Mueller (2016) and Kabeer, 
as well as propagating the narrative of ‘flower girls’ in the Kenyan parliamentary system.  
In retrospect therefore, the inability to meet constitutional requirements on the quota system in 
Kenya is a clear demonstration of a decoupling process (Mackay et al., 2010) while further 
highlighting the power of non formal institutional norms and considerations in influencing 
formal institutional goals. 
A parliamentary debate on 28th November 2018 further highlighted this, after failing once again 
due to a lack of quorum. This happened even though members were reportedly present in 
parliamentary buildings, forcing a postponement further pushing the debate to 2019.21 On 27th 
February 2019, a quorum hitch caused the bill’s fourth failure, signalling a constitutional crisis 
that could necessitate another general election.  
Moving away from these operational inefficiencies, I briefly shift to outline the framework 
under which the political engagement of Kenyan women is currently pursued and promoted. 
4.2 Legal and Institutional Framework 
There is an extensive legal framework that informs the parameters of the promotion, realisation 
and evaluation of gender equality in Kenya. It also highlights the constitutional institutions with 
the mandate to promote gender equality. 
4.2.1 Legal Framework 
As discussions so far evidence, special legislation is passed to protect and advance the rights of 
special interest groups such as women. Kenya is a signatory to several international and regional 
human rights treaties, charters, conventions, protocols and agreements, which are backed by 
additional national laws aimed at promoting gender equality for socio-economic development. 
These are outlined in Table 4. 2 below. 
With these commitments to international and regional legal frameworks, Kenya’s commitment 
to advancing human rights is also reflected in the 2010 Constitution. The Bill of Rights is 
exceptionally explicit in its focus on principles of equality and the advancement of rights. 
Additionally, Article 2 explicitly states that; (5) The general rules of international law shall 
 
21 House shelves gender equity bill as quorum hitch hits vote https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Aden-Duale-
shelves-gender-Bill/1064-4872784-tettku/index.html Accessed: 28.11.2018 
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form part of the law of Kenya and (6) Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form 
part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution. 
The country is therefore obliged to honour the provisions of all international and regional 
agreements it has signed up for, by incorporating the same in the national legal system. The 
Constitution therefore has several provisions in line with the advancement of equality. 
Table 4.2 Kenya’s International Legal Commitment to Equality 
International Continental 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981) 
International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 
AU African Youth Charter (2006) 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966) 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2005) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) 
African Union’s Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in 
Africa (2004) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979) 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984) 
African Plan of Action to Accelerate the Implementation of the 
Dakar and Beijing Platforms for Action for the Advancement of 
Women (1999) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Dakar Platform for 
Action (1994) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2006). 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) 
 AU Cultural Charter for Africa (1976). 
Source: Author’s compilation 
4.2.2 Institutional Framework 
The Constitution is clear on the role of state organs to protect the welfare of special interest 
groups. This is spelt out in Chapter Four on The Bill of Rights, Article 21(3): 
All State organs and all public officers have the duty to address the needs of vulnerable 
groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons with 
disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalised communities, and 
members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities.  
In all their operations therefore, state agents and agencies are expected to respect and promote 
the socio-economic and political interests of women. However, there are specific bodies that 
are constitutionally mandated to promote the equality status of women. These are the National 
Gender and Equality Commission and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission. The 
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two commissions partner with civil society organisations in the shared goal of protecting and 
promoting the rights of women in Kenya. 
National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) 
NGEC acts as the principal state organ in ensuring compliance with all treaties and conventions 
ratified by Kenya relating to issues of equality and freedom from discrimination for special 
interest groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and children.22Bearing the largest 
responsibility, the commission mainly derives its mandate from Articles 10, 27, 43 and 59, as 
well as Chapter 15 of the 2010 Constitution. Article 10 spells out national values and principles 
of governance, Article 27 deals with equality and freedom from discrimination, Article 43 
focuses on economic and social rights, and Article 59 establishes the Kenya National Human 
Rights and Equality Commission. Chapter Fifteen provides information on commissions and 
independent offices. 
The functions of the commission are provided in Section 8 of the NGEC Act 2011, and include 
among others, to: 
• Monitor, facilitate and advise on the integration of the principles of equality and 
freedom from discrimination in all national and county policies, laws, and 
administrative regulations in all public and private institutions. 
• Co-ordinate and facilitate mainstreaming of issues of gender, persons with disabilities 
and other marginalised groups in national development and to advise the Government 
on all aspects thereof. 
• Monitor, facilitate and advise on the development of affirmative action implementation 
policies as contemplated in the Constitution. 
• Investigate on its own initiative or on the basis of complaints, any matter in respect of 
any violations of the principle of equality and freedom from discrimination and make 
recommendations for the improvement of the functioning of the institutions concerned. 
• Work with other relevant institutions in the development of standards for the 
implementation of policies for the progressive realization of the economic and social 
rights specified in Article 43 of the Constitution and other written laws. 
• Work with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on 
Administrative Justice and other related institutions to ensure efficiency, effectiveness 
and complementarity in their activities and to establish mechanisms for referrals and 
 
22 Mandate and Function Of NGEC http://www.ngeckenya.org/about/15/mandate  
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collaboration in the protection and promotion of rights related to the principle of 
equality and freedom from discrimination; 
• Prepare and submit annual reports to Parliament on the status of implementation of its 
obligations under this Act. 
These aspects of Equality and freedom from discrimination that NGEC is tasked with are 
fundamental rights in accordance with Kenya’s Bill of Rights as laid out in Chapter Four of the 
2010 Constitution. The Bill calls for recognition and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in order to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities, and to 
promote social justice and the realisation of the full potential of Kenyans. In carrying out its 
mandate, NGEC conforms to national values and principles of governance introduced by the 
Constitution. These values and principles include sharing and devolution of power, the rule of 
law, democracy and participation of the people, good governance, integrity, transparency and 
accountability, and sustainable development among others (Franceschi et al., 2015). 
Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (KNHRC) 
Established under Article 59 of the Constitution, the commission is mandated to, among others, 
promote gender equality and equity, and to coordinate and facilitate gender mainstreaming in 
national development (subsection 2 (b)). Specific functions of the commission include to: 
• Promote respect for human rights and develop a culture of human rights in the Republic. 
• Promote the protection and observance of human rights in public and private institutions. 
• Monitor, investigate and report on the observance of human rights in all spheres of life 
in the Republic. 
• Receive and investigate complaints about alleged abuses of human rights, except those 
relating to the violation of the principle of equality and freedom from discriminations 
under the gender and equality commission, and take steps to secure appropriate redress 
where human rights have been violated. 
• On its own initiative or on the basis of complaints investigate or research matter in 
respect of human rights, and make recommendations to improve the functioning of State 
organs. 
• Act as the principal organ of the State in ensuring compliance with obligations under 
international and regional treaties and conventions relating to human rights except those 
that relate to the rights of special interest groups protected under the law relating to 
equality and non-discrimination. 
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• Work with the National Gender and Equality Commission and the Commission on 
Administrative Justice to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and complementarity in their 
activities and to establish mechanisms for referrals and collaboration. 
KNHRC therefore collaborates with NGEC to complement each other’s roles in the promotion 
and protection of human rights and gender equality in the country. In fulfilling their brief, the 
two constitutional bodies also work together with MYWO, the Caucus for Women’s Leadership, 
the Federation for Women Lawyers in Kenya (FIDA) and the Kenya Women Parliamentary 
Association (KEWOPA) among other civil society groups, which share in the goal of protecting 
and promoting the rights of women.  
Having outlined the historical trajectory of gender equality in Kenya, the following section 
examines the current status of women’s representation. I briefly describe the equality 
environment resulting from the current legal and socio-political environment. 
4.3 Status of Equality and Inclusion in Kenya’s Political Representation  
Despite the well laid out legislation, Kenya seems to be failing in its quest for gender equality, 
pointing again to the gap between policy and practice. The national assembly does not meet the 
constitutional gender quota to guarantee equality in representation. All the efforts made by 
lawyers, academics and several civil society groups have not yielded the much-needed critical 
representation of women. Structural elements of the gender equality legislation are decoupled 
from the activities that would ensure its success leading to a loss of legitimacy (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) as will be demonstrated shortly. This failure echoes the critique by Claire 
Mathonsi (former director of operations at the Western Cape Network on Violence against 
Women) on the situation in South Africa, as captured by Christi van der Westhuizen (2011). 
She notes that in many ways, women’s rights have been incorporated into the larger human 
rights discourse, which categorises women as a special interest group just like youth and 
persons with disabilities.  
Mathonsi argues that this approach relegates women to a tick box category, which fails to deal 
with the crux of the problem that women are facing, which is patriarchal power relations. This 
can be seen for example, at county government assemblies, where political parties focus more 
on nominating women to fill the gender quota after elections, instead of fronting women 
candidates for elective positions. By so doing, this approach fails to deal with the normative 
realities of social and power relations in society and within political institutions (Lovendsuki, 
2011). These sentiments reflect the issues that came up during the constitutional review process 
in Kenya, where major setbacks were caused by men’s reluctance to accept the equal status of 
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women. Negative comments from male leaders, including the president, point to the reality that 
success lies not in dealing with gender equality as purely a policy matter, but going further and 
interacting with the unequal power relations that necessitate the debate in the first place. It is 
only by doing so that the gendered nature of institutions can be uncovered, allowing for the 
deconstruction of masculinist ideologies and unequal power relations (Mackay, 2008; Krook 
and Mackay, 2011).  
Reflecting on the provisions of the two thirds gender rule highlights a goal focus on descriptive 
and not substantive representation. This approach, Mathonsi argues, ‘‘replaces substantive 
issues with numbers. For example, when we talk about 50/50 representation in government, we 
don’t talk about influence. When we talk about 50/50 political participation, we don’t talk about 
decision making’’ (van der Westhuizen, 2011: 13). Looking at the situation in Kenya, this 
critique echoes the one made by Nzomo (2011) that the continued focus on numbers fails to 
deal with matters of power and influence as part of the multidimensional nature of gender 
inequalities. 
In Kenya, the version of the 50/50 quota provision is at 70/30, and so far, women are still 
struggling to achieve the stipulated 30% minimum. A focus on descriptive representation 
creates loopholes in the actual realisation of gender equality, especially considering the history 
of female bureaucrats (femocrats) in Kenya. These have been women who get political positions 
but cannot necessarily be relied upon to advance the agenda of women, as their relationship 
with the political male elite makes them ineffective representatives (Mueller, 2016). This 
observation is shared by Kabeer (2005), in the case of Indian women acting as proxies for their 
husbands or powerful men in their families. These strategies contribute to having a 
representation of women, but without any substantive or symbolic effect.  
Women in Political Positions in Kajiado and Narok 
As Table 4.1 on the representation of women in the Kenyan parliament shows, there are 
improvements in the number of women elected and nominated into political leadership. This 
trend is observable from the 2012 and 2017 general elections conducted under the new 
Constitution. By having more women in political positions, the historical dominance of men in 
these positions is minimised (Mackay, 2008; Chappell and Waylen, 2013), promising a shift in 
the power dimension of political institutions. Failure to meet the 30% threshold however raises 
concerns on why this is so, despite all the effort that has reportedly been put into political and 
education mass campaigns on promoting gender equality. The improvement can however be 
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viewed as the marginal success of these campaigns by the different institutions committed to 
campaigning for the rights of women.  
Reserving a special seat for women representatives has undoubtedly contributed to an 
improvement in the symbolic representation of women’s political leadership.  However, even 
though it aims to increase the number of women representatives, this provision has 
unintentionally created a situation where women limit themselves to these positions as they 
guarantee higher chances of winning. Reflecting once again on Article 177(b), the opportunity 
to get nominated into County Assemblies arguably dis-incentivises women from fighting for 
electoral positions. In exploring whether Kenya’s new Constitution was helping or hindering 
the political participation of women, (Leigh, 2012) argues that the introduction of quotas has 
caused misunderstandings and created a skewed system. Women choose the ‘safer’ Women 
Representative slots as there is limited squabbling with male politicians for this position.  
The preference for this position is reflected in Kajiado and Narok Counties where, in the 2017 
general elections, for example, Kajiado County had seven candidates for the Women 
Representative position, while Narok had eight. In contrast, Kajiado had only two women out 
of 27 candidates from the five constituencies vying for the position of Member of National 
Assembly. On the other hand, Narok had no women vying for the Member of National 
Assembly, which had 37 candidates from the six constituencies. This disparity is highlighted in 
Table 4.3 below which shows a similar trend in candidacy for the Member of the County 
Assembly (MCA) positions. Neither county had a woman vying for the Senator position, with 
Kajiado fielding four candidates, and five in Narok.  
The political ambitions of women do not seem to transcend to the ‘conventional’ political battle 
grounds dominated by men. This attitude preference towards reduced interaction with men in 
the political sphere can be argued to be a result of the male dominated nature of the Kenyan 
political arena which is ruled by patronage (Brownsell and Gatabaki, 2013). The environment 
is therefore unfriendly to women who wish to break into the political space and compete with 
men, unless they have patrons to support them. Additionally, political engagement requires a 
lot of financial resources and combined, these conditions limit the capacity for women, and 
especially those with limited financial capacity, to fully engage in political party politics and 
legislation in general, as they lack the necessary capital ‘‘to build political networks and gain 
electoral power’’ (Kenny, 2014: 680). The reality of these challenges will be highlighted in the 
forthcoming chapters. In securing elective positions therefore, Kenya is far from achieving 
gender parity. 
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Table 4.3 Women candidates in the 2017 general elections 
County Constituency 
Seat 
MCA MP 
Male Female % Women Male Female 
% 
Women 
Kajiado Kajiado West 26 2 7.14 6 0 0 
Kajiado Central 13 0 0 5 1 16.67 
Kajiado South 19 3 13.64 3 0 0 
Kajiado East 33 2 5.7 4 1 20 
Kajiado North 48 2 4 7 0 0 
Narok Narok East 23 0 0 7 0 0 
Narok North 30 1 3.2 5 0 0 
Narok West 19 0 0 7 0 0 
Narok South 36 5 12.2 9 0 0 
Kilgoris 35 1 2.8 5 0 0 
Emurua Dikirr 22 1 4.4 4 0 0 
Source: Compiled from https://roggkenya.org/ 
Registered women and percent that voted in the last general elections  
The 2012 general elections registered the highest voter turnout in Kenyan history (NGEC, 2016). 
Even then, as with many other Sub-Saharan African countries, women participated in fewer 
numbers than men. Data from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 
highlights that out of the 14,388,781 registered voters in the 2012 general election, 7,050,503 
were women, placing them at 49% of the voting population. This trend was maintained in the 
2017 elections, where there were 9,217,369 women voters, against 10,394,054 men. Women 
therefore accounted for 47% of the voters, a 2% decline from 2012.  
Table 4.4 shows the statistics for Kajiado and Narok counties, which reported voter turnouts of 
79.35 and 82.58% respectively. 
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Table 4.4 Registered voters per county 
County 
Total 
Total Voters % Female % Male Female Male 
Narok 161,414 180,316 341,730 47.2 52.8 
Kajiado 201,125 210,068 411,193 48.9 51.1 
Source: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission23   
The gender gap in voting is significantly narrow, which is consistent with observations on 
voting patterns across Sub-Saharan Africa. In their study on gender gaps in political 
participation across Sub-Saharan African nations, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011) find that gender 
gaps in voting patterns across Africa are smaller because, as the most institutionalised form of 
political participation, voting is a safer arena for the participation of women.  
The number of women voters reported in the 2012 and 2017 elections also points to a radical 
change in another observation by Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011), that of the 18 countries under 
study, Kenyan women were the least likely to register to vote. Evidence from the 2012 and 
2017 elections shows that the difference between women and men’s voter registration in no 
way infers women’s reluctance to participate in elections. This radical change can be attributed 
to the highly publicised constitution-drafting process, which increased public awareness of the 
importance of exercising political agency. During this process, debate on the rights of women 
was key alongside the discussion on devolution. Results of this can be observed in Kajiado and 
Narok, where women participate in elections just as much as men. An evaluation of voting as 
a civic duty therefore demonstrates the achievement of gender parity. 
4.4 Informing Gender (in)Equality 
The historical approach adopted here confirms the observation that history ‘‘draws attention to 
the changing relationship between gender and institutions over time - for example, in terms of 
feminist engagement and institutional outcomes’’ (Kenny, 2014: 82). In the Kenyan context, 
feminist engagement has been problematic because, from the beginning, the political leadership 
of women has mainly been through proxies and ineffective representatives (Mueller, 2016), 
highlighting the influence of formal and informal institutional practices of the elite in political 
recruitment (Krook, 2010). In their positions, these women have contributed to the 
reinforcement of patriarchy, effectively creating a system where it is mostly elite women who 
benefit from the patronage, as they are almost always related to the male politicians by either 
 
23 Gender and age statistics per county https://www.iebc.or.ke/iebcreports/  
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marriage or class (Wambui, 2016). This has made politico-institutional transformation difficult, 
as the presence of these women has not always translated into substantive representation.  
Another problematic dimension in the quest for equality in Kenya has been the negativity 
women face for being the embodiment of women’s movements. There is a tendency to portray 
these women as ‘un-African’, hard-headed and unreliable, reflecting a desire to maintain a 
normative environment that perpetuates political male dominance. One KANU official is 
quoted saying that women could not be trusted as they were ‘‘a time bomb that can explode at 
any time... and are hard, decisive and very difficult to deal with’’ (Owuor, 2016: 11). Such 
assertions are used to delegitimise their efforts among the public as is well captured in the 
experiences of Wangari Maathai.  
The discourse on demonising outspoken women and downplaying their efforts, together with 
the patriarchal reluctance to accept their equality status means that the struggles of Kenyan 
women transcend organisational challenges, to include socio-cultural norms that are webbed 
into the structures that constitute formal institutions. This indicates that the political sphere has 
the most effective institutional arrangements to incorporate a normative system of informal and 
internalized rules (Mackay et al., 2010: 576) that inform resistance to women’s inclusion, even 
in the face of legislation that calls for the same. In Pakistan, for example, institutional reforms 
and the provision for reserved seats have ‘‘contributed to an increased scope for positive action 
and greater acceptance of women as vehicles of political representation,’’ leading to the election 
of more women in the National Assembly (Krook, 2010: 714).  
In contrast, time, knowledge and interactions with women politicians do not seem to be 
effective at promoting the acceptance of the political agency of Kenyan women, and Maasai 
women are no exception. This shows that institutional norms that ‘‘prescribe and proscribe 
‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine…values for men and women’’ within political institutions 
(Mackay et al., 2009: 259) have not shifted in favour of women in Kenya. Instead, the adoption 
of gender quotas in Kenya has become subject to isomorphic paradoxes (Mackay et al., 2009), 
due to the demonstrated lack of political will, coupled with the prevalence of masculinist 
ideologies associated with informal institutions. For example, an aspiring Member of County 
Assembly in the 2013 elections narrated how men and women alike would laugh at her efforts 
of trying to get into a male arena, with some men offering marriage to save her from running 
around and fighting with men. Such attitudes arguably contribute to the increased preference 
for the women representative position as opposed to other elective positions where women 
would have to face men as their opponents.  
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For women who make it to the county assemblies through direct nominations aimed at ensuring 
gender equality, the experiences remain negative. In conversations with some of these women 
from the Kajiado and Nairobi assemblies,24they reported that it was common practice that their 
male colleagues looked down upon them, regarding them as ‘token’ representatives. Their 
contributions are therefore disregarded, as they are not considered ‘real’ representatives since 
they were not duly elected. Women who are outspoken and dare to oppose agendas fronted by 
men in the assembly are also subjected to hostility. These experiences point out that creating 
quotas does little to change the norm environments, confirming Krook’s (2006) argument that 
quotas do not really challenge the status quo. The challenges to the political inclusion of women 
lie in deeply enculturated social norms that impede ‘‘women’s ability to participate,’’ and which 
need to be replaced ‘‘with norms that foster parity of participation’’ in order to promote just 
institutions (Mackay, 2008: 133). 
One way to achieve this is to engage more women (and men) at the grassroots level, to maximise 
impact on the status of women (Achieng, 2016). This would help deal with the shortcomings 
noted by Daniel (2011) and Kanyi (2016) on the information and relational gap between policy 
makers, civil society groups and women in rural areas. As Maasai women additionally reported, 
there is very limited political engagement due to lack of awareness and channels of 
communication or civic education. Evaluating the country’s adoption of gender equality 
legislation as a global trend therefore reflects the paradox of mimetic isomorphism in contexts 
where formal institutions are weak or seemingly absent. This echoes the observation that many 
organisations ‘‘reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of 
their work activities’’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). 
Efforts to strengthen these weak institutional mechanisms would therefore facilitate the political 
inclusion of women and men from different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. The 
process itself presents an opportunity to challenge the politics of institutional engagement, 
which Waylen (2018) argues is crucial in seeking to change gender norms. The ensuing 
heterogeneity of viewpoints, experiences and expertise would inform an approach to political 
agency that is more capable of dealing with the myriad of formal and informal challenges to 
the success of the gender equality agenda. It is critical that men and women work together in 
 
24 For a project I carried out in March 2018 on the nomination of women to the county assemblies in order to meet 
the two thirds gender rule. 
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the formation of a collective state of consciousness that encourages and promotes normative 
change. 
The next chapter however shows that collective political action among the Maasai is far from 
being realised. Just like in the rest of Kenya, women have to deal with barriers founded on 
socio-cultural biases towards their political agency. As the debate herein indicates, socio-
cultural transformation sometimes needs an emancipation proclamation from the government 
through legal policing. Chapters one and two have highlighted why this viewpoint has gained 
much support over the years, and Kenya’s legal and institutional frameworks have contributed 
to an improvement in the descriptive representation of women in the political arena.  
As earlier noted however, the challenge remains that the affirmative action debate in Kenya has 
mainly occurred at the policy level. Being driven by a group of lawyers and academics has left 
out most citizens and especially women who stand to benefit from the gender equality 
legislation (and devolution by extension), fuelling the subsequent decoupling as will be 
explored in forthcoming discussions. The next chapter therefore investigates the challenges 
women in Kajiado and Narok face in their quest for political agency. By checking on the 
influence of both formal and informal institutions, the chapter discusses the collective state of 
affirmative action consciousness and status of gender equality among the Maasai. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENDERED NORMS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON POLITICAL 
AGENCY 
The previous chapter has described the journey and current landscape of gender equality in 
Kenya. It has focused on how national policies, alongside global equality agenda, have 
influenced the political position of women, to the present-day reality of institutionalised gender 
equality norms. This chapter therefore focuses on the equality position of Maasai women, as 
informed by historical realities and changing socio-economic dynamics. The discussion 
establishes that the replacement of the traditional socio-political organisation with the currently 
preferred rights approach to political agency has done little to improve the status of Maasai 
women.  
Attitudes towards women as domestic agents continue to make it difficult for the community to 
appreciate the value of female public agency and leadership. Women are therefore pro the 
gender equality agenda, but few men are supportive of a position that would reduce their 
dominance. Unfortunately, these supporters lack the political power to effect change, which has 
left Maasai women with the option to either accept a position of diminished political influence, 
or fight for equality at a high social cost. Some of the fighters are however successful, 
depending on their socio-economic realities and support from their husbands and other male 
relatives. This reality makes it clear that the success of equality in political representation relies 
on concurrent socio-economic adjustments (Dahlerup, 2005). 
In the first section, I discuss how gender relations among the Maasai as a patriarchal community 
have influenced the position of women today. This is followed by an analysis of how specific 
factors such as education, age, employment and socialisation, have created environments that 
are slow in their acceptance of women’s equal status, and political agency thereof. Section two 
also investigates how these attitudes shape and perpetuate barriers to the political engagement 
of women. In section three, I explore these barriers from cultural, economic and institutional 
perspectives, before summarising the discussion in section four. The analysis makes clear that 
for Maasai women, successful public engagement lies not necessarily in policy directives for 
equality. Rather, success is in the creation and promotion of avenues for exposure to what 
benefits the public stands to gain from women’s input in decision making and the management 
of public affairs. It is only after this has been established that the community can engage in the 
constitutional drive towards gender equality.  
 83 
 
5.1 Engagement, Equality and Authority 
To maintain their hegemony, patriarchies in different times and places define 
gender relationships and roles like "wife," "mother," "daughter," or even 
"woman" in ways that seem natural, self-evident, unchangeable. Women who 
defy these dominant representations by challenging patriarchal control of their 
sexuality, fertility, or autonomy disrupt the status quo and threaten patriarchal 
hegemony by exposing the possibility for alternative, non-normative meanings 
and practices. To defuse the subversive potential of these "wicked" women, 
patriarchies must stigmatize the women's actions or persons as "wicked" or 
morally corrupt (Hodgson, 1996: 107) 
As the discussion in chapter four demonstrates, processes of equal engagement in Kenya are 
met with challenges rooted in the patriarchal set-up of the traditional public sphere. Omwami 
(2011) notes that patriarchal considerations far outweigh any interventions that would change 
the relational space in male dominated environments. The marginalisation of women in such 
communities as the Maasai thus becomes inevitable, frustrating efforts to improve the position 
of women in the political realm (Omwami, 2011). Additionally, the gendered separation has 
fuelled the absence of Maasai women from political spheres of public meetings and delegations, 
resulting in a lack of involvement in politics and public affairs (Hodgson, 1999).  
This exclusion of Maasai women is rooted in the changing economic environment. Wangui 
(2008) reports that development interventions have resulted in a fundamental shift in gender 
roles in livestock production – the key economic activity of the Maasai. She notes that even 
though women’s contributions to livestock production outweigh that of men, modernisation 
efforts in the sector means that women are losing control over milk resources, making them 
more vulnerable. Her findings echo Kipuri’s (1990) observation that women are losing control 
over the products of their labour, even though they remain active producers. An explanation for 
this is in Talle’s (1987) observation that the expansion of state administration, especially 
through the commercialisation of the pastoral economy, has contributed to men’s firm control 
over family resources. The position of Maasai women is therefore tied to development agenda 
and the class formations that ensue, which have gradually pushed them to the periphery in the 
socio-political and economic realms (Kipuri, 1990). The political agency of Maasai women is 
therefore a reflection of the historical masculisation of the Kenyan public sphere detailed in the 
previous chapter.  
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In the examination of Maasai women’s experiences in the complexity of literacy, Taeko (2014) 
notes that women's voices are heard and have an impact on the implementation of projects 
within their created space of women groups, but have almost zero effect on the community’s 
decision-making processes. This, she explains, is because they rarely attend political initiatives 
which would not only provide opportunities for political consciousness, but also platforms to 
challenge discrimination and prejudice. Characteristic of this patriarchal set-up, considerations 
for age and paternity pay a big role in establishing power relations. At the core of it, Maasai 
women are supposed to respect men and do their best to avoid confrontations in both private 
and public spheres. Rooted in enkanyit (respect), Llewely-Davies (1981) explains that this 
moral value calls for courteous behaviour towards others, in a measure appropriate to their 
social position. As subordinates therefore, women are expected to exhibit courtesy and respect 
for men in all situations, and not voice opposition even when subjected to injustice. 
Lack of enkanyit invites physical abuse in the domestic front and shunning, or even curses25in 
the public space. Therefore, even when women have reasonable cause to disagree with men, 
they exercise caution in doing this openly. This behaviour points to an operating logic of 
appropriateness when it comes to public engagement. Chappell (2006) explains that logic of 
appropriateness exists where there is a perpetuation of certain types of behaviours while others 
are being discouraged. The operation of this logic can be seen in the case of Ayola, a Maasai 
girl from Tanzania who sued her father Aladala for forcing her to get married against her choice. 
Hodgson (1996) reports that Aladala cursed Ayola in the courtroom for not being a proper 
Maasai daughter, as she had defied the legitimate authority of her father and the elders. Her 
curse also served as a warning to other wicked women who might be tempted to follow Ayola’s 
example, and use the court system to circumvent traditional authority.  
In a system is upheld by actors who dictate the acceptability of ‘‘masculine and feminine forms 
of behaviour, rules, and values for men and women within institutions’’ (Chappell, 2006: 226), 
a Maasai woman is encouraged not to argue against men in public forums. This encourages 
encouraging the dominance of positions that do not oppose the views of men. Respondents in 
the focus group discussions reported that widespread fear of curses from men pervades, and it 
is believed that the curses affect not just the woman in question, but her future generations. 
With a Christianity dominance, most do not believe in the power of these curses but would still 
 
25 The Oxford dictionary defines a curse as ‘a solemn utterance intended to invoke a supernatural power to inflict 
harm or punishment on someone or something.’ In this case, curses are meted as punishment, intended to both 
stigmatize and ostracize those who disregard the traditional logic of appropriateness. 
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avoid contradicting and confronting men publicly as this would taint their image and soil their 
family name – a social cost too high to bear. In the case of Ayola, Hodgson (1996) reports that 
the few educated men and women who privately supported Ayola’s actions refused to voice 
their opinions in public, because like most villagers, they did not wish to invite anger and curses 
from the elders. 
In discussing how culture inhibits the implementation of women’s rights in Anglophone Sub 
Saharan Africa, Howard (1982) explains that individuals place a high value on beliefs and 
practices, even when outsiders may regard these as irrational. The effect of the notions of 
appropriateness contributes to the limiting of women’s freedom to participate and contribute to 
decision making in public affairs. Instead, most women choose to complain in the safe spaces 
of women group meetings, with the hope that their opinions will reach the decision makers 
through a woman or two among them who can openly discuss such matters with her husband, 
and the husbands will then have the matter addressed at an appropriate avenue.  
It is however important to note that this system was, and remains, unfair as far as public 
awareness on development matters is concerned. Using husbands as proxies presupposes 
equality in access to information. As respondents in the fourth FGD however reported, men are 
not always keen to share the details and outcomes of their deliberations. 
If it is a meeting that does not discuss deep secrets, women are involved but 
when the meeting is about hot topics that require a lot of deliberations, women 
are sent away. They are told that the men have a private meeting. We are only 
invited to general conversations…When he comes home, and you ask him what 
was being discussed, he cannot tell you…But as women, we do talk because if 
he were to ask me, I would tell him. But the men would never discuss what their 
private meeting was about…He would tell you that the discussions were men's 
affairs. (Female Respondents, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
23.03.2016) 
Despite the passing of time and availability of policies that support equal participation, the 
reliance on men by most women is reminiscent of the traditional political organisation where 
sons and husbands were the voices of Maasai women’s political interests (Hodgson, 1999). This 
system cemented a gendered separation of authority which saw women largely excluded from 
political affairs. 
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Notably, there is only one Maasai woman elected to parliament in Kenya today - Ms. Peris 
Tobiko, even though the dominantly Maasai counties of Kajiado and Narok have a total of 11 
parliamentary seats. She is also the first Maasai female Member of Parliament in the country’s 
history. To achieve this, she is reported to have overcome threats, alienation and curses from 
Maasai elders for ‘trying to be a man’.26 This analogy once again points to the association of 
the political sphere with men, and the presence of women as out of order. Mackay (2008: 130) 
explains that this is made possible through the reinforcement of masculinist ideologies, which 
are regarded as ‘‘ostensibly gender neutral’’ in public institutions and political life. The effect 
of this is that the absence of women in public and political institutions is normalised, causing 
efforts by women to seek leadership in these spaces to be regarded as disruptive and out of 
order. 
All these notwithstanding, evidence from this research shows that while the women may be 
powerless, they are certainly not passive (as reported by Spencer, 2003). Any perceptions of 
passivity can be argued to be resulting from the lost will to fight losing battles against the 
dominant male authority. Many Maasai women rely on the courage of the outspoken women 
who, mainly with the support of their husbands, can speak out in public and engage with men 
without fear. These women therefore become the mouthpieces for the many who cannot raise 
their voices in public. Most of these outspoken women have gained experience from working 
with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) mainly as community mobilisers, and therefore 
enjoy a legitimacy informed from their actions as key players in community development. 
Nevertheless, the Maasai social structure and power relations have retained relevance in the 
community, especially rural areas. The role of gender and age in shaping roles, responsibility 
and power relations within the community is still persistent in present day politics in the 
community, confirming that internalised informal rules are very effective in shaping 
institutional arrangements (Mackay et al., 2010). The finality of male authority in structuring 
the community, in its design, contributes to denying women freedom and justice. This is 
especially made evident when matters reported to the Chiefs, or even the police, fall through 
the cracks. Cases involving the unfair sale of land and livestock, female circumcision and early 
child marriages are therefore not properly dealt with, as they are mostly orchestrated and 
resolved by and among men. By opting to settle such matters with male leaders, Chiefs 
 
26  How Peris Tobiko escaped child marriage, Maasai curses to be MP https://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2017/10/24/how-peris-tobiko-escaped-child-marriage-maasai-curses-to-be-mp_c1657699 
Accessed: 24.10.2017 
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contribute to the obstruction of justice. For example, in the case of an old man being reported 
to the authorities for marrying an underage girl, a respondent in the fourth FGD reported: 
He can speak to the chief and explain that they are of the same age set and stuff 
like that and next thing you know, he has been released (Female Respondent, 
Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
The influence of traditional social organisation and its pervasion of patriarchal norms even at 
the civic public sphere inhibits women’s access to fair recourse on private and domestic disputes. 
This leaves women prone to injustices supported by male authority, as the case of Ms. Kipaaya 
demonstrates. 
Christine Kipaaya’s Case 
A mother of four and a cook at one of the local schools, Christine from Rombo Ward in 
Kajiado South took some tea, allegedly infused with drugs by a group of men during the 
mourning period at the home of a neighbour. Her boyfriend then forced himself on her, 
as did his friends, and she ended up being raped by nine men. Not wanting to be 
implicated in any way, members of the mourning family decided to throw her into a 
ditch where she was later found by a man who then contacted her brother in law. The 
brother-in-law could not immediately assist, as he, by cultural dictates of decency, could 
not view his sister-in-law’s half-naked body. He therefore sought help, and she was 
taken to a local dispensary where she later died.  Seeking to resolve the matter, a male 
dominated council of elders decided that her family would be given 49 cows in 
compensation, a solution the family refused. They reported the matter to the Chief and 
local police but got no assistance, as the two authorities recommended a traditional 
dispute resolution. It was only after the story got media attention from a Facebook post 
that the government stepped in to investigate the matter.  
Christine’s case highlights the injustices women without influence, and men in the same 
category by extension, face from having to live under rules and norms orchestrated by powerful 
men. Her family’s inability to get justice from the government additionally reflects how 
informal rules contribute to the incorporation of ‘‘old ways and old paths’’ that contribute to 
the maintenance of power relationships within formal institutional frameworks (Mackay et al., 
2010: 576). Skewed influence over decisions has created an unfair system where it is common 
that women fall victim to domestic violence, but the perpetrators walk free thanks to a dispute 
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resolution system that largely favours men, and the misguided outlook on women as men’s 
property and therefore without the right to question or disagree with them.27 
Unsurprisingly therefore, and as Taeko (2014) reiterates, most Maasai women remain dormant 
on matters relating to public engagement, which leaves them increasingly unaware of social 
and political injustices due to the limited exposure to engagement and acting upon solving 
community problems. This is however not always the case, as the Member of County Assembly 
(MCA) for Rombo Ward in Kajiado South reported regarding the participation of women in 
public meetings. 
In my ward, it’s very different. We normally have the meetings in either Rombo 
or Illasit. Illasit women are very sharp, sharper than the men. (MCA, Rombo 
Ward – Kajiado South, 06.02.2017) 
As discussions will later show, the pattern of women’s participation in Kajiado South is linked 
to their socio-economic positions within households.  
Respondents made it clear that the biggest problem lies in the inability to assert influence, 
rendering them helpless within the male-dominated social structure which mostly disregards 
their input. All together, these conditions exacerbate the socio-political and economic 
underdevelopment of Maasai women, and are made worse by reports that silence is sometimes 
due to concerns about their security in the community (Taeko, 2014). This assertion is reiterated 
by Parsimei (2013) who notes that male family heads and other male relatives can become 
oppressors and exploiters within Maasai families, leading to an inferiority complex in most 
women. The absence of Maasai women from the political space therefore becomes a result of 
both choice and the lack of it. Ultimately, these conditions have promoted a culture where 
Maasai women remain subordinated in power structures, with very limited chances of being 
uplifted to an equal status of influence as men.  
How is it that Maasai women still live under these circumstances? What informs their 
powerlessness and how does this influence their agency in society? The following section 
 
27 Both social and mainstream media are however providing platforms for alternative emancipation as this case 
shows. While Twitter is most common in calling for accountability by Kenyans, Facebook has in this case been 
used a platform to publicise an affair that would otherwise have remained unjust. By linking the matter to the 
general Kenyan public, there is a by-passing of structures that collude in perpetrating injustice at the local level. 
This therefore subjects the case to due legal procedure, as would be the case if there was no conflict between 
cultural and administrative agents. This matter of interaction, collusion and collision of agents in traditional and 
civic publics will be discussed further in chapter seven. I tried to follw up on Christine’s case but could 
unfortunately not get any updates on the status of the case. 
 89 
 
explores how attitudes towards women as subjects in their respective communities are formed, 
and how these contribute to their powerlessness  
5.2 Informing Attitudes and Shaping Norms 
Discussing impediments to the political participation of women in Kenya, Kivoi (2014) 
explains that their marginalisation is the result of perceptions, stereotypes and traditional beliefs 
that depict women as inferior to men. This is part of a ‘‘globally pervasive ideology of male 
superiority’’ that has shaped the structures and processes that uphold women’s marginalisation 
(Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 267-8). It is therefore important to understand how these beliefs, 
perceptions and stereotypes are reproduced, to shape male dominance in the public sphere. The 
analysis herein thus focuses on the attitudes of both men and women towards gender norms, 
how they influence approaches to gender equality, and the effects thereof. Equality agenda in 
this study relate to laws, policies and such other declarations or goals that aim to promote the 
status of women in their capacity as both individuals and collective agents in society. 
Generally, attitudes towards the political agency of women and the equality agenda are based 
on the interests of an individual, as well as their levels of exposure to different norm 
environments (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). This exposure could be from personal 
experiences, as well as contextual realities. An interest-based approach is influenced by whether 
individuals stand to gain from a feminist agenda while exposure to feminist ideology, through 
either education, personal experience or socialization, is what determines the attitude of an 
individual towards the same (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). 
A push for gender equality, in this case through the incorporation of Maasai women in political 
affairs, holds a lot of promise for women, which is evidently why most of them support it. For 
most Maasai men however, the engagement of women denotes reduced influence on their part, 
with a provision such as the two thirds gender rule making it possible that in some instances, 
men could be the minority. As a respondent in the fifth FGD succinctly put it: 
On political matters, just like in development, women should be involved and 
in equal measure as men. Women could take up the Women Rep and Councillor 
positions. But not that women should take up all positions and leave out men. 
It should be 50/50. Just as we agree at home, so should it be in government - 
we should be equals. That is all I would add. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward - Kajiado West, 24.03.2016) 
 90 
 
This denotes an openness to gender equality, but one that is clouded in uncertainty on what the 
implication of this would be on the dominant position of men. This fear is arguably informed 
by the lack of exposure to female leadership within the community. As Banaszak and Plutzer 
(1993) argue, resistance, or the reluctance to support the elevation of women in the political 
space, can be because of a status disconnect that happens when certain individuals react 
negatively to contexts they deem hostile to their status. The lack of exposure to female 
leadership in this case presents itself as a risk to the dominance of men. Men with exposure 
have differing opinions, acknowledging the unfair male dominance, welcoming the engagement 
of women, and even offering support to promote the same. This is evident in the discussions on 
the involvement of women in the management of communal land. The system is currently run 
by men, with women having no voting rights or other decision-making authority. As a member 
of one group ranch pointed out: 
I wanted to mention that women are not allowed to be in the group ranch 
committees. Women do not appear anywhere, there is no one to represent them 
and the women depend on the men's decisions whether or not to give them any 
land. The committee is the men's. (Male respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – 
Narok East, 20.04.2016) 
It is very telling that such a practice prevails even in a space where the involvement of women 
would benefit their families as singular units of society. In addition, such attitudes symbolise 
the strong reluctance to accept the position of women as equals. As the comments by the 
respondent in the excerpt below however show, there are those that are of a contrary opinion, 
and they happen to be young therefore confirming arguments that the youth are more inclined 
to be pro-equality as will be discussed shortly. 
On our side as young men, we are now one with the women unlike it was with 
the older generation. In our times, the fights that existed between men and 
women have reduced because things have changed and we discuss everything 
together. We take women as adults unlike before. We cooperate; when you want 
to do something at home, you have to involve her so things have become easier. 
There is more understanding and we stay together (Male respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 25.03.2016) 
Unfortunately, such men are evidently in the minority and lacking political influence, as they 
would otherwise have successfully instituted change. This points to a probable influence of 
other factors on an individual’s attitude towards agency in a public space. To explore this, the 
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discussion now shifts to family structure, socialisation background, employment and education, 
which Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) argue to be the factors that can be used to predict differences 
in attitudes among individuals. 
5.2.1 Background and Socialisation 
The socialisation background of an individual influences their political socialisation, and with 
it, attitudes towards equality agenda. This is in accordance with social context theory whereby 
the attitudes of an individual are influenced by their environments (Banaszak and Plutzer, 
1993). Key background factors I explore here are age, religion, education, location, gender roles 
and family responsibilities. Alesina and Giuliano (2013) point out that in situations where the 
authority of women is limited to domestic affairs, there are significant socio-economic 
consequences. For the Maasai, this is manifested in women’s lack of authority over financial 
decisions relating to land and livestock, leaving them reliant on proceeds from the meagre sales 
from milk. In maintaining significant financial authority, the hypothesis of men as providers 
continues to be supported and even strengthened. In addition, the exposure of women continues 
to be limited by duties restricted to the domestic realm, as men continue to interact with the 
socio-political and economic environments. 
In opposition to this trend, are situations where female-headed households act as conducive 
environments for the promotion of equality agenda. In the case of widows in the Maasai 
community, Llewely-Davies (1981) explains that upon widowhood, a woman’s animals are 
distributed among male relatives and any existing co-wives, leaving her dependent on the 
hospitality of her male relatives. Unfortunately, this hospitality is not always forthcoming. 
Forced by circumstances to take responsibility, women in these situations therefore work hard 
and invest in the education of their children, affording them increased opportunities for 
exposure. They also have an additional advantage when it comes to public engagement, as 
widows enjoy relatively more freedom of expression. Compared to her married counterparts, a 
widow is less restricted in her public interactions and can engage in public platforms more 
freely because, in the absence of a husband, she is answerable to male relatives and her late 
husband’s age set, a secondary level of accountability. 
As far as age is concerned, consensus would be that young people are highly likely to be 
educated and therefore supportive of ideas of equality (Kenny and Patel, 2017). While this is 
generally true, the situation is different among the Maasai, especially among women. For those 
in rural areas, early marriages are common, especially among those who have undergone female 
circumcision. By transitioning into adulthood through circumcision, they are pressured to drop 
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out of school and start families, limiting their chances to gain exposure through formal 
education. Circumcision marks the social maturity of a woman, where she is considered ready 
for childbirth, and therefore ends up getting married a year afterwards (Llewelyn-Davies, 1981). 
Women who follow this trajectory end up having to wait on adult education and such other 
opportunities that would provide the exposure to realities beyond their immediate environment. 
In relation to this, there is a difference in exposure levels between rural and urban dwellers. 
Individuals in urban areas are more likely to favour equality ideas than their rural counterparts 
since ‘‘urban environments provide greater heterogeneity in opportunities and ideological 
exposure than rural environments’’ (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004: 766). Evidence of this was 
found in the attitudes of respondents towards gender equality. Many who were open to the idea 
of including women in political affairs were those with exposure to urban environments through 
education, business activities or engagement with NGOs. Subsequently, even though 
respondents in this study were mainly from rural areas, it was unsurprising that narratives on 
reluctance or opposition to allowing women to fully engage in politics were mainly perpetrated 
by those with limited exposure to urban settings. 
I observed that the spread of vernacular radio stations was useful in bridging geographical 
distance. The consumption of news provided exposure, increasing awareness of contemporary 
affairs. Interestingly however, women reported that they could not bank on news as a tool for 
challenging men on issues such as polygamy and land rights. The men front the argument that 
whatever was reported was something that happened ‘there’ in Nairobi and does not really apply 
to women in the rural areas. As female respondents in the fourth FGD narrated: 
Even as you listen to the radio with your husband, he tells you that it does not 
apply to us…They say it only applies in Nairobi…When they are maybe 
discussing polygamy, dare you raise this with your husband…He will kick you 
out and remarry. (Female Respondents, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
23.03.2016) 
Men therefore continue to find ways of playing gatekeepers and curtailing influence in favour 
of traditional systems that suit them, a phenomenon that will be discussed in depth in chapter 
seven. 
Beyond radio influence, there are other avenues of change available to women. In his discussion 
on the role of non-state actors in public policy in Africa, Neubert (2009) highlights that religion 
plays an important role by setting moral standards for their members. Adherence to these 
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standards facilitates mutual trust, especially since church members arguably obey the set 
standards even outside the church. This norm transferability can play a big role in influencing 
attitudes towards equality. Evidence on the influence of religion among the Maasai however 
depicts varied outcomes, as the protestant churches dominant in the community play a decidedly 
ambiguous role among men and women. For some men, as one respondent pointed out, effects 
of the church and religious teachings are confined to the church building. Once they are back 
home, inequality and unfairness prevail. 
Jesus is left at the church door until next Sunday. (Female Respondent, 
Keekonyokie Ward - Narok East, 19.04.2016) 
In other circumstances however, the church promotes positive attitudes towards equality agenda, 
through the reiteration that everyone is equal in the eyes of God. Additionally, church-going 
men become familiar with women’s freedom of expression and even leadership through various 
church organs. From the narration of a respondent in the ninth FGD, the church has become an 
instrument of change by influencing norms through the promotion of agenda that favour women. 
It has become a point of knowledge and change, with the women slowly getting 
the husbands to go to church. As the man has explained, now men leave more 
land to their families and this can be credited to the church because you will 
notice that families with transparency are headed by church-going men. The 
church sheds spotlight on this issue, even saying that every man should leave 
at least one acre for his family. So, if we get an opportunity similar to this, then 
there will be change; but only a little because we have a very long way to go. 
(Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward - Narok East, 21.04.2016) 
Going by the example of promoting women’s access to economic units such as land, the 
churches promote a positive attitude towards women’s decision-making ability and even 
ownership rights. Church-going men who ignore such directives are considered not to be good 
Christians, a label not many in the community wish to carry around. Pentecostal Christianity 
therefore plays an influential role, however minimal. 
As part of ‘‘long-standing patterns of traditional socialisation’’ (Krook, 2010: 709), gender 
roles and family responsibilities among the Maasai are arguably the biggest challenges to 
interest in, and exposure to, positive attitudes towards equality agenda. The intersection of these 
challenges with other factors such as education, age and location further increase the 
disadvantaged position of many women. This is especially so when the identity and personality 
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of an individual are regarded as the result of their environment, as for example communitarians 
would argue. The response of an individual to factors both within and outside their environment 
is determined by the lessons and responses learnt and unlearnt through various media that they 
have been exposed to. This explains why, despite the presence of educated men and women in 
the community, negative attitudes towards equality prevail, as will be analysed in detail in sub-
section 5.2.3. 
The Silent Listener 
A respondent in the ninth FGD embodied the intersectionality of positions of disadvantage very 
clearly; aged below 30, she offered no opinions of her own, always speaking shyly and agreeing 
with whatever the older women said.28Having taken notice of this, I encouraged her to speak 
out, and she responded by saying that she had nothing to add, and that she agreed with what the 
rest had mentioned. To this, one of the older women explained: 
Most of the people are not even aware of this new Constitution we keep 
referring to. This lady here who doesn't know what to say, it could be that she 
knows nothing about it; what it is or what it says. (Female Respondent, 
Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 21.04.2016) 
At her young age, she is married and living in a rural village where she has limited contact with 
government agencies beyond the area chief and the local school. She was thus unaware of the 
Constitution, and the state agenda on women empowerment. This young woman represents the 
population of Maasai women who get married very young and live in villages where they have 
limited interaction with urban or diverse environments, thus limiting room for exposure to 
contemporary socio-political issues. It is very unlikely therefore, that she, and women in similar 
positions, understand what rights are afforded to them, and how they can take advantage of 
opportunities such as public participation exercises under devolution, to advance their status 
and that of their community.  
Unfortunately, it is such persons who perpetuate the ‘if it is not broken, do not fix it’ myth. 
Lacking knowledge on rights means that these women would accept the status quo as seemingly 
neutral, which only works to encourage male dominance. The lack of knowledge limits 
opportunities for critical engagement, query or dissent, ensuring that norms continue to apply 
as they do, relations continue to be governed as they are, and women continue to be 
 
28 An arguably clear depiction of the application of the logic of appropriateness in respecting one’s superior per 
the traditional Maasai social organisation and power structure. 
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subordinated. For these women, and men in similar situations by extension, the lack of exposure 
to equal rights agenda leaves them little room to seek change, ultimately strengthening the very 
system the Constitution seeks to change. 
5.2.2 Family Structure 
Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) note that marital status and number of children do influence 
attitudes towards equality agenda. They argue that women’s attitudes are driven by the 
combination of family size and their marital status. For women who are divorced, their uptake 
of the role of provider pushes them to seek work opportunities so they can fulfil their 
responsibilities. Among the Maasai, divorces, especially in rural areas, are rare as polygamy 
and separations are common. Therefore, it is widows who take on the non-traditional financial 
responsibilities of the household in a way that matches that of the divorced women in the study 
by Bolzendahl and Myers (2004). It is also common for married women to be providers, in 
cases where men abandon this responsibility. As a respondent in the first FGD explained: 
Many of the learned girls are children of widows, those with parents are 
married off early. Widows work very hard to ensure their children go to school. 
Even then, their efforts are rubbished. It is not many houses under the care of 
men thrive, it is those headed by women that succeed. The women take charge 
of homes, even with useless men and deceased ones. (Female Respondent, 
Loitokitok - Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
For many women however, time is a major determinant of the likelihood of exposure to ideas 
and debate on equal rights. Women who are overwhelmed by domestic chores have little time 
to spare and engage in activities that would provide relevant information. This confirms the 
observation by Ortiz-Ospina and Tzvetkova (2017) on the limitations of time use on the political 
agency of women. Women respondents repeatedly mentioned that even though they would like 
to, they could not attend public participation forums as these came in the way of their household 
chores and other domestic responsibilities. These arguments tally with observations by Alesina 
and Giuliano (2013) that increased household production limits interest and participation in 
political activities. For Maasai women, this is exacerbated by untimely communication from 
the relevant county government authorities, leaving them little time to plan accordingly, as will 
be demonstrated in the next chapter. In the end therefore, the increased participation by women 
in the role of caretaker, and sometimes provider, reduces their chances of exposure to forums 
that could equip them with information to take part in and fight for equality. 
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This situation does not have a similar effect on men. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) report that 
even with reduced responsibilities around the homestead, men do not feel positively inclined to 
equality ideas. This was echoed by female respondents in Kajiado South and Narok East, who 
complained that men have abandoned their responsibilities as providers, choosing instead to 
spend time away from their families, hanging around shopping centres discussing politics while 
enjoying alcohol and the spoils of the unfair sale of land and livestock. This confirms 
observations that Maasai men, though not constrained by domestic chores, do not support 
equality ideas even though they are more engaged in political affairs (Taeko, 2014). Instead, 
for the men, education seems to play a bigger role in influencing their attitude; with those that 
are more educated tending to be more pro-equality than their uneducated but otherwise exposed 
counterparts are. 
5.2.3 Education 
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 above have alluded to the importance of education in shaping the 
attitudes of individuals towards equality. Formal educational attainments have been found to 
have a strong correlation with political behaviour, since education has the capacity to influence 
socio-cultural norms. It can therefore work to reproduce or reduce their influence. As Berinsky 
and Lenz (2011) highlight, education has been argued to equip citizens with the necessary skills 
for political participation as they can effectively communicate their concerns. Being educated 
also means that one is able to understand abstract political affairs, follow campaigns and 
evaluate candidates and the issues they present. Thus, education has both individual and 
collective benefits, with higher qualifications being associated with positive social outcomes 
that include participation in volunteer and civic activities, as well as political efficacy (Roser 
and Ortiz-Ospina, 2017).  
There is also a strong correlation between education attainments, employability and income 
generation, as can be seen in Sudan where women’s access to higher education increased their 
employment in the formal sector (Schultz, 2005), a correlation that will be demonstrated in sub-
section 5.2.4 . 
Using evidence from the World Values Survey to explore gender laws, values and outcomes, 
Kenny and Patel (2017) note that it is the young and educated who push the trend of positive 
attitudes towards gender equality, as they generally have more positive attitudes. This 
observation points to the crucial role of education, especially at the basic primary and secondary 
levels, as a platform for introduction to principles of rights and equality. As a factor, education 
alone does not control for norms or address possible reverse causality. It can also be used as a 
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tool to propagate inequalities as most elites tend to do in their employment of political 
dominance strategies. As a platform however, education promises an equal learning opportunity 
that carries a lot of potential to institute lasting change. If one is to borrow from Proverbs 22:6 
(Direct your children onto the right path, and when they are older, they will not leave it), it is 
much easier to instil values of equality among children than to encourage the older generation 
to unlearn deeply internalised unfair norms. This is especially so in the Kenyan education 
system where primary education is free.  
Unfortunately, statistics evidence a substantial reduction in completion rates from the primary 
to secondary school levels in both Kajiado and Narok Counties, with enrolment at the secondary 
level dropping by more than half that of the primary level.  
Table 5.1 Primary school enrolment & access indicators, 2014 
  
Kajiado Narok 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Enrolment 80,276 77,788 130,386 119,827 
Gross Enrolment Rate (%) 92.7 89.1 107 96.7 
Net Enrolment Rate (%) 75.2 74.8 88.5 81.7 
*Provisional. Source: Ministry of Education, Science & Technology  
In the table above, Net enrolment rate represents the enrolment of the official age group for a 
given level of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population. Gross 
enrolment rate is the total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the 
same level of education in a school year (KNBS, 2015). A Gross Enrolment Rate of more than 
100% indicates the existence of over-age and under-age children enrolled in primary schools. 
These numbers drop significantly when it comes to sitting qualification examinations, as the 
results for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) in Narok show.  
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Table 5.2 KCPE candidates by sex and Sub-county 2013-2014 
Sub - County 
2013 2014* 
Male Female Male Female 
Narok North 2,498 1,993 2,451 2,255 
Narok South 2,987 2,193 3,425 2,392 
Transmara West 1,782 1,580 2,084 1,792 
Transmara East 1,049 901 1,202 933 
Total 8,316 6,667 9,162 7,372 
% 55.5 44.5 55.4 44.6 
*Provisional. Source: Ministry of Education Science and Technology 
Of the 250,213 pupils enrolled in primary schools across Narok County, only 16,534 sat the 
qualifying exams for primary school completion. This represents a primary school completion 
rate of only 7%. A similar trend can be observed at the secondary level where candidates who 
sat the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education examinations (KCSE) are less than half the 
number of those enrolled. 
Table 5.3 Secondary school enrolment and indicators 2014* 
  
Kajiado Narok 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Enrolment 12,918 11,791 15,467 10,875 
Gross Enrolment Rate (%) 34.1 30.8 29 20 
Net Enrolment Rate (%) 27.2 25.4 23.4 16.5 
*Provisional Source: Ministry of Education, Science & Technology  
In total, 24,709 students enrolled in secondary schools across Kajiado County, with Narok 
registering 26,342 students. Out of the enrolled students from Kajiado, only 24% sat the 
secondary school qualification exam, as table 5.4 below shows. 
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Table 5.4 KCSE candidates by sex and Sub-county, 2014 
Sub - County 
2014* 
Male Female 
Kajiado Central 584 286 
Kajiado North 1.529 1.273 
Loitokitok 597 474 
Mashuru 218 123 
Isinya 287 655 
Total 3.215 2.811 
% 53.4 46.6 
*Provisional. Source: Ministry of Education, Kajiado County  
With the notable exception of Isinya,29these statistics point to the low education attainments 
across the counties, with the female population lagging behind their male counterparts. The 
trend is noted across the country, per research by the Institute of Economic Affairs: Of the 1.3 
million pupils who entered Standard 1 in January 2003 when free primary education was 
introduced, only 67% completed primary school in 2010. Further, only 35% of the 1.3 million 
went ahead to complete secondary school education, with boys achieving a completion rate of 
36% and girls, 34%.30 This indicates that the high primary school dropout rates are not just in 
Kajiado and Narok, but throughout Kenya where generally, girls register slightly lower 
completion rates than boys at both levels. 
A study by Nyagah and Luketero (2016) on transition rates of girls from lower (standard one to 
five) to upper primary (standard six to eight) in Kajiado County indicated that early child 
marriages were the top reason for dropouts. These usually follow from female circumcision, 
which, as a rite of passage, renders school-going girls marriageable, per the traditional social 
organisation structure. Other related contributors to dropout rates were early pregnancies and 
the lack of female teachers to act as role models to the girls. Of particular importance to note 
from the study, is that girls from poor backgrounds constituted a majority of the dropouts, as 
they were more likely to undergo circumcision, get married and fall pregnant. This phenomenon 
contributes to the dominance of a certain economic class that can avoid this cycle, advance their 
 
29 Isinya hosts several boarding schools for girls, including Moi Girls School Isinya, the largest and most reputable 
in Kajiado County. The presence of these boarding schools could explain the high secondary school completion 
rate among female students. 
 
30 Institute of Economic Affairs, Kenya http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/number_of_the_week/number-of-the-week-
35-primary-enrollment-amp-completion-in-kenya Accessed: 13.07.2018 
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education, and in the process, improve their political efficacy and be able to assert influence in 
the civic public sphere. 
Considering however, that girls report higher dropout rates, it follows that Maasai women have 
lower literacy levels, with as much as 26.8% of them being illiterate, compared to men’s 16.1% 
(CBS, 2004). However, women make up for their dropout rates through adult literacy programs, 
as demonstrated in Table 5.5.31  
Table 5.5 Adult education by sex, 2013-2014 
 
Enrolment 
2013 2014* 
Male Female Male Female 
Kajiado** 3,259 3,978 2,939 4,696 
% 45 55 38.5 61.5 
Narok*** 1,284 1,660 1,385 2,096 
% 43.6 56.4 39.8 60.2 
*Provisional 
 **Source: Department of Adult and Continuing Education, County Government of Kajiado.  
***Source: Ministry of Education Science and Technology 
Table 5.5 above shows that more women than men enrol for adult literacy programs, with the 
numbers increasing substantially in 2014. This disparity can be due to such factors as labour 
migration that renders men more mobile, and masculinity that makes it more difficult for men 
to attend school as if they were children. Particularities on these phenomena however fall 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
Women go ahead to perform slightly better than men in the proficiency test, as table 5.6 shows. 
This helps fill the literacy gap between men and women, with improved literacy increasing the 
potential for women to question political authority, a consequence of education as argued by 
Berinsky and Lenz (2011). Attending literacy programs also means that adults will be better 
placed to benefit from civic education programmes, which Finkel (2002) argues make up for 
the lack of higher educational attainments. 
 
 
31 Data from Kajiado County represents that of Kajiado Central, Kajiado North, Loitokitok, Isinya and Mashuru 
Sub Counties, while Narok North, Narok South, Transmara West and Transmara East Sub Counties provide 
representative data from Narok Couty. 
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Table 5.6 Adult education proficiency by sex, 2013-2014 
 
PROFICIENCY TEST RESULTS 
2013 2014* 
Number Sat Number Passed Number Sat Number Passed 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Kajiado**  74 120 63 105 128 151 119 146 
% 38.1 61.9 37.5 62.5 45.9 54.1 44.9 55.1 
Narok*** 178 206 177 198 129 154 126 154 
% 46.4 53.6 47.2 52.8 45.6 54.4 45 55 
*Provisional 
**Source: Department of Adult and Continuing Education, County Government of Kajiado.  
***Source: Ministry of Education Science and Technology 
Just like in primary school however, both men and women exhibit high dropout rates. Without 
accounting for the pass rates, there is a huge gap in numbers between enrolment and completion. 
In 2013 for example, only 74 out of the 3,259 men from Kajiado who enrolled for the program 
sat the proficiency exam, registering a 2.3% completion rate. Women have an equally poor 
completion rate, at only 3% as only 120 out of the 3,978 women enrolled in the same year sat 
the exam. This is also the case in Narok, where in 2014, of the 1,385 enrolled men only 9.3% 
(129) sat the exam. In the same year, only 154 (7.4%) of the 2,096 women who enrolled for the 
program sat the exam. It is understandable that adults have more responsibilities and face 
different challenges from primary school pupils, but the statistics here paint a gloomy picture 
of education attainments. Persson (2015) argues that educational attainments influence political 
participation. Therefore, for as long as the Maasai continue to register lower attainments, then 
political participation will remain low, in both descriptively and substantively.  
Poor literacy levels also highly undermine the capacity of individuals in the hierarchical socio-
economic structures, as literacy promotes self-reliance, problem solving and is a tool for 
critiquing man-made social structures (Taeko, 2014). Women are additionally disadvantaged 
by socio-cultural barriers as discussed in section 5.3.1, making it difficult for them to critically 
engage with their socio-political environment. 
A high number of educated women, Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) point out, provides a pool of 
women who can promote resistance to unfair gender norms. Of great relevance to this study, is 
what the effect of educated women would be, on power relations in the Maasai community. 
Kabeer (2005) points out that educated women are more capable of dealing with government 
officials, and the exposure afforded to them equips them with the ability to challenge male 
prerogatives, including standing up to domestic violence. Citing the case of Bangladesh, she 
demonstrates that educated women participate more in decision making. 
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This matter was discussed at length with many respondents who pointed out that, a lack of 
educated role models among the Maasai is a major contributor to the absence of women in the 
political space. Nyagah and Luketero (2016) have also reported the lack of role models as 
contributing to high school dropout rates for girls. For this reason, the Narok County 
Department for Gender, Youth, Sports and Culture is reportedly maximising on the presence of 
women with exposure, in their outreach program. 
We go with them, and the women leaders and women who are exposed. We use 
them as our resource persons during the program. (County Chief Officer - 
Narok County Department for Gender, Youth, Sports and Culture, 26.02.2017) 
Dedication and commitment to improving literacy levels in the community are therefore key in 
promoting positive responses to gender equality. As Kabeer (2005) points out, education 
increases the capacity to question, reflect and act on life conditions, which is especially 
important for women as they negotiate their power and place in society. This necessitates action 
not just for adult literacy, but a critical look into contributors to the high dropout rates that 
necessitate the need for the adult literacy programmes.  
5.2.4 Employment 
Attitudes towards the role of women in the family influence their employability or dedication 
to income generating activities. Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) point out that in contexts where 
the economic participation of women is high, support for feminist goals is also high.  As it is, 
economic participation is itself a source of conflicting gender identities. Shultz (2004: 414) 
explains that in many African communities, women’s access to markets ‘‘serves as a metaphor 
for different views of the appropriate place of women in society’’ as their presence in centres 
of trade could be representative of either social transformations or traditional female spaces of 
autonomy and gender segregation. Employment among the Maasai is however not easily 
quantifiable as they, like most Kenyans, operate in the informal sector. As the table below 
illustrates, only 30,525 of the estimated 1.5 million (2%) Maasai population, is engaged in 
formally registered wage employment.32  
 
 
32 There has been a slight increase in formal employment levels with the institutionalisation of devolution in 2013. 
Even though county governments across Kenya absorbed employees from the previous administration structure, 
they have also created new opportunities for employment. The figures in table 5.7 are also subject to a margin of 
error informed by the lack of data on parastatal employees in Kajiado County. Nonetheless, the percentage of 
registered wage employment is at less than 10%. 
 103 
 
Table 5.7 Wage employment by sector, 2013-2014 
Sector 
Kajiado** Narok*** 
2013 2014* 2013 2014* 
Public Sector: National Government at Counties 2,798 1,918 2,554 1,747 
                           : County Government 1,312 1,577 1,557 2,547 
Teachers Service Commission   3,585 4,859 5,093 
Government Agencies (Parastatals)     484 494 
Total  4,110 7,080 9,454 9,881 
*Provisional.  
**Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
***Source: County Commissioner, Teacher Service Commission, County Government of Narok 
Majority of the population engages in micro and small enterprises related to agro-pastoral 
activities, with relatively few of them managing medium sized enterprises and being formally 
employed. It is however important to note that in most cases, Maasai men still control the units 
of production, in this case livestock and land. This gives them authority over decisions and 
economic benefits accrued from economic activities, allowing them to accumulate more 
economic capital. The trade and networking involved also afford men the opportunity to engage 
with others, increasing their knowledge of societal functions, an opportunity not many women 
have. In the end therefore, men continue to build on the socio-economic capital required for 
political activity in Kenya (Kimani, 2014). 
Reduced or minimal participation of women in the socio-economic platforms thus limits their 
exposure to political affairs. This is so since economic participation not only increases the 
economic resources of women and dispels myths on their inability to perform as well as men, 
it also increases their power at the household level. Even though it might not challenge 
subordination, employment equips women to better cope with risks and uncertainties. Kabeer 
(2005) thus notes that at the household level, engagement in paid work is a strategic tool for 
increasing the agency of women, as it brings with it a shift in power relations. As a respondent 
commented on the host of our sixth FGD: 
So it is all about coming to an agreeing at a household level. Today, every 
family has development projects and either the man or the wife can be in charge; 
as you can see in this family, it is developed because there is mutual 
understanding between the husband and wife. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward - Kajiado West, 24.03.2016) 
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The couple in reference work together in managing both the farm and livestock, and the wife is 
therefore free to make decisions that she considers beneficial to the business and her family, 
making her as authoritative as her husband. Accordingly, Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) point 
out that involvement opens the space for women to be exposed to existing inequalities, 
sharpening their socio-political efficacy. As role models, the host family for this focus group 
discussion represents the benefits of equality at the household, which provides a lens for the 
rest of the community to gauge the pros and cons of their attitudes and behaviour.  
Most importantly, the participation of women in the economy promotes networking, through 
which experiences are shared and strategies developed on how to counter unfair practices in 
both business and community. It creates opportunities for exposure, for both men and women, 
on the benefits of economic and political liberties for women. In the case of Wad al Abbas in 
Sudan, Bernal (1994) narrates that many village women have never visited the nearest town, 
Sennar, unless for hospital visits, while the men commute daily to the town and have travelled 
widely in Sudan and even abroad. Consequently, teenage boys are more capable of navigating 
the world outside the village than their mothers. Bernal goes ahead to point out that such 
patterns of segregation not only mark gender differences but give rise to them. The same applies 
to the Maasai, where young men not only benefit from the exposure gained through increased 
mobility, but also benefit from a social structure that favours men, to the point of having them 
as more powerful than their mothers. In the end, the entitlement and dominance of men continue 
to be propagated. 
The interconnectedness of the socio-cultural and politico-economic status of women discussed 
here highlights conditions that propagate their subordination. By interrogating barriers to public 
participation that Maasai women face, the following section thus explores the influence of 
attitudes and norms on determining the engagement of women in debating contemporary affairs. 
5.3 Maasai Women and Public Participation 
Engagement in decision making processes is an equality agenda whose effectiveness can be 
scrutinised in terms of accessibility, representation and the ability of women to influence 
decisions. Commitment to the effective engagement of women results in the normalisation of 
their political agency, generating ‘‘new codes and norms’’ that contribute to a more balanced 
political culture (Mackay, 2008: 130). In exploring gender parity in politics therefore, studies 
on the participation of women mainly focus on three inter-related explanatory variables: cultural 
norms and practices, socio-economics, and institutional factors. This section adopts this 
approach in exploring barriers to public engagement for Maasai women. 
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5.3.1 Socio-cultural Barriers 
These barriers relate the combination of social and cultural elements, and how they influence 
the political engagement of women. For example, while it might be a source of power in some 
instances, Bernal (1994) warns that women’s custodianship over community traditions can also 
work to perpetuate their subordination. As overseers of domestic affairs, Maasai women have 
the responsibility to pass on the socio-cultural traditions of the community to their children 
before they are initiated into adulthood. This involves passing knowledge on gender roles and 
societal expectations, and continues among women after their initiation. While this might be 
quite ordinary, it also means that women themselves perpetuate their subordinate position by 
constraining themselves in gender injustices embodied in ‘‘institutionalized patterns of cultural 
value’’ (Mackay, 2008: 132). They do this by passing down norms and lessons on appropriate 
behaviour, such as the acceptance of assertive and loud behaviour from men and not women 
(Schultz, 2005). The continuity of such norms does nothing to question the status of women, 
instead normalising the authority of men and supporting unfair practices. 
Beyond custodianship, as overseers of domestic affairs, women continue to be absent from the 
public space, limiting their input in the decision-making processes within their communities. 
This is so because, as mentioned earlier, overseeing domestic affairs affords them little time to 
spare for political or such other public engagements, a problem that men do not have to deal 
with.  
They [the men] are now off to their jobs so if there is a political meeting they 
can go at night and will come back home whenever they wish. But as a woman, 
you cannot do this; you have to take care of the children, cows and other 
domestic affairs, but the men have free time. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
Due to a lack of control over economic resources, they are also relatively poor, 33 which 
combines with their non-engagement as informed by cultural norms on gender roles to create 
the double-burden barrier to participation (McNulty, 2015). However, with the increased 
awareness and legislative calls for change in engagement mechanisms, women are gradually 
becoming more visible in the public space, an effort that would ordinarily contribute to the 
legitimisation of their political interests and concerns. Descriptively speaking therefore, the 
 
33 The Challenge of Being a Maasai Woman http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/the-challenge-of-being-a-maasai-
woman/ Accessed: 02.02.2015 
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goal is met. However, it is the substantial element of their representation that remains lacking. 
Women are involved, arguably for the sake of numbers, without there being a commitment to 
understand and incorporate their views and opinions. Regarding her duties as a Nyumba Kumi34 
committee member, a respondent explained: 
You will find that such a woman knows nothing and is not involved in anything. 
It is only the men who are involved. You find that in the same Nyumba Kumi, 
they asked us for several documents; they asked me for an ID, a picture and 
KES 200 but nothing came of it. There were two of us women from my area on 
this, but it is only the men who are recognised. So we have a problem of women 
being disregarded by men. (Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok 
East, 21.04.2016) 
In most cases, women are given the chance to give a closing or a ‘women representative’ remark 
at a public meeting. I observed this on 5th May 2016, at a meeting convened to celebrate the 
academic excellence of a local school in Rombo Ward, Loitokitok Sub-County. With the 
Member of Parliament as guest of honour, there were over 20 speakers, only three of which 
were women. Of the three, one was from the Ministry of Education, another from an NGO that 
sponsors pupils at the local school, and only one woman from the community. This lady spoke 
on behalf of the women in the community, a chance that had been given to more than ten men 
from the same community. Towards the end, women were invited to present the gift of two 
goats to the guest of honour. 
It is scenarios such as this that continue to discourage women from public participation as they 
are increasingly aware of the lip service paid to the inclusion of women. They are largely 
ignored by a system that places high value on the input of men, forcing them to focus on their 
domestic duties instead. 
…when we hear of such meetings, we do not see the importance of attending 
because we would only be taking our eyes as we have no opportunity. So we 
choose to remain at home and do other things. Men tell us whenever they go 
for meetings and we let them go and choose to focus on our chores as we have 
no chances in such meetings. (Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok 
East, 19.04.2016) 
 
34 Nyumba and Kumi are Swahili for house and ten respectively. Nyumba Kumi is a neighbourhood security 
programme championed by the government to engage citizens in security management  
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Unsurprisingly, this disregard for the public role of women shapes attitudes on their political 
leadership. As has earlier been mentioned, the only elected Maasai woman MP, Ms. Tobiko, 
narrated the harsh criticism she faced from the community, with her contestation being regarded 
as her trying to be a man. These sentiments were echoed by Nanoi,35 an aspirant for the position 
of Ward Representative, Rombo Ward in the 2017 general elections. Being a young single 
mother, she was often criticised for choosing to fight with men and thereby neglecting her role 
as a mother.  
Additionally, being separated from her husband earned her the title Elkirikoi. Llewely-Davies 
(1981: 341) provides an insightful explanation for what this title encompasses. In discussing 
men who carry the title, she explains that ‘‘Ilkiriko are men without substance. They are usually 
said to have lost their herds, and consequently their wives and children, through restlessness, 
alcoholism, or an excessive desire for women that has led them to neglect their 
responsibilities.’’ In Nanoi’s case however, this was used as a synonym for ‘prostitute,’ by both 
men and women. Men would make promises to listen to her only after she has granted them 
sexual favours or agreed to be a second, third or even fourth wife, demonstrating the culturally 
mediated harassment that women have to contend with in the political arena.  
But it is not just men that are hostile towards women’s political ambitions. In a debate on why 
women do not support and vote for fellow women, both men and women in the focus groups 
agreed that there is a tendency among women to despise each other. They explained that this is 
part of the pull her down tactics employed by women in several competitive situations, to 
introduce doubt and destroy trust in their opponents. Objectively, this points to the internalised 
cultural politics of presence that view the public sphere as a male domain. A respondent went 
ahead to point out that could men vie for the position of women representative,36 it would not 
be surprising that women vote for them over one of their own.  
All work therefore needs dedication, and if we start this way, and women unite, 
become one and stop despising each other, we will have progress. What 
contributes mostly to women being left out is that some despise others; they 
look at them and ask, ‘who do they think they are to stand and address us?’ 
(Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 07.03.2016) 
 
35 Pseudonym  
36 Which they have tried, as was reported in Kajiado and Bungoma Counties in the 2017 general elections - Why 
male candidates are seeking to become ‘Women Reps’ https://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/featured/why-male-
candidates-are-seeking-to-become-women-reps/ Accessed: 08.09.2016 
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The phenomenon of questioning the capacity of women to lead is not limited to the Maasai, 
having played out in previous presidential elections. Throughout Kenyan history, female 
presidential candidates have failed to win despite the majority status of women. In examining 
attitudes toward descriptive representation and voting behaviour in the 2010 British election, 
Campbell and Heath (2017) point out that the link between the sex of a candidate and the voting 
behaviour of the public is not straightforward; it is mostly context specific. Among the Maasai, 
evidence points to the fact that beyond voting, and regardless of the constitutional provision for 
the inclusion of women in politics and public affairs, there are members of the community who 
still maintain attitudes and adhere to norms that are in opposition to this vision.  
My opinion is that in our Maasai community, a woman cannot take on 
leadership. I am the man and as the head, I am in charge and have all the 
authority. (Male Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 21.04.2016) 
These gendered norms and rules are very powerful and evidently work to undermine formal 
changes within the community. This points to the need for negotiations and reforms, to open 
the political space to women, especially through the exploitation of opportunities to influence 
attitudes towards gender equality.  In the opinion of the respondent cited above, a Maasai man 
is the head of the home, and women should not be allowed to make decisions either at home or 
in the public arena. As gatekeepers of gender norms in the community, men are therefore key 
in the success of any attempts at gender equality reforms, an argument I revisit in chapter eight. 
Religion 
Religious teachings on the role of women in family and social settings influence attitudes 
toward the autonomy of women. Among the Maasai, religion plays a role especially since 
women are more active in religious life than men. As mentioned in section 5.2.1, the dominant 
Pentecostal churches in Kajiado and Narok influence attitudes and actions towards women, 
especially in their role as wives. Noteworthy however, is the fact that this influence depends on 
personal interpretations of matters at hand. In some cases, the church is a change agent, allowing 
women to take on leadership and even influencing men’s attitudes towards women. 
I think education has now penetrated Maasai-land through the word of God. 
This is because those women who have become Christians and go to church, 
get opportunities to attend seminars where they are taught about their position 
and responsibility because even if we are the neck, I think the neck is more 
powerful than the head. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
07.03.2016) 
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It seems like issues among the Maasai are changing. The Church has brought 
a lot of changes so men and women have changed and are more united now. 
Before, a woman would not even sit close to her husband, she would sit far 
away and not even speak to her husband, but today they sit together and even 
with their children, so we see good changes. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 24.03.2016) 
These statements affirm findings by Agadjanian and Yabiku (2015), who, in their study on 
religious belonging, agency, and women’s autonomy in Mozambique, find that attendance in 
liberal Pentecostal churches translates to increased autonomy for women. Religion thus offers 
a viable empowerment platform for women, while also creating room for the negotiation of 
power and a shift of roles and authority within society.  
In other cases, especially among men, the church has become the institution through which their 
superiority is affirmed. In a discussion on the behaviour of women as informed by religious 
teachings that reinforce equality, a businessman argued that what this meant was that women 
now felt like they had the moral authority to undermine men. The respondent was therefore of 
the opinion that women should not be quick to believe that they could now challenge decisions 
by men, simply because the church preaches equality.  
As Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) point out, even though different religious groups have 
dissimilar attitudes toward gender roles, religion can also be used to support conservative values 
such as the subordination of women. This is supported by the following observation: 
It [the Constitution] says that men and women should be equal. If this happens, 
bad things might happen because we read the Bible mostly where it does not 
say they are equals. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
25.03.2016) 
This reference can be traced to Ephesians 5:22-2437and 1 Timothy 2:11.38In the presence of 
such conservative attitudes, the influence of religion on the public participation of women 
largely remains limited to church affairs, bearing little consequence on decision making outside 
 
37  Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands as you do to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife 
as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Saviour. Now as the church submits to Christ, so 
also wives should submit to their husbands in everything. (New International Version) 
 
38 A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to assume authority 
over a man; she must be quiet. (New International Version) 
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the church (Agadjanian and Yabiku, 2015). The role of religion in promoting equality among 
the Maasai therefore remains largely ambiguous, since translation to action remains highly 
subjective. 
5.3.2 Economic Barriers 
A woman has milking rights to the females of her herd and the right to the sale 
or use of the hides of all stock that die or are slaughtered…These animals 
constitute the nucleus of the herds and flocks her sons will eventually come into 
possession of. She alone is responsible for the reallocation (a-itodol) of specific 
animals to them, and can decide to give nothing at all to a particular son. But 
she never has rights of alienation (a-itore) over any living animal; these rights 
pass through her from her husband and settle on her sons when they come of 
age. (Llewelyn-Davies, 1981: 334) 
The excerpt above summarises the traditional economic powers held by Maasai women. Today, 
their economic engagement is still limited by a lack of direct authority over resources, which 
strains their socio-economic development. As Schultz (2004) explains, even where men and 
women engage in economic activities, there are variations in the extent to which women access 
and control resources, which has men maintaining authority over capital intensive and large-
scale operations. Among the Maasai, this is seen in women’s authority over the sale of milk, 
but not the sale of livestock or land, which remain in the hands of men. 
The traditional set-up described in the excerpt above was worsened by the colonial 
reconfigurations described in chapter four, that effectively established men as heads of 
households. The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 has had lasting effects among the Maasai, where 
beyond land privatisation, men still control the remaining communal land organised as group 
ranches. It is very difficult for women to be registered members, and even more difficult for 
them to be part of the managing committees, as a respondent in the first FGD described:  
What we lack is leadership positions in the group ranches. They only use us for 
political purposes, when they need us to vote for them. In Kuku ward, the 
women are not members of the group ranches, it is assumed that women become 
members through their husbands. This means that whenever women have 
opposition, they have no voice since they are not members. Only members have 
the right to give opinions, thus excluding women. (Female Respondent, 
Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
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A male respondent who is a member of the Kuku group ranch in Kajiado South and opposed to 
the exclusion of women in the management and leadership of group ranches explained the 
unfairness of this system thus: 
To tell the truth, because we are here to help each other intellectually and one 
can tell what might be of use; the group ranches are governed by male 
dictatorship. This is what causes women to fear because for example, as a 
member of my group ranch, why shouldn’t my wife vote? She and I are one. But 
there is dictatorship between candidates. One looks at who has the majority, 
and knows that if women were to be added, he would be defeated. So we make 
decisions that are not in the by-laws just so that women cannot vote. That is 
dictatorship because, the land allocated to me, is equally my wife’s because it 
cannot [should not only] be inherited by my children. (Male Respondent, 
Loitokitok - Kajiado South, 04.03.2016)39 
Women who successfully challenge the unfairness of this system are punished through means 
such as being allocated rocky ground to farm. Outright denials are however common, as one 
respondent narrated: 
The other day we had a big problem; people were farming because the cows 
are dying from drought, only to be told that the space they tilled was not for 
farming. They push for pastoralism which is enslaving. They want women to 
just take care of cows, cook and do beadwork. We explained that days of 
pastoralism are over, one only needs a few animals for subsistence use. They 
then denied us farming space. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
03.03.2016) 
This control over land by men leaves women with limited avenues for income generation, as 
they rarely control the sale of livestock. Historically, men have controlled pastoralism, so the 
prospect of farming is appealing to most women as it provides an avenue through which they 
can participate in income generation. As the female respondent in the excerpt above reports 
however, there is still a reluctance to grant economic autonomy to women.  
Consequently, women are relatively poor and cannot afford to meet monetary demands relating 
to the basic needs of the household, for which they are responsible as part of role division with 
 
39 There was another respondent in the focus group that is a group ranch committee member. He refused to engage 
in this topic. 
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their husbands. Women respondents who have managed to find ways to save and invest reported 
that their men would claim this success as theirs, openly showing off home improvements and 
claiming responsibility. Unfair as this might seem however, some who manage to make some 
investments also risk having the proceeds taken from them. 
She is saying that her neighbour, a young woman, worked hard and bought a 
goat. She fed it daily and once there was a party at the neighbour's, her husband 
slaughtered it. When she made enquiries, her husband beat her up and sent her 
back to her parents' house because no woman owns cows or goats. She 
remained sick at her father's house for a week and when she went back to her 
husband's house, she vowed never to make such an investment and would rather 
buy clothes instead. That is why Maasai homes will always remain poor. 
(Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 19.04.2016) 
This intersection of poverty and control affects the capacity of women to engage in public 
participation exercises. It is also a reflection of the failure to recognise that economic 
interactions are gendered (Krook, 2010), which should be considered in politico-institutional 
structures. As the next chapter will show, the conduct of these exercises in administrative 
centres, necessitating travel for those from the villages, becomes problematic, and is doubled 
by the increased likelihood that their input will not be dully considered. According to one 
respondent: 
They make announcements for development meetings to be held in the 
administrative centre. Further, they do not provide transport for the people 
coming from remote areas…This process leaves out the common mwananchi 
because they need to go to the people at the grassroots and ask them what their 
needs are, and the people give their proposals. (Female respondent, Loitokitok 
– Kajiado South, 03.03.2016)  
For women whose domestic duties limit their mobility, participating in public fora ranks lower, 
as they choose to save time and the little resources they have. Any spare time they have for 
themselves is spent in women groups where they do beadwork, the proceeds of which contribute 
to meeting domestic and personal needs.  
How public participation meetings are conducted excludes many inhabitants of areas further 
from administrative offices. This was confirmed by the Narok County Budget Officer who 
reported that his office only reaches out to 12 locations that are easier to access, excluding 
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citizens who live in the outskirts, and especially women who cannot afford to take time off their 
chores for such meetings, or even afford it. 
Citizens and administration alike, depend on the availability of resources to be able to fulfil the 
participation mandate. The Kenyan Public Finance Management Act of 2012, in conjunction 
with the County Public Participation Guidelines of 2016, give the public the right to participate 
throughout the budgeting process, which runs from the formulation of the budget, throughout 
its implementation, to the evaluation stage. The effectiveness of public participation thus 
depends on the availability of resources to implement it. The issue of inadequate resources was 
prevalent in the discussions with both citizens and economists from Kajiado and Narok 
Counties, proving that financial constraints are limiting women’s political agency, as well as 
the implementation of public participation as envisioned in the Constitution. 
Financial resources do provide a constraint to the successful realisation of public participation. 
Jütting et al., (2005) point to the reality that local governments may sometimes lack the human 
and financial resources to effectively implement decentralisation. As the narratives above 
evidence, the lack of resources in both the domestic and public fronts continue to limit the 
capacity of women to actively engage in public participation exercises. Respondents 
continuously pointed out the need for such to take place within reasonable, preferably walking 
distance, so they could manage to attend at little or no cost. Collaboration with existing women 
groups could provide a platform to allow this, as will be discussed in detail in chapter eight. 
5.3.3 Institutional Factors 
The 2010 Constitution details Kenya’s commitment to the equal inclusion of women. However, 
respondents argued that there have been very few efforts to take the gender equality agenda 
seriously. The dissemination of information on civil rights and public participation procedures 
was continuously reported as being absent. This is consistent with the observation by Rai (1996), 
that implementation of directives can be held hostage by facts that are beyond the state. Among 
the Maasai, implementation failure is exacerbated by low political efficacy and exclusionary 
social practices that affect women as previously mentioned. 
Many community members are unaware of the provisions of the very transformative 
Constitution that guarantees them a position and a voice in governance procedures. Most voted 
for the Constitution in 2010 based on hearsay, with men being generally more knowledgeable 
thanks to their relatively wider socio-political networks. However, everyone is becoming more 
knowledgeable from the administrative failures that continue to play out in the public domain. 
Both men and women admitted that civic education on the 2010 Constitution was poor prior to 
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the vote in August 2010, and the situation still prevails, presenting the biggest challenge to 
gender mainstreaming within the community. 
We are asking the government to come to the grassroots, we sit together and 
discuss, and for them to explain the Constitution to the community because we 
don’t know. They only come during the campaign period. (Female respondent, 
Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 07.03.2016) 
The limited civic education carried out was skewed and marred with political interest, and very 
little, if anything at all, on rights and responsibilities was discussed. 
There wasn't much of civic education…What there was, is that they told us 
Christians to refuse Islamic law and legalisation of abortion…But we did not 
understand what it all meant. (Female respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward - 
Kajiado West, 23.03.2016)  
These shortcomings created a loophole that promotes the apparent lack of political will and 
commitment to gender equality. Combined with the structural barriers, they create a system 
where political institutions are unable to perform as expected due to the proliferation of 
powerful norms that particularly undermine gender reforms (Chappell and Waylen, 2013). 
Women therefore continue to lack an equal voice in participatory decision-making processes 
which would improve their agency and legitimise public participation within the community.  
Unlike the national level, public appointments at the ward level meet the two thirds gender rule, 
fulfilling women’s descriptive representation. However, this representation cannot be 
substantiated, as the women do not really have a voice or any decision-making authority. This 
lack of authority reflects a lack of commitment to the enforcement of quota systems, which 
Dahlerup (2005) argues may be due to the perception that quotas are purely symbolic. 
This attitude extends to other positions in the administration, such as the chiefs; it is 
recommended that the Chief and the assistant Chief be representative of both genders. This is 
so, to allow women have one of their own to whom they can address their concerns, especially 
on matters such as domestic disputes which would be difficult to report to a man. It however 
does not work out as envisioned, because the women in these positions always have men as 
colleagues and fellow decision makers. Therefore, these men and the structure as is, do little to 
legitimise the position of these women, clearly highlighting the paradox of policy commitments. 
On a female Chief in the Ewuaso Kedong Ward, respondents in the fourth FGD reported: 
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In her position, the men just let her be for the sake of it. So it can be seen that 
she is there…She is there because the government has said she should be…She 
is there but most decisions are made for her…She is given the opportunity to 
speak but it is not so that she can say everything. The power is there just 
because the government created the position…They still say a woman cannot 
do much…When a woman stands to speak on something they do not like, they 
use very bad language, asking 'What can a woman say or do?'…They ask in 
what capacity that woman gets up to speak to them. (Female respondents, 
Ewuaso Kedong Ward - Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
This scenario depicts the infiltration of gender bias into the government administration, the 
consequence of which is a lack of commitment to fulfilling the agenda tasked to public 
institutions. Chapter seven will provide deeper insights into this. Cooke and Kothari (2001) 
point out that having women in power without power is a failure of participation, not from 
operation or technique, but as a systemic consequence. Supporting this, Connell (2005) 
theorises that principle and practice differ in the acceptance of change by men, which is 
especially evident in the Maasai community since it is men who, thanks to their political 
dominance, select women who will join in the committees and even endorse candidates for the 
Women Representative position.  
For example, when Mary Seneta expressed political interest, we had not known 
her previously but we voted for her (as Women Representative) because the 
men said they already knew her. (Female respondent, Ewuaso Kedong – 
Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
In the Maasai patriarchal set-up, it really matters that the male political class endorses a 
candidate, otherwise they stand little chance of winning. For women, this process begins with 
a husband’s support, in consonance with the observation that families are ‘‘a key source of 
support to women accessing parliamentary politics’’ (Rai, 2012: 209). Fathers and husbands 
therefore play a big role in legitimising the political candidacy of women, as they have the 
socio-economic capital necessary to get into political institutions.  
While it is true that Maasai women could do a lot more in nominating and voting for one of 
their own, the financial requirements in the Kenyan patron-client political set-up exclude many 
of them from being actively engaged in the political scene (Kimani, 2014). The endorsement of 
women candidates by men then makes it difficult for the women who get into political power 
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to contradict their benefactors, such that in the end, the system supports and upholds an elitist 
political structure controlled by men. 
Beyond representative positions, there are men keen on volunteering as civic education 
ambassadors within their communities, if there is government support. This is necessary as 
financial support is required to facilitate movement and resources such as expertise and texts, 
to promote training of trainers in a system that would speed up the process and increase the 
depth of outreach.  
In order to deal with these problems and help women feel like part of society is 
that we the knowledgeable men…need to volunteer to teach whenever public 
meetings take place or during the women's merry-go-rounds since the 
government seems to have abandoned the grassroots. If the county government 
can facilitate this because facilitation might be problematic especially in 
reaching out to women in this vast area, it would go a long way in uplifting our 
women and our community in general. (Male Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward 
– Narok East, 201.04.2016) 
Additionally, this partnership would have a positive influence on the relationship between 
citizens and government administration, as communication and support channels would be 
readily available to both parties. This would also go a long way in legitimising outcomes of 
public participation exercises. The role that men can play in the promotion of equality is 
discussed further in chapter eight. 
However, the affordance of new platforms for empowerment does not translate to supportive 
environments and positive outcomes. This is made evident in the position of Women 
Representatives and their administration of funds meant to provide special attention to 
challenges faced by women. The representatives administer the Affirmative Action Social 
Development Fund (AASDF), established in February 2015. The object of the fund is to 
complement the National Government Constituency Development Fund (NG-CDF) by paying 
special focus on women, the youth, persons with disabilities, children and the elderly. The NG-
CDF of 2016 is a successor of the 2003 CDF Act, and is set at 2.5% of the national government’s 
annual revenue. On the other hand, the AASDF fund disbursement is limited to annual work 
programs and cost estimates, which are to be prepared by the administrator of the fund and 
approved by the board at the beginning of the financial year to which they relate. As a result, 
the AASDF allocations tend to be much lower than the NG-CDF. In the financial year 2015/16 
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for example, the AASDF fund received Kshs. 2 billion40while the NG-CDF received Ksh. 35.2 
billion.41 
In a political set-up that relies heavily on clientelistic relationships, the limited AASDF funding 
means that women representatives are incapacitated at giving special assistance to women. 
Many respondents were unaware of the existence of this fund, with the common belief being 
that the women representatives have no development fund.  
We believe that the Women Rep. is the voice of women in parliament…they have 
no fund allocations to come help women. If I call her, she comes in her capacity 
as a friend, not as an MP who has the CDF (Constituency Development Fund) 
kitty. Our MP has a lot of projects, and no one can oppose him, but the Women 
Rep only has the name and the salary. (Female respondent, Loitokitok – 
Kajiado South, 03.03.2016)  
The Women Representatives are also allowed to administer the Uwezo Fund, a programme 
aimed at enabling women, youth and persons with disability access finances to promote 
businesses and enterprises at the constituency level. The equitable distribution of this fund has 
however been widely questioned. It has reportedly been overtaken by an elite who have become 
guaranteed beneficiaries in every allocation cycle, leaving out many other deserving citizens. 
This is in addition to its demanding and tedious application process that leaves very little room 
for the illiterate to participate.  
This problem is spread out through the country, as reported by The Institute of Social 
Accountability (TISA). TISA’s study finds that among Kenyans, perceptions of fairness and 
equity in the administration of various affirmative action funds are very low. For example, only 
30% perceived the management of the Women Enterprise Fund (WEF) to be equitable and fair 
(TISA, 2017: 8).  
Poor participation, lack of information and corruption in disbursement were generally reported 
as highly prevalent in the management and disbursement of affirmative action funds. 
 
40  Affirmative Action Social Development Fund against the spirit of the Constitution 
http://www.mzalendo.com/blog/2015/09/12/affirmative-action-social-development-fund-against-the-spirit-of-
the-constitution/ Accessed: 12.09.2015 
 
41 Kenya: More Cash for the CDF http://allafrica.com/stories/201506120533.html Accessed: 12.09.2015 
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Responding to complaints by women on the same, a male respondent asked the women to be 
more reflective of the process: 
If my neighbour has benefitted, then I would say I am happy and comfortable 
because someone has benefitted. But if we all miss out, then there is a gap that 
could either be on our side or the administration's so when they give feedback, 
it can be used to bridge this gap. I have heard a lot of women saying they have 
really tried but they never benefit from the public fund. So where is the problem? 
Is it me who did not fulfil all the obligations, or is it that the whole thing is a 
hoax? (Male Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 21.04.2016)  
According to the TISA report, the root cause of these complaints is the administration. The 
information sharing strategies are reportedly so poor that benefits are limited to those with 
networks to the administrators, who are privy to clear information on application criteria and 
procedures. Consequently, the funds remain out of reach for many women, especially those 
who are most in need. Even for those who qualify, the allocated funds are too little, requiring a 
top-up if they are to be truly transformative. It is for these reasons that the fund is argued to not 
only be duplicative of the NG-CDF, and therefore unnecessary, but also another platform for 
corruption.42Consequently, such initiatives that would be an opportunity for transforming the 
socio-economic condition of Maasai women sadly end up being ineffective. 
5.4 The Maasai Woman as a Political Agent 
As the history of affirmative action in Kenya detailed in chapter four shows, patriarchal 
considerations, though existent in pre-colonial times, were strengthened during the colonial era. 
This confirms that the informal can work to ‘‘support, or work in parallel with the formal 
institutions of the state’’ (Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 606). The Victorian dictates of gender 
roles from the British colonialists therefore alienated women from the public space even further, 
and the Maasai were not exempted from this. As Hodgson (2001) aptly documents, the 
complementarity of roles among men and women was replaced by a system that favoured men’s 
authority and control.   
The cultural, economic and institutional barriers to women’s political involvement as 
highlighted in this chapter are therefore a result of the continued male dominance and their 
reluctance to cede control and share authority with women. The ensuing politico-institutional 
 
42  Affirmative Action Social Development Fund against the spirit of the Constitution 
http://www.mzalendo.com/blog/2015/09/12/affirmative-action-social-development-fund-against-the-spirit-of-
the-constitution/ Accessed: 12.09.2015 
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arrangements have thus constrained ‘‘the expression and articulation’’ of women’s perspectives 
(Mackay, 2008: 129). As a result, most Kenyan women have been unable to benefit from the 
changing socio-political landscape, with Maasai men making it more difficult for their women 
by ascribing to a power structure that does not reflect contemporary socio-economic realities.  
It could be assumed that Kenyan women would substantially benefit from the struggle that 
culminated in the 2010 Constitution, an instrument that exemplifies the success of the 
affirmative action struggle. But this is sadly not so. As this chapter demonstrates, Maasai 
women continue to face discrimination from their menfolk, many of whom insist that the public 
space rightfully belongs to men. As political agents, Maasai men demonstrate how actors resist 
institutional change when there is no ‘‘tight coupling between the old informal and the new 
formal’’ (Mackay et al., 2010: 576). Not even liberal Christian teachings have managed to 
influence a major shift in perspectives. 
Opinions on the masculinity of the Maasai political sphere are founded on a traditional social 
structure which inadvertently promotes discrimination against women. The historical socio-
cultural changes have caused substantial erosion to the complementarity of roles, meaning that 
there is also a reduction in the public influence of women. The prevalence of this attitude on 
subordination in present day Kenya may be difficult to grasp, especially considering the effort 
that has gone into publicising the women’s struggle over the years. As Mackay (2008: 134) 
points out however, in the pursuit of substantive institutional change, ‘‘inclusive mechanisms 
of dialogue in the ongoing and iterative processes of contestation that accompany 
implementation’’ are as important as mechanisms for accountability., which are seemingly 
ineffective. 
What gender debate in Kenya highlights therefore, is its non-inclusivity, which informs the 
disregard for historically moulded contextual realities. As Kanyi (2016) notes, ordinary women 
remained ignorant of the ongoing changes as these occurred predominantly at the policy level. 
Daniel (2011) further points out that the concentration of NGOs and women organisations in 
Nairobi means that they are out of touch with most women in Kenya, and especially those in 
rural areas. The current political situation among Maasai women in their struggle for equality 
is a clear manifestation of these shortcomings. They are facing the socio-political struggles that 
Kenyan women were supposed to have tackled in the 1990s, meaning that they are not only 
struggling to catch up with their men, but also the rest of the women in Kenya.  
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The attitude that informs individuals’ perceptions and reception to change is a great determinant 
of the success of a change campaign. Among the Maasai, low levels of formal educational 
attainments and subsequently, formal employment, residence in mostly rural areas and a 
socialisation process that seemingly promotes the subordination of women, constitute an 
inhibiting environment. They limit opportunities for the recognition of the potential of women 
to participate and make public contributions to society as much as the men do.  
Aware of this reality, the case depicts a community where most women opt for a powerless 
presence, instead of confrontation (Moglen, 1983) as the desired pathway to approaching 
gender equality. In confronting the struggles of legitimising their influence, women are slowly 
normalising their presence in the public space, and it can be hoped that with time, acceptability 
will increase, as will their influence on decision making. At the same time, there are women 
who are taking up the challenge; before the third FGD in Loitokitok for example, an argument 
erupted over women’s insistence to be recognised as equally capable to engage in political 
affairs. To this, a female respondent pointed out that the men can call these women all the names 
they can conjure, but the women will not be quiet until they are taken seriously. The lady in 
question is a known activist who credits her active engagement to the support her husband 
provides. She acknowledges that without his support, she would not be able to be politically 
active. This support reportedly earned him disdain from his peers, but his refusal to concede 
has now earned him respect among those he has managed to demonstrate that supporting his 
wife does not emasculate him but has contributed to an improved livelihood of his family. 
Altogether, the narratives in this chapter demonstrate the important role that informal 
institutions play in the Kenyan political landscape. The challenges that women face in trying to 
assert their political agency are grounded in cultural politics of belonging and power, which 
happen to favour men over women. Chappell and Waylen (2013: 601) point out that parity 
would not necessarily change how institutions operate, as the swapping of women for men in 
‘‘traditionally masculine arenas does little to disrupt either the symbolism or practices of the 
gender order.’’ As the institutionalisation of equality in Kenya has so far demonstrated, gender 
bias is deeply entrenched, and impartial to equality arrangements in the politico-institutional 
environment. 
Due consideration for the gendered politics of power and belonging is therefore necessary, as 
they govern power relations within the community, shaping attitudes and responses to the 
promotion of openness to inclusive engagement processes. These politics influence women’s 
approach to engagement in the civic public sphere, and men’s acceptance of this reality, because 
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political institutions are ‘‘profoundly gendered’’ (Kenny, 2014: 679). Among the Maasai 
therefore, evidence suggests that women will not enjoy their political rights unless and until 
there are opportunities that would amplify the benefits of allowing them to influence decision 
making in public affairs, thus dis-incentivising men’s dominance.  
Mackay (2008: 132) defines women’s citizenship as ‘‘agency to participate as peers in social 
and political spheres,’’ and argues that the same should be recognised in both social and 
political institutions. One way to promote their citizenship would therefore be through the 
creation of platforms that can demonstrate the capacity of women to make meaningful 
contributions to the life of these institutions.  
In the following chapter, I therefore explore how the provision of such a platform, namely 
participatory budgeting under devolution in Kenya, influences the position of women as agents 
capable of influencing public decisions. The chapter pays attention to the expected achievement 
of empowerment from power transfer to citizens, particularly women. By evaluating the extent 
of coupling between legislation on equality in public participation and actual practice, the 
chapter provides empirical evidence on the interaction between state law and informal 
institutions with differing value systems on the political agency of women. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DECENTRALISATION, PARTICIPATION AND 
EMPOWERMENT 
The previous chapter concludes by inferring that attitudes towards the political agency of 
women can be reshaped through the provision of platforms where their political efficacy can be 
demonstrated. This would influence men to accept women’s political agency, from the 
demonstrated benefits of allowing them to contribute to decision making. In this chapter 
therefore, I employ the concept of power transfer through decentralisation to analyse how 
participation, as a new affordance for inclusion, influences gender equality in politics among 
the Maasai. Situated within the context of devolution in Kenya, the chapter focuses on the 
complementarity of the principles of participation and empowerment in eliminating exclusion 
and achieving equality.  
Taking into account attitudes towards the political agency of women as discussed in chapters 
four and five, I aim to explore whether, and to what extent, the coupling and decoupling of 
institutional norms influence women’s political agency. In order to do so, I situate the 
discussion on the assumed neutrality of a public sphere as a space where individuals deliberate 
as equals towards the common good (Habermas, 1989). Coupling and decoupling processes are 
therefore examined through an evaluation of public participation in the county budgeting 
processes, in accordance with the 2016 County Public Participation (CPP) guidelines. These 
guidelines are in place to provide mechanisms for equality in participation as envisioned in 
Chapter Eleven of the Constitution which lays out the framework for devolution. Informed by 
the barriers and attitudes towards Maasai women’s political participation discussed in chapter 
five, this chapter is guided by the following objectives under Article 174 of the Constitution: 
(c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the 
people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them. 
(d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development. 
(e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised 
communities. 
(f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily 
accessible services throughout Kenya. 
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Conceptually speaking therefore, these legal objectives project a Habermasian public sphere, 
where the legitimacy of a public decision depends on majority deliberation and support. Putting 
them into consideration therefore provides a glimpse into the patterns of engagement, different 
aspects of power relations, and how these then influence the achievement of equality objectives 
among the Maasai. The chapter thus explores how tightly coupled ‘rules-in-form’ and ‘rules-
in-use’ are (Mackay et al., 2010: 576), through an investigation into how legal (constitutional) 
provisions guaranteeing citizens the right to political agency are operationalised in the face of 
informal systems that seemingly curtail women’s political agency. In so doing, I aim to 
contribute to the understanding of how the formal and informal interact to influence responses, 
and how institutional realities influence the outcome of norm-changing legal provisions. 
In section one, the chapter briefly discusses the debate on decentralisation and participation, 
outlining the pros and cons of propagating participation under decentralisation as an effective 
way of eliminating exclusion. This is followed in section two by a description of the 
administrative operation of devolution in Kenya. In section three, the chapter evaluates public 
participation in Kajiado and Narok CPP guidelines. The outcome of this evaluation informs the 
discussion on the empowerment of Maasai women through public participation. The reasons 
for the disparities between new formal and old informal rules on the political agency of women 
is then described in section five.  
6.1 Decentralisation and Public Participation  
Decentralisation bears significant socio-political consideration as it involves a shift in power 
and with it, resources. The transfer of power to citizens, making them co-sharers in decision 
making processes, makes an important contribution to participatory democracy, through 
increased avenues for the exercise of equality. This power however transfer takes place in the 
face of socio-political realities that can either accelerate or slow down this process, as the 
influence of informal norms in Kenya has suggested in chapters four and five. In addition to 
this, Crook (2003) points out that shaping a decentralisation structure and the extent of its 
acceptability, especially for the ruling elite, is very much determined by the politics of ethno-
regional conflicts.  
This is of relevance in the Kenyan political environment, where national politics are based on 
ensuring regional representation, since regions also tend to be ethnic enclaves. Among ethnic 
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groups are different clans,43making the clan system a sphere of political and social influence. 
Lowndes (2005) points out that taking these ethno-regional realities into consideration is crucial, 
because local governance is a matrix of rule sets that reflect power relationships existing in 
historical and spatial contexts. This, she posits, influences the interpretation, adaptation and 
implementation of rules as influenced by power relations and positions of authority. Ethno-
regional balance is also pursued at the level of county governments in Kenya, to ensure the 
representation of the different clans that form ethnic groups, as well as sub-clans and minority 
ethnic groups whenever applicable.  
By focusing on the adaptation and interpretation of public participation among the Maasai of 
Kajiado and Narok, this chapter sheds light on whether the participation forums are free from 
the socio-cultural politics discussed in chapter five. The affordance of a government-supported 
platform of engagement bears great potential in reshaping power relations among the Maasai, 
which could improve the status of women. In this case therefore, decentralisation allows for the 
investigation of ‘‘processes of interpretation, imitation and adaptation’’ in institutional change 
(Mackay et al., 2010: 578). This chapter therefore makes clear the extent and effect of 
interdependence between formal and informal institutions and their norm functions in relation 
to gender equality. 
Before probing the specifics of this change process however, the discussion briefly looks at the 
debate on decentralisation and its influence on government-citizen relations, patterns of 
participation, and service delivery.  
Challenges of Implementing Decentralisation 
Transforming institutions requires dedicated effort to strengthening and broadening 
accountability mechanisms at both local and national levels. Ghana, Uganda and Ethiopia 
represent some of the countries across Sub-Saharan African that have embarked on 
decentralisation aimed at increasing citizen participation in governance. Despite the enhanced 
participation however, there is arguably little to show in consequences of the same as far as 
responsive local authorities and citizen-centred policymaking are concerned (Ndegwa, 2002). 
This therefore raises doubt on the value of decentralisation in the promotion of gender equality. 
 
43 A clan constitutes individuals united by actual or perceived descent. This element of perception differentiates a 
clan from a ‘lineage’, where descent can be demonstrated. It is for example possible for a non-Maasai to be 
incorporated into a clan through ritual performance (Coast, 2001). 
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In the investigation of institutional gender dimensions, effective accountability mechanisms are 
crucial as they ‘‘may counter legacies of institutional gender bias and capture’’ (Mackay, 2008: 
134). Wunsch (2001) echoes this in his argument that many decentralisation efforts in Africa 
are experiencing problems stemming from difficulties in translating initiatives for reform into 
workable processes and operations at the local level. This, he explains, is due to the combined 
reluctance of central governments to relinquish authority in key areas, and the complexity in 
redesigning organisational structures to support decentralisation. The presence of actors trying 
to retain authority and control resources therefore becomes a great barrier to effective 
decentralisation.  
Evidence of this can be found in a study by Timothy Okech on the devolution of health services 
in Kenya. He finds that despite a commitment to universal healthcare, there is an apparent lack 
of investment planning, a poor distribution of medical supplies, and limited solidarity in 
healthcare financing. These have contributed to a skewed distribution of health resources, and 
consequently, differences in health outcomes across the country (Okech, 2017). These 
challenges echo similar observations by Ndii (2010) on the failure of decentralisation efforts in 
the 1980s. 
These challenges are also part of a wider resource allocation challenge; county governments 
are supposed to receive financing from the treasury depending on their population size, poverty 
indices and fiscal responsibility. This allocation formula also includes an equalisation fund for 
counties that have lower levels of revenue generation. As it is however, the national treasury 
delays in releasing the funds, so county governments often find themselves lacking the financial 
resources required to meet their obligations.44 As section 6.3 will demonstrate, this makes 
service delivery difficult for the county governments, in addition to delays in wage payments 
as has been the case with nurses across the country.45  
Kena Jebessa reports on similar challenges in Ethiopia, where public protests are dominant, 
challenging continued control by the central government despite formal decentralisation. This 
control means that Ethiopia is still struggling to achieve good governance and democratisation, 
even though decentralisation has been in operation since 1991 (Jebessa, 2016). These cases 
 
44  Release county funds now, governors tell Government: 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001271266/release-county-cash-governors-demand 
Accessed: 27.02.2018 
 
45 Nurses threaten to take action over unpaid dues https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nurses-threaten-to-take-action-
over-unpaid-dues-/1056-4251386-by0srtz/ Accessed: 05.01.2018 
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resonate with the assessment by Wunsch (2001) on the unsuccessful operationalisation of 
decentralisation across Africa, reiterating the need for effectiveness through accountability and 
changes in institutional behaviour among government bureaucracies. 
Citing the case of Ghana, Crook (2003) illustrates that participation by itself, though a necessary 
condition under decentralisation, is not enough to guarantee responsiveness. This, he notes, is 
because responsiveness does not automatically follow from increased participation or 
representation of special interest groups. Instead, he points out, the success of any 
decentralisation effort is a product of the seamless alignment of means, and towards the end – 
a governance structure that is inclusive, consultative and one that promotes justice and equality.  
A lack of alignment between policy and delivery unfortunately means that participation 
becomes a platform for the legitimisation of institutional transformation, without actual 
commitment to addressing outcomes of the process. As a result, Hanna (2000) warns, 
participation can serve as window dressing, lending credibility to decisions rather than helping 
to construct them. 
Benefits of Implementing Decentralisation  
Despite these challenges, the main argument for decentralisation remains that it brings 
government closer to the people, promoting political participation by the citizens and ultimately, 
responsive policy making by the government (Crook, 2003). Decentralisation therefore 
becomes the driving force for deliberative democracy, an argument that topped the agenda in 
the period before the Kenyan Constitution was overwhelmingly voted for.  ‘Power to the people’ 
created a euphoria that in some ways still prevails in the country, as citizens feel more engaged 
in decision making. This confirms arguments that recognition and inclusion play a significant 
role in promoting substantive representation (Mackay, 2008). 
It has been observed therefore, that ‘‘participation has in itself become a fundamental human 
and citizenship right, and a prerequisite for making other rights claims’’ (Gaventa, 2002: 3).  
This is because participation emphasizes a bottom-up approach focused on locally defined 
priorities and perspectives for the generation of knowledge for action (Cornwall and Jewkes, 
1995). Adoption of this approach to governance, Holland and Blackburn (1998) posit, allows 
for the involvement of different community members in the articulation of complex and non-
quantifiable cause-and-effect processes. This then legitimizes their knowledge, redefining 
expertise in ways that create room for the experiences of those affected by social policies. For 
women therefore, participation provides an avenue where they can counter ‘‘institutionalised 
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gender bias’’ through substantive representation (Mackay, 2008: 129). Their involvement thus 
facilitates the emergence of alternative interpretations of needs, informing alternative policy 
solutions (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). These affordances make participation very important 
for social groups whose input has been historically absent from the political sphere. 
Bolivia’s 1994 Law of Popular Participation - Ley de Participación Popular (LPP) is an 
example of how decentralisation creates room for the involvement of marginalised groups. The 
law mandated broad-based participatory processes, starting at the neighbourhood level as part 
of local government decentralisation. It recognises the importance of social organisations that 
already existed (including indigenous communities, with their own practices and customs) and 
legally creates citizens’ oversight committees in each municipality which are empowered to 
freeze municipal budgets if actual expenditures vary too far from the planning processes 
(Gaventa, 2004). Bolivia’s LPP thus presents decentralisation as a process of power transfer to 
citizens, empowering them to drive local development. 
At its core therefore, decentralisation is crucially about ‘‘the processes that public managers, 
citizens, and stakeholders use in determining what shape policy, its implementation, and its 
enforcement will take’’ (Bingham et al., 2005: 548). By definition therefore, the process 
promotes good governance as characterised by power sharing in decision making. Considering 
that institutions ‘‘magnify the position of their creators,’’ power sharing allows a marginal 
group such as women ‘‘to exercise leverage well beyond their apparently meagre power 
resources’’ (Lovenduski, 2011: ix). In its inclusion of the politically marginalised, 
decentralisation provides a platform for both the engagement and empowerment of women in 
public decision-making processes.  
This argument bears a lot of significance for Maasai women who have had, for a long time, 
limited power over decisions that affect their public agency, designating them to a position of 
an equally limited power to effect change.  
With such potential, being present at a public forum, as an act by itself, becomes beneficial 
even though forms of engagement may not be as inclusive as could ideally be. The additional 
provision of reserved seats for Women Representatives increases the incentive for active 
participation, because of the change in the face of public decision-making. Similar effects can 
be found at the local level, where women from Ewuaso Kedong Ward reported that even though 
there were no elected women in the County Assembly, the presence of women as Nyumba Kumi 
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members and chairs was a source of confidence in the increased opportunities for the political 
inclusion of women.  
The present situation is better than what we had before. Women are getting 
closer to political leadership…At least women are now in positions of 
authority…We are saying it has helped a bit because earlier, women could not 
even speak. Meetings would go on and end without the engagement of women. 
But now, if a woman from Nyumba Kumi is present, she is given a chance and 
when they call for a meeting with community leaders, both men and women are 
present and women get a chance to speak. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
These opportunities are available as a result of quotas within devolved units, which necessitate 
the granting of opportunities for women in public forums. This has an influence on symbolic 
representation, by sending the message that the public space is slowly opening up to women, 
and that there eventually will be an equal engagement platform. In a study on the effect of 
substantive representation on political participation among American Latinos, Jeong (2013: 
1247) observes that ‘‘visible political leadership by members of a minority group encourages 
minorities to feel that politics is not a closed arena, thereby leading to their more active 
involvement in politics.’’ As the excerpt above confirms, there is already a positive influence 
among women on the opportunities for inclusion, which encourages political engagement.  
Bearing these in mind, the discussion now shifts to how decentralisation is organised in Kenya, 
before embarking on an evaluation of its promotion of gender equality. 
6.2 Decentralisation in Kenya 
Chapter 11 of the Constitution spells out, among others, the objects and principles of devolved 
government, functions and powers of county governments, and relationships between central 
and county governments. These are backed by the County Governments Act (CGA) of 2012, 
which sets the rules of operation under the devolution structure, specifying the coordination and 
facilitation of public participation in the development of policies and plans, and the delivery of 
services. Part VIII of the Act focuses on participation, with specifications on among others, the 
principles of public participation in counties, citizens’ right to petition and challenge decisions, 
and the establishment of modalities and platforms for participation.  Within this framework, 
power is devolved from the national government to 47 county governments, whose bottom-up 
operational and relational structure is captured in Figure 6.1 below.  
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This structure of decentralisation evidences a focus on reaching out to citizens at the lowest 
level, especially with the integration of village councils which are traditional non-governmental 
entities.  
Figure 6.1 County governments organization structure based on officers 
 
 
 
 
In the following sub-section, the discussion briefly summarises the role of officers at each level 
in fulfilling the objectives of devolution. 
6.2.1 Composition and Duties of County Government Officers 
Chaired by a Village Administrator, a Village Council consists of not less than three and not 
more than five elders chosen by the Village Administrator, with due respect to gender balance. 
This council is tasked with coordinating public participation at the village level, and such other 
activities that promote local development at the village, as well as cooperation with other 
administrative units. This unit symbolises the incorporation of informal institutions of 
governance, since village councils are a feature of traditional socio-political structures found 
across African communities. Their new status as formal state actors can be seen as the result of 
a negotiation process (Neubert, 2009) which has necessitated a restructuring of the institution - 
to include previously excluded women - in exchange for official state recognition. In its 
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legitimised decision-making position, the council is tasked with protecting and promoting 
public interests. 
Above the council are Village Administrators, who oversee administrative functions at the 
village level and are answerable to the Ward Administrators. Village units are so determined 
by the County Assembly whose members are elected Ward Representatives, commonly referred 
to as Members of the County Assembly (MCAs). Neither Kajiado nor Narok County 
Assemblies have accomplished this task however, reportedly due to a lack of financial resources. 
In both counties therefore, local government administration officially begins at the Ward level, 
but the administrators reported having informally selected elders to help them out in their duties 
at the village level. The village councils and administrators do not however receive any form 
of remuneration from the county government, but receive financial and such other support as 
may be necessary for the fulfilment of their duties. 
Ward Administrators are competitively selected by the County Public Service Board, the county 
government’s employment agency, to represent each electoral ward represented in the County 
Assembly. Their roles are similar to those of Sub-County Administrators who are their 
supervisors. Also competitively selected by the County Public Service Board, Sub-County 
Administrators are charged with coordinating and supervising administrative functions for each 
constituency. In carrying out this mandate, they are responsible to the relevant County Chief 
Officers in charge of public service at the county and are nominated by the Governor from a 
list of competitively selected candidates. Nominated candidates need the approval of the County 
Assembly to assume office as County Chief Officers and are answerable to County Executive 
Committee Members of the relevant County Departments. 
Nominated by the Governor and approved by the County Assembly, County Secretaries are 
secretaries to the County Executive Committee. They are therefore in charge of county public 
service and such other duties as may be determined by the County Executive Committee. 
Functions of the members of this committee are provided under Article 183 of the Constitution. 
These include; to implement county legislation; implement, within the county, national 
legislation to the extent that the legislation so requires; manage and coordinate the functions of 
the county administration and its departments and; perform any other functions conferred on it 
by the Constitution or national legislation. The committee may also prepare proposed 
legislation for consideration by the County Assembly and shall provide the assembly with full 
and regular reports on matters relating to the county.  
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Governors are directly elected by voters registered in a county. The roles of governors and their 
deputies include providing leadership in governance and development, while ensuring service 
delivery and proper management of county resources. The governor and his deputy are also 
legally required to promote public participation. Per Section 30(3) (g) of the CGA, the Governor 
should promote and facilitate citizen participation in the development of policies, plans and 
service delivery in the county. Section 46(2) (g) of the same Act provides that the County 
Executive Committee should ensure the widest possible outreach for participatory decision 
making. 
The Sub County Administrator is, per Section 50(3) (g), responsible for the coordination, 
management and supervision of the general administrative functions in the Sub County. This 
includes the facilitation and coordination of citizen participation in the development of policies, 
plans and service delivery. Under Section 51(3) (g), the ward administrator is responsible for 
the coordination, management and supervision of the general administrative functions in the 
ward including the facilitation and coordination of citizen participation in the development of 
policies, plans and service delivery. Per Section 52(3)(a)(I), the village administrator is 
responsible for the coordination, management and supervision of the general administrative 
functions in the village, including ensuring and coordinating the participation of the village unit 
in governance. 
Article 196 of the Constitution provides that a County Assembly should facilitate public 
participation and its involvement in its committees, the legislative and other business of the 
assembly. Lastly, Section 125 of the Public Finance Management Act provides the involvement 
of the public in the budget making process, to be overseen by the County Executive Committee 
member for finance. 
Having outlined the structure of devolution according to the Constitution and articulating the 
composition and functions of each unit, the discussion now shifts to the operationalisation of 
this structure in Kajiado and Narok. With due recognition of the unofficial status of the existing 
Village Councils, the analysis in this chapter nonetheless focuses on the village and ward levels. 
The negotiated working arrangements reported by Ward Administrators negate the informal 
nature of the village units, as they nonetheless shape public participation. The analysis therefore 
checks on the mechanisms of inclusion and what effect these have, by evaluating the 
effectiveness of public participation as a platform for citizen empowerment in general, with 
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particular focus being paid to the effect of this on Maasai women. Before beginning the analysis, 
I describe the framework for the operationalisation of citizen engagement. 
6.2.2 Framework for Public Participation in Kenya 
Citizen participation in Kenya is guided by Part VIII of the CGA and the 2016 CPP guidelines 
as developed by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning in cooperation with the Council of 
Governors. The CPP guidelines inform on; the constitutional and legal foundation for public 
participation in county governments, content and mechanisms for public participation, enablers 
of public participation, petitions, compliment/complaint, grievance and redress mechanisms for 
public participation, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning of public participation, and 
common challenges with public participation and some proposals of mitigation.  
Per the CPP guidelines, public participation entails; informing the public by providing 
information to help them understand the issues, options and solutions; consulting with the 
public to obtain their feedback on alternatives or decisions; involving the public to ensure their 
concerns are considered throughout the decision making process, particularly in the 
development of decision criteria and options; collaborating with the public to develop decision 
criteria and alternatives and identify the preferred solution and; empowering the public by 
placing final decision-making authority in their hands. 
However, public participation rights and duties are not limited to the administration, as the 
public is also called to action to ensure effective public participation in their respective counties. 
These duties and responsibilities are laid out in the CPP guidelines and include: 
▪ Equal participation in decision making processes at the county. 
▪ Freedom of expression including the freedom to seek, receive or impart information or 
ideas. 
▪ Right to access information held by the state, including information required for 
effective public participation. 
▪ Involvement in strategizing, mapping, prioritisation and codification of issues that may 
be subjected to public participation be they draft policies, legislation or development 
plans.  
▪ Participation in decision making processes as individuals or representative groups.  
▪ Duty to fully participate in county civic education initiatives and other processes. 
▪ Duty to monitor and evaluate the implementation of policies, legislation, development 
plans, citizen’s participation and the civic education process. 
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Bearing in mind these duties and responsibilities for both county governments and citizens, the 
discussion now focuses on the mechanisms and outcomes of public participation exercises in 
the study areas.  
6.3 Public Participation in Kajiado and Narok Counties 
To analyse public participation and its affordance of opportunities for equality, this section 
adopts the framework provided in the CPP guidelines. This framework spells out the conditions 
necessary for meaningful participation, which are; clarity of the subject matter, clear structure 
and process, access to information, opportunity for balanced influence, commitment to the 
process, inclusive and effective representation, a climate of integrity, a belief in the value of 
public input, capacity to engage, complete transparency, and bearing in mind standing 
conditions of the participants.  
To ensure that I check on the effectiveness of these conditions, the analysis additionally 
incorporates the evaluation criteria proposed by Rowe and Frewer (2000), which propose a 
division of public participation evaluation into Acceptance and Process Criteria. Acceptance 
criteria relate to the effective construction and implementation of a procedure, and include 
representativeness, independence, early involvement, influence and transparency. Process 
criteria relate to the potential public acceptance of a procedure, and include resource 
accessibility, task definition, structured decision making, and cost effectiveness. In justifying 
the criteria, Rowe and Frewer (2000: 11) point out that ‘‘if a procedure is effectively constituted 
but perceived by the public to be in some sense unfair or undemocratic, then the procedure may 
fail in alleviating public concerns. On the other hand, if a procedure and its recommendations 
are accepted by the public but the ultimate decision is attained in an ineffective manner, then 
its implementation could prove objectively damaging for sponsors and public.’’ It is therefore 
imperative that policies, procedures and outcomes are harmonized, to ensure the effectiveness 
of a public participation exercise.  
The following section discusses the CPP guidelines’ conditions for meaningful participation as 
applies to Kajiado and Narok counties. 
6.3.1 Clarity of the Subject Matter and Access to Information 
Need for clarity emphasises the importance of establishing realistic and practical goals that are 
acceptable to all stakeholders, to mitigate the public’s expectations. Having all stakeholder on 
board is ensures ‘‘there is good fit and tight coupling’’ which reinforces change by minimising 
resistance or direct contradiction (Mackay et al., 2010: 576). For the public especially, 
confidence in the participation process is key to successful transformation. At the same time, 
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the nature and scope of the participation task should be clearly defined. This tallies with Rowe 
and Frewer’s (2000) call for the early involvement of key stakeholders, as the transmission of 
information in a timely manner greatly influences the role played by participants in a public 
forum.  
The CPP guidelines therefore require duty bearers to provide information in acceptable, easy to 
use formats. This calls for use of language that is easy to understand, especially considering the 
education achievements of a particular public, and through channels that would ensure the 
widest possible information outreach. According to Section 99 of the CPP guidelines, these 
channels include; Television, Brochures, Newsletters, Information communication technology, 
Mass mailing, Websites, Social media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram etc.), 
Community radio stations, Public meetings, Traditional media and Notices in county, Sub-
county, ward and village offices, places of worships, markets, schools, libraries, social clubs, 
medical facilities and national government offices. With this in place, information can reach all 
social groups, ensuring inclusivity.  
Accordingly, Ward administrators reported that they utilise all possible avenues, including local 
vernacular stations: 
Like for instance now, if we have information on citizen participation on budget 
process, we have so many avenues like the local radio stations, the elders, 
village leaders. You know, we have created our networks and now, for most 
people there is this internet so we use WhatsApp groups. Like now in my ward, 
we have WhatsApp groups for elites, we have WhatsApp groups for leaders, so 
once information reaches us, we pass information to these groups, we visit 
churches and all other avenues that are available for conveying that particular 
message. (Ward Administrator, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
30.01.2017) 
This statement however bears challengeable truths. Most respondents reported that because 
information sharing is limited to a small group of people, they remain unaware of public fora. 
For those to whom information might reach at a later stage through their peers (considering 
limitations on exposure as discussed in chapter five, it is mostly men who benefit from this), it 
becomes too late to adequately prepare, or get detailed information. This means that contrary 
to reports by county government agents, the recommendation to explore various 
communication media as set out in the CPP guidelines is not adhered to, at least not in a manner 
that guarantees equal access to information and adequate preparation. 
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In the case of the Kajiado County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) meeting held on 4th 
December 2017, for example, none of the people I spoke to knew of the scheduled meeting. My 
MCA needed to seek confirmation that the meeting had indeed been scheduled. All the 
participants I spoke to on the day of the forum reported that they had received invitations via 
text, signalling the exclusion of most of the people whose contacts the administrators do not 
have. 
Ideally, women in various administrative offices and development committees should be relied 
upon to spread all the necessary information regarding forum agendas. Their positions allow 
them to be better informed and able to pass this information to fellow citizens and especially 
women. Unfortunately, these women are reportedly unaware of contemporary public affairs. 
For example, of a nominated female Member of the County Assembly and member of the 
bursary council for Entonet Ward in Kajiado South, a respondent who is also a relative of the 
nominee lamented that nobody understands what she does, as she never communicates what 
her position entails or what projects the office is working on and their progress. She is arguably 
in the County Assembly and bursary council for the purpose of representing women, without 
much evidence to substantiate her engagement. 
She just occupies her seat, a Councillor in this area…We don’t even know what 
she does, this Councillor, we don’t know what development she’s championing; 
she never reports that a child has received a bursary or we are working on a 
certain development project. (Male Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
07.03.2016) 
This provides insight into the application of gender equality in county government structures, 
where more than their male counterparts, women are seemingly in power without power. These 
women are therefore unable to ‘‘manipulate and subvert’’ the present masculinist institutional 
arrangements, as they lack ‘‘access to and control of information’’ (Moglen: 1983: 133). The 
subsequent inability to engage with the public backtracks the potential gains of symbolic 
representation. The expectation is that these women will be able to communicate on the 
operations of their respective offices to their constituents, ensuring that the public stays 
informed and most importantly, appreciates the benefits of service delivery and government 
response that comes with the existence of these offices. With this in place, the public would be 
encouraged to participate, as there is a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities, 
backed by responsiveness that signals unity of purpose. 
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However, without proper information on the matters in their respective chairs or committees, 
these women are incapable of demonstrating their capacity to carry out their mandate as special 
representatives. Consequently, there is little incentive among the public to promote the political 
engagement and leadership potential of women, as the effect of their presence is hardly tangible. 
In addition to challenges of outreach, respondents reiterated the need to provide information on 
public deliberations in Maa or even Swahili, to deepen the public’s understanding of the subject 
matter and encourage participation. This points to the limits of text mediation in institutional 
practices. By limiting women’s engagement in formal procedures, their knowledge is 
subordinated as it does not fit in the ruling perspective (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 245) further 
alienating them from political engagement. 
6.3.2 Complete Transparency 
This condition highlights the importance of having easily understandable and accessible 
information to educate the public about the issues and options available. The same must 
additionally be shared in a timely manner. This condition is related to the call for the provision 
of information in formats that are easily understandable. The information shared is however not 
easily understandable for most participants. It is presented in policy language necessitating 
translations which consumes the already limited time allocated to deliberations.  
…like I have said, with the policy, the county fiscal strategy paper, the 
presentation is done, everything is in English, some are figures, they cannot 
really make sense out of it so they would rather when it reaches a point where 
you have the plenary, then they raise general issues. It is upon you to know how 
to frame it to suit their needs (Officer, Budget and Economic Planning 
Department – Kajiado County, 23.01.2017) 
This was the case in Loitokitok, where approximately 30 minutes were spent translating and 
explaining the CIDP’s guiding document into Kiswahili and Maa. If the same information had 
been shared on time, and in an easy-to-understand language, the public would have been more 
prepared to contribute to the agenda and make substantial contributions. This provision would 
also arguably contribute to effective time use, as little time would be required for internalising 
the subject matter and more time dedicated to actual deliberations. 
Rowe and Fewer (2000) therefore argue for the involvement of the public early in the process, 
as soon as value judgments become salient. This enables them to be well prepared and therefore 
capable of engaging meaningfully in the participation exercise.  From the interviews and focus 
group discussions, it was evident that the channels and timing of communication to the public 
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are problematic, as they often leave citizens unaware of public meeting agendas. As a result, 
citizens are ill prepared, and/or end up giving opinions that would not be considered due to their 
mismatch with the set agenda.  This happens despite the CPP guidelines’ clear condition, as 
noted in Figure 6.2 below, that information should be shared in a timely manner, so the public 
is knowledgeable and reasonably prepared. Timeliness in this process not only ensures 
effectiveness of the participation exercise, but also results in the success of the participation 
cycle, providing room for feedback sessions, that would allow for the improvement of the 
process, which helps overcome challenges and improve participatory democracy through 
decentralisation. 
Figure 6.2 Public participation communication timelines 
Source: CPP, 2016: 37 
In line with this timeline, a Narok County Budget Officer narrated that ideally, citizens should 
be notified of upcoming public meetings 21 to seven days prior, but realistically, this is done 
three or four days before the main date. The Keekonyokie Ward Administrator noted that such 
poor timing is especially unfair to the women who, unlike their male counterparts who mainly 
focus on single tasks, must manage extensive responsibilities related to managing households 
and planning group meetings and activities. This burden of unpaid care work limits women’s 
mobility (Ortiz-Ospina and Tzvetkova, 2017), and they therefore require more time than the 
men would, to plan accordingly if they are to be present and actively engaged at such meetings. 
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We’ve been having a problem with…the passing of information even between 
us and the head office…they publish something in the newspapers today and 
say the event is for the day after tomorrow…you know women’s affairs require 
planning; if you want to take them for a trip next week, tell them last week so 
they prepare throughout this week. So if you say today that the meeting is 
tomorrow, it’s difficult to find them. (Ward Administrator, Keekonyokie Ward 
– Narok East, 21.02.2017)  
In the case of the 2018-2022 CIDP forums in Narok County, for example, the announcement 
was made on the county government’s website and through The Standard newspaper, on 
Monday 12th February, with the forums scheduled from Wednesday 14th to Friday 16th February 
2018 (see Appendix IV). The agenda was not clearly communicated either, except that the 
meetings would be used to discuss development plans. It is difficult to fathom adequate 
preparedness by members of the public on such short notice, even while ignoring the limitations 
stemming from the media platforms utilised.   
While these faults could be attributed to poor planning and/or execution, they could be, in some 
instances, predetermined (Hanna, 2000). The Narok County Budget Officer interviewed on 
15.02.2017 lent credibility to this argument by pointing out that for outcomes from public 
hearings to be incorporated to the County Integrated Development Plan, they should match 
predetermined functions of the county government, and not necessarily what the citizens have 
outlined.  
This signals a limited commitment to citizen engagement, as outcomes from these forums do 
little to alter the plans already set by the county government. This contradicts the essence of 
participation as a platform for power transfer to citizens, confirming observations that it is 
‘‘more difficult to institutionalise gender equality reforms and norms than other sorts of 
innovations’’ due to variations in the institutionalisation of these reforms in norms and practices 
(Mackay et al., 2009: 259).  
This realisation strengthens the arguments for a genuine bottom up approach to participation. 
Commitment to this approach would ensure that there is a fit between public needs and 
government interventions, to avoid the reported incidences of undesired projects from 
disengaged informants only interested in private gains. Seeking agreeable terms of engagement 
for both the local government and citizens would go a long way in legitimising the participation 
exercises.  
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E-Participation and communication 
The CPP guidelines recognise that online participation in governance and democracy processes 
has become widespread, and counties are increasingly open to receiving information and data 
online. In Narok for example, the government welcomed public opinion via email, to reach the 
administration before the end of the 2018-2022 CIDP deliberations, on 16th February 2018. This 
is very useful for those who cannot be physically present in the forums. For this group of people, 
it is important that the counties develop an elaborate e-participation platform to support 
reciprocal engagement. However, as of September 2018, not many counties provided 
information on public participation on their websites, as Figure 6.3 below illustrates. Before 
attending the Kajiado 2017-2022 CIDP forum in Loitokitok Sub-county, I tried checking for 
additional information from the website, but the website was unavailable. This was the case 
throughout the week before the main event on Monday, 4th December 2017.  
The availability of information to the public and its ease of access are evidently lacking, which 
contributes to the weakening of the effectiveness of public participation in the two counties.   
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Figure 6.3 Availability of budget formulation data across counties in Kenya 
  
As the map shows, Kajiado and Narok counties are among the poorest performing counties in 
the provision of key budget documents online. 
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6.3.3 Clear Structure and Process and Opportunity for Balanced Influence 
The requirement here is that before public participation takes place, clear rules need to be set, 
defining the conduct of the process, tools to be used, and how final decisions will be arrived at. 
Rowe and Frewer (2000) note that a call for structured decision making in participation 
exercises should use and provide appropriate mechanisms for structuring and displaying the 
decision-making process. The establishment and maintenance of horizontal relationships of 
authority with fellow citizens, seek power with rather than power over the citizenry, thus 
providing an opportunity for the citizens’ voices to be factored in policy making (Bingham et 
al., 2005). 
As detailed under the devolution structure in Figure 6.1, descriptive representation begins at the 
very bottom level, ensuring that the views of citizens at the grassroots are taken up the command 
chain. Like all public service positions, there is need for gender balance in the Village Council 
(VC). Representatives of the VC are commonly referred to as Community Elders with the 
position of Village Administrator commonly occupied by a Chief, assisted by an Assistant Chief. 
These two positions were carried forward from the administrative structure in the previous 
constitutional framework. Together with the Ward Administrator, these three positions are 
tasked with voicing citizens’ needs and concerns to the County Government, through the MCAs 
in the County Assembly. Clarity of task definition plays an important role in legitimising 
political processes and activities related to fulfilling public participation mandates (Rowe and 
Frewer, 2000).   
Respondents however reported that due to the non-existent civic education on the new 
Constitution, most of them become knowledgeable on rights and duties as the structure is 
operationalised, and mostly through the failures that play out in the public domain.46This 
loophole has facilitated the dominance of an elite, mostly men, in decision making.  
To ensure balanced influence, rules of engagement at public forums are supposed to ensure a 
balance of opinions and avoid dominance or bias by a section of the public. The participation 
process should therefore be conducted in an independent, unbiased way. Understandably, one 
of the biggest issues with participation, is who controls information and whether the same is 
trustworthy (Hanna, 2000). Participants in public forums need to be assured of the freedom to 
air their opinions and that the same will be given due consideration. This freedom of expression 
 
46 Such as legal action against The Kiambu County Government for ignoring citizen participation before passing 
new laws in the county assembly. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Court-nullifies-controversial-Kiambu-county-
law/1056-2283222-s9eqg4/index.html Accessed: 04.01.2018 
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is a right for all citizens as stated in the CPP guidelines. Doubts in the legitimacy of participants’ 
efforts therefore discourage commitment, faulting the process and consequently, its outcomes.  
Respondents reported that pre-set agendas rule out fair input by citizens, locking out genuine 
deliberations and threatening the legitimacy of the entire process. They also reported that public 
meetings are largely dominated by a few citizens close to the people in power, contradicting 
reports by county government agents, that they put in effort to ensure equal participation: 
There are other men and youth in the meeting, but some men would want to 
speak again and again. So you have to be in charge, and manage those 
situations in a professional way so they don’t also feel slighted…as a facilitator, 
you have to be alive to that fact and let everyone participate (Chief Officer, 
Department of Development Planning  – Narok County, 20.02.2017) 
Respondents pointed out that dominance by a certain group is inevitable, as they are made aware 
of agenda before others, allowing them to align their goals accordingly and therefore engage 
better and faster in the forums. They end up controlling the meetings, thereby shaping outcomes 
and action points, as was reported by a member of the Kuku group ranch in Loitokitok on the 
complete disregard for due process in citizen engagement in decision making processes.  
When a chief calls for a meeting, he already knows who will speak. Even men 
who might have any contribution, stand no chance especially if one wants to 
oppose them, they give you no chance. It is the leaders who are dictators. Even 
in meetings called by the MP, he knows all the speakers. He plans a meeting 
for Rombo from Nairobi, knowing exactly who will speak. Those who had 
pressing issues stand no chance; the chief is told who not to give a chance to, 
as they would ruin the meeting’s plans. So if they can suppress men, what about 
the women? (Male Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 04.03.2016) 
This allegation on the suppression of the voices of those without close relations with 
administrative and political officers confirms the lack of equal opportunity to assert influence 
in participation exercises. As platforms for inclusion and gender mainstreaming therefore, 
devolved structures are reflecting the myths of their institutional environments instead of the 
demands of their work activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). A farmer from Acre Kumi in 
Keekonyokie Ward reiterated this in explaining that his enthusiasm for attending public forums 
had waned because even when called to meetings, there are no benefits to be gained. Not 
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everyone is free to express their opinions, with the elite dominating, and the rest merely 
providing a quorum to qualify the agenda. 
Sometimes you are called to a meeting whose benefits for participation are not 
evident because when you get there, you don't have a chance to give your 
opinion as it is dominated by the strong ones...it gets to a point where the 
women, or even us men, opt to stay at home and do our things as going to such 
meetings bears no fruit because there are those who already have an agenda 
and a strategy to push it through. So when some of us go, we are nothing more 
than pictures because everything has been discussed and decided. (Male 
Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 21.04.2016) 
This confirms the argument by Cooke and Kothari (2001) that the unjust exercise of power is a 
real and potential consequence of participatory development, contrary to the empowerment 
rhetoric that accompanies it. This can be seen in the reported cases of inequality in opinion 
sharing, regardless of the CPP guidelines’ pre-requisite for a commitment to the participation 
process, by ensuring openness to public opinion in decision making. Such accusations also 
contribute to the critique of a lack of genuine commitment to the actualisation of public 
participation and equality. 
The transformative power of public participation is thus brought to question, with its 
independence being curtailed by hidden powers. As a face of power, hidden power fuels the 
exclusion that follows from agenda setting behind the scenes (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002). 
When this power manifests itself, as in the argument presented in the excerpt above, it 
negatively influences individual power to act and consequently, the collective action that would 
follow from individuals working together. In the end, the continued lack of independence 
strengthens the power of certain individuals, further limiting the power of the general public in 
decision making. 
The respondents’ remarks highlight an elite dominance, which takes away neutrality from 
public forums, further subordinating men and women that are outside political power circles. 
Instead of providing opportunities for citizens to engage with government more closely, a key 
argument for participation, the process as actualised in Kajiado and Narok has created a 
platform where those with close ties to public officials are able to benefit more from devolution. 
Power relations are therefore highlighted, with the elite demonstrating that ‘‘sometimes power 
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begets power’’ (Lovenduski, 2011: ix), which is in this case magnified in the politico-
institutional mechanisms. This phenomenon is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
6.3.4 Commitment to the Process and Belief in the Value of Public Input 
The CPP guidelines point out that proponents of public participation must be willing to obtain 
and consider public input in decision making and to ensure that public participation works. This 
is necessary to minimise decoupling in change processes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). While 
checking commitment levels can be difficult to ascertain, the participant observation technique 
adopted in the study was very useful in checking on the consideration for public input. 
At only two hours, the time allocated to discuss the development needs in the Loitokitok CIDP 
forum was clearly insufficient. Coupled with the lack of access to information regarding the 
issues to be discussed, one can argue that the forum was more of an information and verification 
exercise, instead of being truly deliberative. To further this argument, I will use the example of 
a youth group that was represented in the forum. Having informed themselves of the upcoming 
meeting, a group of youth came together to discuss and articulate development issues they 
wanted to have addressed. Their action conforms to the principle of inclusion that is at the heart 
of pro-participation arguments, in addition to supporting the argument that participation allows 
problem definition by key stakeholders, and the consequent development of home-grown 
solutions (Gaventa, 2002). Unfortunately, the representative was not allowed to present the 
group’s agenda, since, to paraphrase the forum’s coordinator, the youth were part of the general 
public whose development needs had been presented in the general discussions. He therefore 
argued that allowing the youth to present their agenda would be repetitive and time consuming. 
This argument prevailed, disregarding the CPP guidelines’ allowance for the formation of 
groups to represent special interests in public deliberation exercises.  
These instances of questionable commitment to public participation strengthen the argument 
that public participation is not really a platform for inclusion (Hanna, 2000). Instead, it is used 
to create the illusion of inclusion, as governments and public institutions seek to legitimise their 
governance approaches. As platforms for gender mainstreaming, these participation exercises 
are instead contributing to the ‘‘repeated exclusion of women’’ through their rules and routines 
which further render women and their interests invisible (Chappel and Waylen, 2013: 602). 
As a requirement for meaningful engagement, due consideration for public input results in 
better decision-making and improved governance. The output of a public participation exercise 
would therefore have a genuine impact on policy. Most importantly, the fulfilment of this 
condition ensures that there is an alignment between input and policy relevance for the public. 
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Involvement of all stakeholders is therefore argued to be the most effective way to ensure that 
policies reflect actual needs of the affected public. Cornwall and Jewkes (1995) point out that 
by its very nature, participation emphasizes a bottom-up approach that is focused on locally 
defined priorities and perspectives for the generation of knowledge for action. Public 
involvement thus provides room for the emergence of alternative interpretations of needs and 
therefore alternative policy solutions (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). It is these alternatives that 
reflect the needs of the public as deliberated upon in participation exercises. This is however 
not a guaranteed outcome.  
One respondent reported that despite endlessly requesting better roads, her village continues to 
get more boreholes. She is therefore surrounded by five water projects, but a poor road that 
makes transport, trade and medical emergencies a nightmare. The government does not seem 
intent on listening to what the needs of the citizens are, relying instead on informants seeking 
to benefit from tendering processes. 
They don’t care about coming to the people, they get information on 
development needs from a few men with whom they eat and drink. Sometimes 
they carry out simple projects like drilling boreholes and find ways to 
misappropriate funds…Presently, because 2017 is nearing, we are important 
stakeholders, we have started being invited to meetings. (Female Respondent, 
Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
The continued dominance by men as decision makers has further strengthened their de facto 
leadership role. A respondent argued that men are in a better position to understand community 
needs since women are mostly holed up at home taking care of household chores. This 
reinforces observations that the Maasai woman’s sphere of influence remains the homestead, 
while the man deals with public affairs and political matters (Hodgson, 1999). These informal 
and cultural dictates on gender roles are still powerful, and as respondents from Ewuaso Kedong 
Ward pointed out, some women are resigned to having no influence on decision making.  
A lot of things are decided by men and as women, we only get to hear that 
decisions have been made. It is very hard for us women to be involved and our 
opinions sought. They believe they are knowledgeable enough and we just act 
on their decisions because we cannot refuse as we have no authority to do so. 
We agree with their decisions and see them fit for the whole community. 
(Female Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
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The attitude reflected here points to internalised dependence and subordination as effects of a 
socialisation process that informs the avoidance of conflict (Moglen, 1983), maintaining an 
institutional environment that perpetuates male dominance. The influence of traditional gender 
roles means that participation forums limit not only the input by women, but also opportunities 
for them to gain knowledge, skills and confidence in their ability to influence decisions that 
affect their daily lives. This lack of engagement in decision making strips them of the 
opportunity to exercise their power to challenge the boundaries to their participation, benefits 
Dworski-Riggs and Langhout (2010) argue may be gained from participation, even if limited. 
6.3.5 Inclusive and Effective Representation 
This condition calls for the establishment of mechanisms that will ensure outreach to all the 
relevant stakeholders. According to Rowe and Frewer (2000), public participants should 
comprise a broadly representative sample of the population of the affected public. This way, 
ownership, implementation and enforcement will follow through. Bingham et al. (2005) support 
this view by pointing out that successful governance calls for processes that include all 
stakeholders. Broad representation ensures the legitimisation of stakeholder knowledge and 
redefines expertise in ways that provide spaces for the experiences of those affected by social 
policies.  
Respondents however reported that calls for participation in public meetings tend to exclude 
inhabitants of areas further from administrative offices. One respondent from Entonet Ward in 
Kajiado South, complained of the neglect her area continues to face especially with poor 
infrastructure. She blamed this on the public engagement process, especially the holding of 
meetings in administrative centres that are inaccessible to residents of outskirt villages which 
have poor roads and lack reliable means of transport. Development proposals thus continue to 
exclude the needs of this population, catering instead to urban and peri-urban residents who can 
easily access avenues for public forums. Non-interaction with these groups of citizens results 
in the lack of ‘‘articulation and reflection of group perspective’’ as a basis for substantive 
representation (Mackay, 2008: 129). In the end, policy formulations not only exclude key 
stakeholders, but risk being irrelevant to their actual development needs.  
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They make announcements for development meetings to be held in the 
administrative central. Further, they do not provide transport for the people 
coming from remote areas. In the end, it is only those from around town centres 
that attend these meetings, and they communicate their development needs 
which might not be representative of the entire population. This process leaves 
out the common citizen because they need to go to the people at the grassroots 
and ask them what their needs are, and the people give their proposals. (Female 
Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
The lack of mechanisms to reach out to all relevant stakeholders therefore violates the condition 
of inclusive and effective representation. Poor representation also breeds a conducive 
environment for elite capture due to the dominance of particular voices during meetings. An 
example of this is found in the lamentation of a respondent from Keekonyokie Ward, on the 
lack of equal opportunities for opinion sharing. The few dominant voices end up being 
interpreted as the public’s position, even though they tend to be mainly peri-urban, educated 
and close to political power. Considering the patriarchal set up, these voices also tend to be 
representative of men’s opinions. As a respondent reported: 
When people discuss politics, as a woman, you remain quiet. It is men who 
decide. We keep quiet and are led by men. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
These institutional realities contribute to one of the main arguments against participation, that 
open and fair as it might be envisioned, in reality, it is only the voices of the powerful and 
organised that succeed in private deal-making processes (Innes and Booher, 2004). The excerpt 
above also points to the failure of public participation to challenge unfair power relations, such 
that for most Maasai women, despite the provision of this affordance for political engagement, 
public decision making largely remains business as usual. 
This reflects the existing attitudes towards the inclusion of women in other public, albeit 
traditional, spheres. On the absence of women members in group ranches,47for example, a 
member of the Kuku Group Ranch admitted that the reason for this is that there is an awareness 
 
47 System of communal, instead of individual, land ownership among the Maasai, which supports communal 
grazing and where proceeds from rent – especially to tourist and business ventures - are used for such communal 
development agenda as education. This system is however being replaced by the more widespread individual land 
ownership system, due to the reduced nomadic pastoralist nature of the community. 
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of the power women wield thanks to their numbers. Decisions that contravene the group ranches’ 
governing by-laws are therefore made to ensure that women continue to be left out of decision 
making. These decisions are supported by a reported dictatorship that locks out men who would 
be in opposition.48  
It is not right not to give them membership and voting rights. Why do we call 
them to vote for Councillors, Senators and MPs but exclude them from Group 
Ranch elections? National voter registration is currently ongoing, why aren’t 
we registering them in the Group Ranches? It is just dictatorship because those 
in power do not want this issue resolved. (Male Respondent, Loitokitok – 
Kajiado South, 04.03.2016) 
This attitude, the respondents highlighted, is transferred to public forums where, even though 
men and women are supposed to equally enjoy the freedom of expression, speakers are already 
pre-determined to avoid confrontation and calls for accountability. This dominance thus rules 
out any chance for fairness in representation and by extension, fair prioritisation of development 
agenda.  
Respondents argued that women who get to speak at public forums are specially selected, to 
give the impression of fair representation, while they only support the agenda of the men in 
power. Once again, this affirms observations by Kabeer (2005) on women in political positions 
in India, who merely act as proxies for husbands or powerful men within their families or caste. 
The chosen representatives reported in this study also act as proxies for the political elite, and 
not genuine representatives of the public, as the legitimacy of their positions is riddled with 
tokenism. Since ‘‘language, consciousness, and the structures of power are all socially 
determined’’ (Moglen, 1983: 132), the women who then benefit from such set-ups further align 
themselves with agendas that are favourable to the men in power. 
This embodiment of femocracy was once again confirmed in the study, through the process of 
electing the Women Representative for Kajiado County in 2013. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the rationale behind voting for her in 2012 was not driven by women’s interests, as the 
candidate of choice was actually endorsed by men. It is not surprising therefore, that the women 
 
48 This allegation was made by a male respondent who was particularly angered by the reluctance of the Kuku 
group ranch’s committee to register women and give them voting rights. The matter was debated at length, in what 
I believe was triggered by the presence of one of the committee members in the focus group discussion. The 
gentleman in question remained quiet throughout the debate on the group ranches. 
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did not find the representative beneficial to their cause, having witnessed no tangible benefits. 
They did not believe that she truly represented their interests. 
6.3.6 A Climate of Integrity 
Government agencies and decision makers are required to be credible, honest and trustworthy 
in matters of public participation. Women respondents however reported a general distrust in 
government, confirming observations that women exhibit more distrust in government than 
men (Verba et al., 1997 and Chanley et al., 2000). This is especially prevalent among those with 
lower levels of education and limited exposure, who lack trust in the neutrality of government 
administration. This is evidenced in the attitude of the respondent whose contributions to 
development needs of her area continue to be unfruitful. In such cases, it is difficult for 
individuals to trust that the government is genuinely concerned with listening to them and 
placing value in their input. The additional experiences of unequal opportunities for opinion 
sharing by both men and women further delegitimises the public participation exercises. 
This lack of trust is also experienced in the distribution of public funds such as education 
bursaries and women empowerment funds.  
What I see is that we still have problems with the government. The bursaries 
being made available to school children, for example, are distributed through 
networks. When we submit our papers, it is known that the child of so and so 
should get it and the one of so and so, not. This…continues even when job 
opportunities are involved. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
03.03.2016) 
Elite capture has caused many to lose regard for government entities as fair, therefore 
discouraging openness to engagement in public participation. Perhaps as a sign of hopelessness, 
a respondent answered to the complaint thus: 
To end this agenda, even in saying that our chiefs are good, we said that once 
bribed, they become lions. There is no discussion around it, once bribed, they 
are bad. But if you get to them before the oppressors do, they dare not receive 
the bribe because the women can hold them accountable as they were unaware 
of the situation before the women reported it to them. It is in line with the true 
nature of Kenyan government operations. We are the third most corrupt 
country and soon to be number one. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado 
South, 03.03.2016) 
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This excerpt however points to an existing awareness of the unfair power structures that exist 
in the community and how they could be navigated. Mackay (2008: 130) points out that power 
patterns are ‘‘embedded within the design of institutions and are reinforced or challenged by 
the informal practices that evolve over time.’’ By detailing the benefit of reaching the chiefs 
before the men do, this respondent’s statement can be interpreted as an invitation to 
proactiveness, which would minimise the chances of unfairness. Whether this approach can 
work in matters of public participation is however difficult to ascertain, as information flow 
and location setting remain centred around physical locations of power and social networks that 
exclude those outside power circles. 
6.3.7 Capacity to Engage 
Knowledge on designing and implementing public participation processes by all persons 
responsible is necessary for the success of a public participation process. The CPP guidelines 
therefore clarify official responsibility for managing public participation. Both the government 
agencies and citizens are required to have the knowledge and communication skills necessary 
to ensure the effectiveness of the participation process. The public should be able to see what 
is going on, and how decisions are made. This criterion presupposes knowledge on due process 
and mechanisms to redress any deviations thereof. Respondents however reported widespread 
ignorance on the operating system of devolution as provided for in the Constitution. They 
pointed to the need to bring the Constitution to the people, mainly through translated texts in 
the local Maa language to spread awareness and improve accountability mechanisms.  
In a discussion with women from Keekonyokie ward in Narok East, for example, they reported 
that there was no woman from their area in the County Assembly. This is however untrue 
because, even though there was no woman elected to the County Assembly, there are female 
nominees as part of the gender top-up, to ensure gender equality in the assemblies as required 
by the Constitution. This information gap highlights the much-needed civic education among 
the Maasai, especially women, to improve their understanding of representation under 
devolution. Jeong (2013) rightfully points out that minorities respond to descriptive 
representation. However, without knowledge of how gender and representation work within the 
devolution structure, it is unlikely that these women will have contact with their representatives, 
further alienating them from active political engagement. 
Reacting to this during the discussion with men from the same area, a gentleman who is one of 
the chairpersons of Nyumba Kumi pointed out that the claim was indicative of the women’s 
ignorance on how the county government operates, and representation protocol therein. In his 
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opinion, which was backed by other men in the eight FGD, women would be much more aware 
of how the system operates if anyone took the time to educate them. This, he reiterated, must 
be done through vernacular radio as many women spend their evenings listening to the radio to 
get informed on current affairs.  A female respondent who is a leader at a local church insisted 
that this would work well when both government and civil society groups collaborated on the 
initiative.  
The effect of this lack of information is reflected in the rationale that informed voting for the 
2010 Constitution, pointing evidence to a lack of outreach in civic education:  
As Christians, we chose the Orange (No) and the others were Bananas (Yes). 
That is how we voted, those who could not express themselves carried oranges 
as symbols of their vote…we did not understand what it all meant…as 
Christians we fought the legalisation of abortion. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
Such information gaps continue to make it difficult for citizens, and especially women, to 
understand how devolution works, and the engagement opportunities available to them. This 
limits their knowledge on the hows and wheres of exercising and demanding their rights and 
holding the government accountable. These circumstances limit the women’s capacity for 
active political involvement, considering how experiences are ‘‘written about and reflected 
officially in documents differs fundamentally from women’s real experiences in home and 
family’’ (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 245). Reaching out to them would ensure that participation 
exercises contribute to tighter coupling of formal and informal norms on equality in public 
participation. 
6.3.8 Standing Conditions of the Participants 
This condition calls on facilitators to understand their audience well. They should clearly 
discern the socio-economic status, religious beliefs and other relevant demographic 
characteristics of those engaging in public participation. This is because knowledge levels, 
incomes and wielded power will influence deliberations and ultimately have a bearing on the 
conclusions of deliberation exercise and their subsequent outcomes.  
Rowe and Frewer (2000) argue that there should be access to the appropriate resources to enable 
participants successfully fulfil their brief. Information accessibility by the public is key to 
ensuring that they are aware of the on-goings of participation exercises.  This provision is 
supported by the Kenyan Public Finance Management (PFM) Act of 2012, which outlines the 
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public’s right to participate throughout the entire budget process; from the formulation, through 
its implementation, to the evaluation of the process as outlined in Figure 6.2. This is however 
difficult to implement since financial resources are required in the passing of information and 
planning of these meetings.  
The issue of inadequate resources was prevalent in the discussions with both citizens and 
economists from Kajiado and Narok Counties. Considering the economic challenges discussed 
in chapter five, more women than men are subjected to economic marginalisation which further 
limits their political engagement (Mackay, 2008). The inability of the government to reach out 
means that there is no foreseeable remedy for this. 
A Narok County Budget Officer reported that his office did not have enough resources to 
facilitate participatory budgeting as provided for in the PFM Act. As a result, the county has 
resorted to carrying out the annual budgeting exercises in 12 locations49within the county that 
are accessible to the officers. This process leaves out many residents who cannot reach these 
locations, while at the same time making the 12 locations the entire county’s mouthpiece. This 
confirms observations that decentralisation efforts across Sub Saharan Africa are hampered by 
economic challenges. 
Resources do provide a constraint to the successful realisation of public participation, with 
Jütting et al. (2005) pointing to the reality that local governments may sometimes lack the 
human and financial resources to effectively implement decentralisation. This is well captured 
in the reflection of the Narok County Chief Officer in charge of Gender, Youth, Sports and 
Culture. She notes that due to the limited financial resources, there are no efforts to promote 
political empowerment, with focus being on economic empowerment through women groups 
instead.  
 
 
 
 
49  This was reported during the first field research phase – March to May 2016. Another officer from the 
Department of County Development planning interviewed in the second phase – January to March 2017 – stated 
that it was nine locations.  For the CIDP forum however, as Appendix IV shows, the schedule listed 30 locations 
across the six constituencies, meaning that for the master budget plan, the county reaches out to all administrative 
wards. 
 153 
 
Now, my office is not focusing much more on the political space for women…it 
is more about economic empowerment, other than political. It’s not like a 
human rights aspect whereby we want women to be participating 
politically…we have never really developed a program that is targeted on the 
political aspect or even one that encourages women to participate in politics. 
(Chief Officer - Gender, Youth, Sports and Culture - Narok County, 20.02.2017) 
The same strategy is employed in the women empowerment program administered by the 
gender department in Kajiado County. Even though the economic empowerment objective is 
also valuable, its preconditions lock out most women, especially the illiterate. This is because 
women groups need to fulfil criteria that involve reading, writing and arithmetic, to be 
considered for such programs. The inability of these programs’ benefits to be more inclusive 
and widespread becomes disempowering for the non-beneficiaries, as there is no due 
consideration for the socio-economic dimensions of class and poverty that affect them.  
From her study on the empowerment of factory workers in Malaysia, Miles (2016) finds 
evidence that redressing gender inequality requires not so much a focus on the economic 
integration of women, but the redistribution of power so that social relations, processes and 
structures can be transformed. Putting these into consideration would require that relevant 
agencies find ways of reaching to all people. This can be done through such alternatives as 
rotating locations, or supporting groups that can have official representatives, as will be 
discussed in chapter eight. 
The financial constraints faced by the county governments merge with the logistical and socio-
economic challenges the citizens must deal with, making it increasingly difficult to ensure a 
resource input that would result in widely inclusive participation forums whose outcomes best 
reflect public needs. 
Informed by the empirical evidence discussed so far, the discussion now shifts to the debate on 
how gender mainstreaming, through the utilisation of such platforms as public participation, 
works to promote women’s political agency. 
6.4 Public Participation and the Political Agency of Women 
The foregoing analysis on public participation in the study areas depicts a community in motion 
as far the political agency of women is concerned. The intricacies of this process are seen in 
both the positive and negative narratives on the outcomes of pursuing equality in public 
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participation. It is true that devolution has brought government closer to the people and with it, 
the increased visibility of women as political actors. 
They are responding well… So having learned ladies or women who come from 
those villages and having women who are employed in the county government, 
having women heading those departments especially in the general office, and 
having some of them as ward administrators, and having them in few offices 
there, it is giving them courage to come out. You see now, things are improving. 
As men now we see women as part of this society so we’re giving them a chance 
and they’re getting better and better every day. (MCA, Ewuaso Kedong Ward 
– Kajiado West, 30.01.2017) 
While government agents report a commitment to the promotion of equity in participation 
however, citizens’ experiences offer a different perspective on the realities of devolution 
operatives. These are captured in the grievances on the structure’s lack of information, 
transparency, inclusivity and integrity among others. I argue that the existence of these 
challenges is due to the fact that devolution and all its processes operate within the prevalent 
elite capture that characterises Kenyan political institutions (Sheely, 2015). Elite capture 
facilitates the creation and sustenance of power bases at the local level, which is reinforced by 
weak institutional accountability mechanisms (Crook, 2003). In the end, the rules-in-use 
propagate resistance to the coupling of the old informal and new informal institutional 
arrangements (Mackay et al., 2009). 
The accountability mechanisms discussed in section 6.3 demonstrate how the co-optation of 
elites in the devolution structure disenfranchises both men and women, creating heterogeneous 
interest groups on matters equality. This heterogeneity means that women have allies in men 
who support the equality agenda. However, being outside the power circles and therefore not 
able to influence decisions or action among the elite in control dwarfs their efforts to influence 
equality outcomes.  
Despite efforts in place therefore, the promotion of gender equality through public participation 
in Kajiado and Narok appears to be failing at providing a platform that would reshape attitudes 
towards the political agency of women. The reason for this lies heavily in prevailing socio-
cultural and economic realities. As a patriarchal community, power relations favour men in 
general, and particularly those with links to positions of power. As a result, the political 
participation of women continues to be frustrated. This evidence supports the argument that 
power remains difficult and elusive, especially when its definition is determined by differing 
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cultural habitus (Cheater, 1999). Men’s control over public affairs as a ‘cultural right’ makes it 
difficult to approach public participation as an avenue of equality, as will be discussed in depth 
in the following chapter.  
The engagement process of both the domineering and subordinate groups forms the genesis 
from which ‘‘power might itself be purged and ultimately made the servant of empowerment’’ 
(Moglen, 1983: 134). Political empowerment in this context thus becomes the change process 
through which the ability to make choices is acquired by those to whom it was previously denied 
(Kabeer, 2001). Debate is thus rife on what strategies can best be adopted to bridge the gap and 
make negligible, the consequences of the limited political participation by women. Questions 
on how to go about this in contemporary society abound, with Murray and Simeon (2007) 
summarising this debate as deliberation on whether to institutionalise, blur, or crosscut and 
transcend differences. The current engagement mechanisms employed in Kajiado and Narok 
do very little to overcome challenges of participation, contributing instead to the magnification 
of socio-political differences. 
This brings to the fore, the importance of breaking socio-cultural barriers to ensure that women 
exercise their political agency just as freely and effectively as (most) men do. This is supported 
by observations that the importance of women empowerment is emphasised by the awareness 
of the negative aspects of the power structures that have excluded them (Moglen, 1983). Their 
empowerment thus involves engaging power dynamics around the different spheres of their 
lives. Against this backdrop, women’s empowerment comes across as ‘‘a multi-dimensional 
process of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural participation and rights’’ (Moghadam 
and Senftova, 2005: 390). In this regard therefore, this process requires an engagement with 
formal and informal institutions, to understand how practices in either sphere can be aligned to 
the goal of improving the status of women. 
Participation processes such as participatory budgeting as discussed in this chapter lay the 
foundation for women’s equal citizenship, itself an opportunity to break barriers. By 
participating in socio-economic and political deliberations, women have an opportunity to 
challenge the acceptance of their political agency as they exercise their legal rights. It is 
therefore imperative that the conditions for meaningful engagement are met, in order to promote 
this change. While the CPP guidelines touch on the multidimensional aspects fronted by 
Moghadam and Senftova (2005), in their application, the cultural aspects are ignored, supposing 
public participation to be free from cultural influence. This, Fraser (1990) argues, is a 
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problematic approach, as public spaces can never be free from cultural influences. This 
oversight explains why, despite the efforts by county government administration, public 
participation has little to report in the way of successfully challenging the public dominance of 
Maasai men.  
Nevertheless, participation as an avenue for raising political consciousness is propagated on the 
premise that it is the pathway to the inclusion of the marginalised. As has been previously 
mentioned, women respondents in the study agreed that the quota system applied in public 
committees and similar arrangements are an important step towards their inclusion in public 
decision making. The argument that increased participation can motivate women to ‘‘break 
down customs of inequality and discrimination’’ (Johnson, 2001: 9) is especially important in 
such cases as the women of Ewuaso Kedong, who have resigned themselves to male dominance, 
because men know these things, and they therefore let them make the decisions.  
Participation processes strengthen women’s political agency, lending credibility to the 
observations that empowered minorities are not alienated, tend to trust the government, and are 
politically engaged (Jeong, 2013). This is especially important for a representative democracy 
such as Kenya, since the loyalty and trust that is predetermined by how citizens orient 
themselves to their government largely determines systemic stability (Gilliam, 1996). Women 
empowerment would therefore not only work for the benefit of the female population, but also 
contribute to the general stability that arises from an informed and equally engaged citizenry.50  
Moghadam and Senftova (2005) note that along with long term advances and socio-economic 
development, empowering marginalised groups comes about through legal reform and policy 
changes. Policy making should therefore act as both a catalyst and guideline on achieving 
equality, making empowerment both a strategy and goal of civic engagement. This dual nature 
however introduces complexities since, as VeneKlasen and Miller (2002) point out, political 
participation among women is a result of power dynamics in the public (lived experiences of 
daily life that are visible), private (relationships between family, friends and such other relations) 
and intimate realms (relating to power within and overall well-being). Without strategies in 
place to harmonise power interactions in all three realms, empowerment remains largely 
unattainable.  
 
50 This argument closely relates to that used by champions for girl-child education – when you educate a girl, you 
educate a village. Benefits from informed and empowered women are tangible and widespread, an opinion shared 
by men who appreciate the benefits of encouraging power sharing at the household level. 
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From the focus group discussions, there was continued reference to politically active women 
having the support of their husbands, which reportedly increases their opportunities for 
participation and the acquisition of knowledge and skills on political affairs. In explaining her 
active involvement, a respondent explained: 
Using my own example; I am involved in hospital matters and the county 
government…I am in a women’s group through which I am here today. All this 
is because at home, my husband and I work together and respect each other. If 
anyone calls and tells him that I am needed to attend a meeting somewhere, I 
am free to go. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
This privilege of understanding and acceptance is however not enjoyed by all. As a community 
mobiliser pointed out, active engagement in public affairs is sometimes frowned upon as it 
purports insubordination by the women to their husbands: 
I have been called names: I am bad, I rule over my husband among others...My 
husband and I are one, which the Maasais translate as me ruling over my 
husband. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok - Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
Still, there is a room for compromises. The chair of one of the women groups in Loitokitok 
explained that some men remain sceptical, allowing their wives such freedoms of engagement 
only in the presence of older women acting as chaperons: 
I have been in leadership for many years. It used to be that whenever I asked a 
woman to join me for a seminar in Narok or Kajiado on community 
development, I had to ask the woman’s husband for permission. The man would 
tell me to guard the wife until she came back home. That is heart-breaking. 
They don’t think we have the capacity to take care of or lead ourselves and that 
contributes to our being undermined. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – 
Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
These excerpts point to the dynamics of power relations in the private sphere of the home, and 
how this influences the exercise of agency in the public space of participatory democracy. As 
Kenny (2007: 94) points out, ‘‘gender relations are inevitably power relations, and are, therefore, 
political, extending beyond formal ‘public’ structures – politics and paid work – to include 
‘private’ structures, such as the family.’’ Women that have influence over decisions at home 
are more likely to freely participate in public, a demonstration of what one would consider to 
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be legitimised agency from the private sphere. This form of agency is characterised by a 
husband’s acceptance and support for the wife’s freedom of public expression and association. 
Women who benefit from this support enjoy influence at home, and are subsequently confident 
to engage in, and interrogate public affairs. The importance of this legitimisation is made 
evident in the case of women who are separated or divorced from their husbands. Should they 
seek political positions, the absence of a husband or such other supporting male figure 
delegitimises their capacity to lead in the eyes of the community. In explaining why a female 
candidate lost in the 2013 elections, for example, the chair of a women group narrated: 
…what contributed to her failure is the mentality that an unmarried woman 
cannot lead. We have Sweety now who wants to vie but she is being opposed in 
many areas because she left her husband. They ask ‘if she was unable to control 
her husband to the point of his leaving, will she manage us?’ (Female 
Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 07.03.2016) 
Overall, there is an acknowledgement by both men and women that alignment in the power 
dynamics and harmonised power relations at home, are prerequisites for equality and 
opportunity for women to engage with their male counterparts in political affairs. As a male 
respondent and member of a development committee pointed out: 
My opinion is that now things are changing; there are those being oppressed, 
and there are those who have seen the clear path. Those from the latter group, 
like the beautiful ones you see here, are evidence that even at home, they 
cooperate with their husbands. But if you look closely, even at the market place, 
you will see the difference with others who are still being oppressed. (Male 
Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 07.03.2016)  
These scenarios point clearly to the transferability of the approach to power relations from the 
domestic to the public realm. In households where dialogue and power sharing are supported, 
the women are more active in public affairs, and the reverse is true for their counterparts in 
male dominated households where they are voiceless. What this demonstrates therefore, is that 
on political matters, it is difficult to pinpoint a distinct separation between private and public 
spheres, as value judgements are largely dependent on private interests (mainly of men). 
Female respondents in Ewuaso Kedong Ward reported that for women who face subordination 
at home, it is difficult to use the arguably neutral civic space as a platform to speak out. Should 
their engagement contribute to any form of confrontation, especially with a man, it is a risk to 
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domestic harmony, as their husbands would find this a dishonour to the family. This narrative 
points to the argument that empowerment manifests itself in four spheres: personal/individual, 
family, group or team, organization and community (Thompson, 2006). The interconnectedness 
of these spheres influences the exercise of public agency by individual women, signifying the 
importance of approaching empowerment as a construct of the resultant space of private-public 
interactions, and not simply privy to the civic platform.  
Structural inequalities and the social processes that generate them need to be considered, while 
at the same time acknowledging the complexity of individual persons as equal entities in all 
forms of social interactions (Perrons and Skyers, 2003). This approach, Dworski-Riggs and 
Langhout (2010) posit, allows for the understanding of power relations in communities where 
power asymmetries exist. This process of checking on inequalities and understanding power 
relations improves public consciousness, paving the way for structures that can challenge power 
asymmetries and pursue change, conditions necessary for the political empowerment of Maasai 
women.  
The intended outcome of empowerment initiatives ‘‘is for all community members to have 
access to control over the resources that affect their lives, paying special attention to groups 
who have been historically excluded from that access’’ (Dworski-Riggs and Langhout, 2010: 
216). It is therefore not achieved from an individual’s ability to control every aspect of their 
lives, but from the awareness of existing boundaries and their nature as socio-cultural constructs. 
As an effort to promote equality and deliberative democracy, public participation therefore 
needs to engage with existing power dynamics in specific societies. Otherwise, the exercises 
will be considered a manifestation of institutional biases as the empirical evidence in section 
6.3 shows.  
6.5 The Expectations – Reality Divide 
Despite the existence of participation guidelines, public participation is riddled with integrity 
concerns and an apparent disregard for the socio-economic status of public participation 
audiences. This is problematic since limited financial resources, though a challenge by itself, 
affect other aspects of citizenship and agency. It is important therefore, to give due 
consideration to these effects, to create an enabling environment for the realisation of 
empowerment (Thompson, 2006). 
The CPP guidelines acknowledge that counties are yet to establish multiple mechanisms that 
are inclusive enough to ensure the widest public participation. Exclusion has therefore been a 
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key complaint, stemming from ‘‘the limited scope of outreach channels used to mobilize the 
people, such as adverts in the national newspapers that reach only a small segment of the 
population’’ (CPP; 2016: 51). To ensure inclusivity therefore, the CPP guidelines call upon all 
county governments to map stakeholders and register organised groups, preferably along 
sectoral lines. While this would provide an opportunity for women to organize and deliberate 
politics more freely, it was not evident in either Kajiado or Narok, where citizen engagement 
took on a general approach. If anything, specific organisations such as the youth group in 
Loitokitok do not receive adequate support to encourage political engagement.  
Complaints of unaligned development projects in areas of Kajiado County are blamed on elite 
capture, while in Narok the blame is on the county government and its disregard for citizens’ 
recommendations. This is confirmed by the Ward Administrator for Keekonyokie Ward: 
…the governor, knowing he still has to seek a second term, he also tries to work 
according to how he feels can be best. For example, in Nairagie-Enkare, there 
was a request for the upgrading of several feeder roads within the ward, but 
the governor opted to construct one tarmac road. It cost a lot of money, almost 
400Million...If you try to look at the money that has been spent, and the money 
that was needed, the money used to construct that one road, could have 
improved all the feeder roads. Upgrading the market is still in the pipeline, but 
these things are annual. The finance bill public participation is annual so next 
year could come while last year’s projects are pending, for example issues to 
do with the marketplace; they passed that they want a marketplace, the 
contractor is yet to come and start, we have given him everything. That’s why 
I said there are a lot of challenges in dealing with the community. (Ward 
Administrator, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 21.02.2017) 
The matrix of information gaps especially among the citizens, poor communication within 
county government offices and between government and citizens, integrity concerns from the 
lack of fairness and transparency in participation exercises, and influence over policy decisions 
are key impediments to the effectiveness of public participation in both counties.  
As the empirical evidence herein clearly shows, there has not been a substantial transformation 
in the status of the public, especially among women as a special interest group, and neither 
among those from poor economic backgrounds nor those lacking political networks. 
Undoubtedly, there is increased visibility of the government in the grassroots, but it is clouded 
in a system that does not promote transparency and equality, which undercuts inclusion and 
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transformation envisioned from devolution. This highlights that the introduction of formal rules 
does not wipe out institutional norms and power structures, and ‘‘informal ones can continue 
to operate to contradict them’’ (Chapell and Waylen,2013: 607).The current structures therefore 
do little to support the meaningful transfer of power to the citizens over policy decisions that 
affect their lives.  
Cases of discouragement from public engagement due to the process’ lack of fairness and 
integrity rip off individuals’ power to make any contribution, and most importantly, the 
empowerment that arguably comes from having an opportunity to engage in decision making. 
For Maasai women especially, evidence of unfairness even towards some men offers little 
incentive to engage in the very platform that promises a chance at equality. In the end, the unfair 
exercise of power in the public realm continues to cultivate powerlessness among the women. 
Unfortunately, public participation in these environments is far from realising inclusion and 
empowerment, having instead cultivated distrust and promoted elite capture.  
These shortcomings in the formal institutions have allowed for the proliferation of informal 
gender norms, as well as attitudes and practices that uphold elite (male) dominance. The 
discussion therefore confirms that formal and informal institutions are interdependent, and 
outcomes on gender equality cannot be read off an examination of either institution 
independently since ‘‘it is the interaction between them that shapes these outcomes’’ (Chappell 
and Waylen, 2013: 607-8). 
In the following chapter, I delve into this interdependence, by investigating what contributes to 
the disparities between gender policy and practice. I interrogate the peculiar circumstances in 
Kajiado and Narok which cause the limited impact of gender equality provisions on inclusion 
and equality as by-products of citizen participation under devolution. The chapter therefore 
makes clear why and how informal norms are able to render ineffective, legal norms aimed at 
promoting the political agency of women.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FUNCTIONAL (in)CONSISTENCY OF GENDER 
EQUALITY LEGISLATION 
In the previous chapters, I have described how the Maasai community is responding to policy 
legislation on gender equality. Evidence confirms that informal norms have a strong influence 
on attitudes towards the public agency of women, as demonstrated through gender relations as 
power relations that transcend into the political sphere (Kenny, 2007). In this chapter, I 
interrogate the concept of statutory law as a tool for engineering social norms. The discussion 
focuses on whether and how legislation on gender equality in Kenya is influencing attitudes 
and norms on the equality status of Maasai women. I focus on the contexts within which 
interests and norms are formed, building on what Mackay et al. (2009) term as context-bound 
rationality of sociological institutionalism.  
The chapter therefore investigates the realisation of gender equality as a constitutional provision 
in the face of opposing socio-cultural norms, as highlighted from chapters four to six. I use the 
legal framework for public participation as a guide, with a particular focus on the provisions set 
out in Chapter Four of the 2010 Constitution: The Bill of Rights, Subsections (3), (6) and (8) 
of Article 27 ‘‘Equality and freedom from discrimination.’’ They state: 
(3) Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal 
opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. 
(6) To give full effect to the realisation of the rights guaranteed under this Article, the State 
shall take legislative and other measures, including affirmative action programmes and policies 
designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past 
discrimination. 
(8) In addition to the measures contemplated in clause (6), the State shall take legislative 
and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of 
elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender. 
These provisions are also to be applied by county governments, with the County Governments 
Act (CGA) of 2012 tasking the county executive with the promotion of gender equity under 
Article 34(f). Again, these provisions are analysed within the context of public participation.  
In the first section, the chapter outlines the rationale behind legislation as a pathway to 
influencing the desirability of certain norms. I therefore discuss how laws influence attitudes 
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and inform behavioural change among different agents in a society. This is followed by an 
exploration of challenges in adopting a legal approach to changing social norms as experienced 
in Kajiado and Narok Counties, bearing in mind that ‘‘institutional processes and practices are, 
in fact, embedded in norms and cognitive frames’’ that might constrain change (Mackay et al., 
2009: 254). Section three then focuses on understanding the effectiveness of social engineering 
in changing attitudes and behaviour towards gender equality among the Maasai. In the last 
section, I demonstrate how rules of engagement among the Maasai, responses to legal 
requirements for change, and a poor demonstration of commitment by government agencies, 
have created an environment where women are unable to enjoy the intended benefits of equality 
legislation.   
7.1 Law as a Tool for Social Engineering. 
Following Platteau et al.’s (2017) description of the process, social engineering in the context 
of this study can be seen in the efforts of the Kenyan government to adopt and implement 
legislative amendments aimed at promoting the political agency of women in order to address 
their historical marginalisation from the political sphere. As chapter one demonstrates, these 
efforts are not restricted to Kenya.  
Among the Maasai, there is also a history of social engineering, as can be seen in the efforts of 
the colonial administration to modernise the Maasai. Kibutu (2006) explains that the 
administration regarded manyatta as the basis for conservativism among the Maasai, and the 
reason why they refused to embrace colonial education. Manyatta commonly refers to the 
traditional Maasai houses, and in this case refer to camps where boys live in seclusion after 
circumcision, graduating to become Morans (warriors). It is here that they learn about dictates 
on rituals and appropriate behaviour, marking the period as the heart of Maasai identity (Talle, 
1988; Spencer 1993). 
The continuation of Manyatta was therefore forbidden, with the goal of limiting the military 
capacity of Morans. Through indirect rule, the administration allied with the authority of the 
male elders, broadening and deepening their control over younger men and warriors. This 
alliance worked well for the administration whose willingness to work with the elders instead 
of the Morans was informed by the former’s ‘‘willingness to assist the government in 
modernizing Maasai society’’ (Kibutu, 2006: 121). Male dominance was therefore perpetuated 
by allowing them to reconstruct the logic of institutions in the community (Mackay et. al., 
2010). It can however be argued that these efforts were necessary to ensure the uptake of formal 
education in the community, itself a positive goal. While focused on achieving the desired 
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results therefore, institutional reforms can sometimes generate unwanted results that could have 
either positive or negative effects on certain social groups. 
Within the human rights framework, such institutional reforms are adopted with the aim to 
eradicate norms such as FGM and early child marriages which are considered harmful and/or 
retrogressive. As discussions in chapters four and five have shown, the campaign against FGM 
is very visible in Kenya, and continues to be a subject of debate among the Maasai. Just like 
FGM, gender equality as presented in the 2010 Constitution is approached from the dimension 
of advancing the rights of women. Promoting the political inclusion of women normalises their 
agency, potentially generating norms that encourage more women to be politically active 
(Mackay, 2008). Supporting norms of equality therefore becomes a positive outcome of this 
social engineering process. 
In their nature, social norms are constituted by behaviours that are considered desirable, and 
whose violation invites disapproval in a societal setting. Platteau et al. (2017: 18) define 
behaviour as ‘‘a social norm in the sense that an agent is better off if he (she) matches his (her) 
behaviour with the expected average behaviour in the society.’’ This expectation is especially 
relevant among the Maasai, where enkanyit calls for a certain code of conduct, even when an 
individual would rather do or say something different if personal interest was to prevail. This 
codified logic of appropriateness (Chappell, 2006) is therefore at the heart of reception towards 
a new social order. On the reported fear of women political aspirants to engage with men in 
public, for example, a respondent commented: 
A woman like that has a lot of respect! That woman is very respectful, and she 
should speak in the presence of people as she will not insult men. There are 
those who should not speak too much as she might insult men and ruin her vote. 
So that woman should retain her respectful nature. Respect is more important 
than looking for power and in such a meeting, such a woman is building her 
reputation. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
24.03.2016) 
This excerpt highlights the influence of informal institutions as custodians of norms even in the 
sphere of formal institutions. It shows how adherence to what is regarded as acceptable 
behaviour in the informal set-up can work to legitimise agency in the formal sphere, binding 
both in an operational logic of appropriateness. This interconnectedness highlights the benefit 
of a neo-institutionalist approach to understanding the relationship between the two, as it allows 
for the consideration of the roles and interests of different agents in the different institutional 
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contexts (Lovenduski, 2011). I will get into more details on these roles and interests of different 
agents in sub-section 7.1.1 which focuses on what informs the different reactions by men and 
women in the Maasai community to the gender equality legislation.  
Overall, the law often plays a significant role in changing social norms either voluntarily, or as 
a means to avoid negative consequences - as would be the case with criminalised norms. As 
Bilz and Nadler (2014) expound, legal regulation can either have direct impact through fear of 
sanctions or the desire for rewards, or indirectly, through attitude change towards the behaviour 
under regulation. The impact of gender equality legislation can be achieved by either pathway, 
as is the case in Kenya where the National Gender and Equality Commission is tasked with 
ensuring the two thirds gender rule is observed, while at the same time engaging in sensitisation 
programs to spread awareness and promote positive attitudes towards gender equality among 
citizens. This latter mechanism can be more effective especially if the regulation manages to 
change moral attitudes and reduce the need for monitoring by the state (Bilz and Nadler, 2014). 
If citizens can use morality as a guide to legality, the alignment of legal rules with social norms 
would promote adherence by economising on legal counsel (Licht, 2008). According to Roland 
(2004), this success depends on the systemic consistency between social institutions, which 
would promote complementarity and conceptual compatibility between laws and social norms. 
In other words, successful social engineering depends on the tight coupling of formal and 
informal norm systems. Further, this compatibility depends on content and functionality, with 
content consistency being subject to the compatibility of dictates of law and social norms, while 
functional consistency is derived from the compatibility between the role played by the law in 
social regulation and the informal environment (Licht, 2008: 734). Any inconsistencies between 
content and functionality cause a non-alignment of legal rules and social norms, signalling the 
potential failure of a social engineering process. 
The politics of gender as explored in chapter five draw evidence to the reality that as a legal 
rule, gender equality is not conceptually compatible with equality norms as practised by the 
Maasai. This already creates a disconnect that weakens the systemic consistency between the 
Maasai socio-normative environment and the state legal environment. The question therefore 
arises, whether there is any possibility for functional consistency between the two environments. 
This brings to the fore, what Licht (2008: 736) refers to as ‘‘the most fundamental question 
about social norms and the law – namely, the relations between the content of the law (“law on 
the books”) and compliance with the law (“law in action”).’’ Licht goes ahead to warn that 
unless the rule of law prevails, the interface between state and non-state norm systems will not 
 166 
 
function. As evidence so far however demonstrates, enforcing compliance to the rule of law in 
the pursuit of gender equality among the Maasai is subject to resistance, and could potentially 
cause conflicts that could lead to failure as will be established later on in this chapter. 
Noteworthy at this point, is that cultural rights in Kenya are protected and promoted in the 
Constitution, under Article 44 (1) Every person has the right to use the language, and to 
participate in the cultural life, of the person’s choice. This introduces potential contradiction in 
practice, especially where cultural practices fall outside the scope of legal acceptability. 
Cultural rights however remain subject to provisions in Article 2 (4) Any law, including 
customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this Constitution is invalid. In this 
regard therefore, the rule of law prevails, signalling functionality as argued by Licht (2008), 
and promising the successful realisation of gender equality.  
How then, does the prevalence of state norms influence social norms? The following section 
explores this. 
7.1.1 How Laws Influence Social Norms 
Individuals adhere to social norms to signal that they are good members of society, especially 
where social capital stemming from reputation loss is at stake. This is the driving force behind 
non-state norms which, though unwritten, have the power to control mass behaviour. State 
norms, as embodied in legislation, can also change the perception of what is considered right 
or wrong (Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2010). They can therefore, incentivise change, stemming 
from the ability of the law to express values which in turn influence behaviour. As Equality 
Now (2012) reports, the adoption of awareness raising and education on social norms relating 
to discrimination is important, but established state laws and policies are a major boost to the 
success of such agenda. This is because of the provision of ‘‘opportunities for marginal groups 
to exercise power’’ in institutional settings (Kenny, 2007: 92). The effect of this can be seen in 
the widespread respect for equal representation in the constitution of public bodies such as 
Nyumba Kumi committees and local development committees. 
The way I have selected my (bursary) committee members, there is a person 
living with a disability, youth, women, men, pastor. (MCA, Rombo Ward – 
Kajiado South, 06.02.2017) 
It is important to note however, that there is no direct correlation between the signal sent out by 
legal norms, and the success on the desired attitudinal change. Rather, reactions to legal norms 
could either reinforce or undermine legislation (Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2010). As evidence 
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on the discrepancy between descriptive and substantive representation of women in this study 
has shown, the enactment of gender equality laws does not automatically create equality: 
In my area, we have a problem as women because it is as if men disregard the 
women because even when you take a look at Nyumba Kumi or the village elders’ 
initiatives, both men and women are selected but only men do the work. When 
there is a meeting, it is only the men that attend…It is truly like we have been 
kept aside, we cannot be involved wherever men are present. We are there in 
name but not in action. (Women Respondents, Keekonyokie Ward - Narok East, 
21.04.2016) 
This reality confirms that the reproduction of gender relations can be reflected in actors whose 
interests are constrained in the pursuit of institutional reforms (Mackay et al., 2009). In this 
case, men can be seen to cooperate in excluding women from public decision making. Even 
though there is respect for descriptive representation as required by law, the overall goal of 
substantive representation is unrealised due to the non-alignment between policy and practice. 
Therefore, setting laws on non-discriminatory does not automatically eliminate discrimination, 
just as the criminalisation of harmful practices does not eliminate them. This is especially 
evident in the case of FGM where, among the Maasai, the practice prevails despite its 
criminalisation in 2011. 
Now it is hidden but it is still happening because it will not be made public, it 
will happen in secret. I will not invite guests, but I will do it…I don't think this 
will end among the Maasai. It will not stop. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
Evidently, the existence of the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2011 has not 
automatically translated to its eradication.  
On equality, Kameri-Mbote (2016: 46) argues that ‘‘the effectiveness of laws in according 
women equal opportunities with men depends largely on the society’s willingness and ability 
to enforce such laws.’’ This is key in institutional reforms because official enforcement is what 
grants legitimacy to an institution (Chappell and Waylen, 2013). When a law lacks enforceable 
sanctions, regardless of how high or low these might be, its effect on behaviour is limited to its 
expressive function. This is manifested in the quest for gender equality beyond elective and 
nominative public service positions. There is no formula for the achievement of gender equality 
in open public forums, and consequences of a gender imbalance unclear: do the meetings get 
 168 
 
postponed? Are the outcomes considered representative and inclusive? Should outcomes 
regarded as unrepresentative be adopted or ignored?  
The grey zone created by the lack of a formula or engagement/recruitment criteria means that 
it is upon the discretion of citizens to show up in equal numbers if possible, and any additional 
input by county administration to ensure that members of the public are equally informed and 
supported to attend such meetings.51This lack of clarity is compounded by the challenges 
outlined in chapter six, such as the lack of adherence to communication timeliness, limited 
breadth of outreach to citizens and poor infrastructure, which make participation impossible for 
many. Beyond government’s willingness to enforce laws (Kameri-Mbote, 2016), the case of 
the Maasai highlights the additional role played by informal codes of conduct which allow for 
agenda setting, making public participation forums prone to elite capture. Consequently, public 
participation reflects a situation where the public is ‘‘playing by rules of a game, but it is another 
game – one backed by power that the law cannot match,’’ meaning that the laws of the state are 
not actually the laws in operation (Adler and So, 2012: 85-86). 
Where the formal and informal institutional functions collude therefore, legal requirements on 
gender equality are difficult to fulfil, due to the resultant relational environment of institutional 
challenges and informal politics of belonging in a public sphere. Licht (2008) however points 
out that emphasis should not be on why law in practise differs from written law, but rather, 
what drives this phenomenon. To understand this, I adopt Platteau et al.’s (2017) approach. 
They explore the effects of the law on individuals as society members, and under three main 
situations: 
Effect of Legal Norms on Homogeneous Agents 
According to Platteau et al. (2017), individuals make choices depending on the number of 
people in their reference group that will adopt a certain behaviour. For homogenous agents 
therefore, bad or even harmful practices prevail despite the awareness of their negativity, 
because no one takes the initiative to deviate from the group norm. This can be seen in the 
responses by some women, who realise the unfairness of being locked out of political processes 
but take no initiative to challenge this position. Regarding situations where candidate 
preferences in voting differ from their spouses, for example, women reported they would rather 
 
51 An effort at this is exhibited by the Ward Administrators in Kajiado South, who did their best to contact and 
facilitate attendance by 10 men and 10 women from each ward, to ensure that the 2017-2022 Kajiado County 
Integrated Development Plan forum respected gender equality. 
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not exercise their civic right than risk a squabble with their husbands. This was discussed at 
length with the women of Ewuaso Kedong, as this excerpt from the fourth FGD shows: 
Respondent: You would rather stay at home and look after the cows if you cannot 
vote for a leader of your choice. 
Interviewer: So you choose not to be involved? 
Respondents: Yes. 
Respondent: There are no arguments about it. 
Respondent: Sometimes you realise that you will be fighting with your husband 
over a politician, and at the end of the day you will come home to the same 
husband. Therefore, you would rather stay, and the man will emerge the happy 
winner as I am stuck with him forever and the politician is just a passer-by. We 
therefore agree to let it be. 
Even though Table 4.4 depicts gender parity in voting patterns, this discussion makes it clear 
that women’s votes might not really be a reflection of their candidate preference. This highlights 
the non-universality of voting as a political right among women, making it secondary to other 
considerations. Llewely-Davies (1978) explains that solidarity is difficult to achieve when an 
issue does not equally matter for a certain interest group. As these women demonstrate, peace 
in the household is more important than the exercise of political agency, dis-incentivising a 
collective push for equality in political participation. This points to the interconnectedness of 
not just normative approaches, but also power relations between formal and informal 
institutional environments. 
Beyond the lack of incentive for deviation from certain normative structures, Sunstein (1995) 
points out that perceived judgements of other people, as informed by social norms, influence 
how people behave. Strategic decisions are therefore made to avoid reproach, as women do in 
choosing silence over domestic conflicts or even the loss of reputation in the case of public 
disagreements with men. The costs at hand force women to choose dormancy, with the politic 
here being defined within customary boundaries of acceptable behaviour. Despite being 
otherwise knowledgeable on the benefits of exercising political agency, their contextual reality 
forces them to falsify their internal beliefs on political participation, for the sake of harmony 
and a good reputation. Mackay et al. (2010: 577) explain that even in the presence of better 
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choices, individuals choose to stick to a particular path due to the self-reinforcement nature of 
institutions which effectively makes it difficult to effect reforms. 
The conduct of members of the national assembly as discussed in chapter four, and the 
resistance by Maasai men to share power with the women, also find their position in this 
category of homogeneity. Reluctance by members of the male dominated national assembly to 
adopt a formula to achieve the two thirds gender rule means that despite being otherwise 
knowledgeable in their position as legislators, the men still uphold a system that is in violation 
of the Constitution mainly because it serves to maintain their status quo. 
This scenario is replicated in the attitudes of women respondents from Ewuaso Kedong Ward 
in Kajiado West. Even though they agreed that male dominance did not always work to their 
advantage, they were not willing to challenge the situation. In addition to resigning to its being 
too difficult a task, if not outright futile, one middle aged woman admitted that she is fine with 
men making political decisions as their historical exposure has afforded them the experience in 
dealing with public affairs. For her, and others in her group, male dominance was acceptable, 
especially since the men also took responsibility for providing food and catering for the 
children’s education. The women therefore had no reason to ‘cause trouble.’ Their acceptance 
of male dominance converges with the interests of men to maintain their dominance, creating 
what I regard as a circumstantial homogeneity52that sustains the power structure that allows 
men to dominate the civic public sphere.  
Platteau et al. (2017) advance the argument that changing norms in such an environment 
requires effort into shifting focus from the cultural norm to a new focal point, such as a legal 
provision. Gender equality legislation therefore presents itself as one such focal point. In its 
quest for power distribution among men and women, the legislation could potentially contribute 
to shifting the focus of this group of women who are resigned to male political dominance, as 
well as the men who enjoy the benefits of the current status quo. As has been established in 
chapters five and six however, there is little effort by governments to familiarise citizens in the 
study areas on the new constitutional provisions. This makes it difficult to shift the point of 
focus and achieve the desired effect of the law on gender norms among the Maasai. The unfair 
norms thus prevail through direct support from the men, indirectly through the resignation of 
 
52 It is circumstantial because their acceptance of male dominance is informed by men’s fulfilment of their role as 
providers. It can therefore be assumed that the opposite would be true, would the men fail to meet this 
responsibility, as was the reported case in Kajiado South and Narok East. 
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women, and ultimately from weak institutional mechanisms. A reversal of this thus requires 
effort to shift convergence to the benefits of the gender equality legislation. 
Effect of Legal Norms on Heterogeneous Agents 
Guided by a social norm approach, Platteau et al. (2017) hypothesise that there is a positive 
variation between an individual’s utility function and the proportion of the population that 
follows a certain custom. On the flip side, the negative component is distinct in its reflection of 
an individual’s aversion to the custom or the cost of compliance to it. Taking preference 
heterogeneity into consideration therefore, the effect of legislation depends on preference 
distribution in favour of, or against a custom. The more people have an aversion to a custom, 
the more effective the law promises to be by acting as a new focal point away from the 
undesirable custom. This effect is minimised when the number and influence of people with an 
aversion to the custom are low and changing the custom cannot therefore be achieved by 
changing people’s expectations. Evidence of this is found in the reports by women on broaching 
the subject of equality with their spouses: 
Even as you listen to the radio with your husband, he tells you that it does not 
apply to us…They say it only applies in Nairobi. (Female Respondents, Ewuaso 
Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
This excerpt points to two things; it sheds light on the distance of the equality debate from 
everyday realities, and shows that a change in expectations does not necessarily translate to a 
change in normative institutions. Evidence from this study on the variation between what 
women expect and how men respond to gender equality legislation positions the realisation of 
gender equality in the study areas, and Kenya by extension, in this category of heterogeneity.  
At the national level, the failure to pass legislation on the realisation of the two thirds gender 
rule in the national assembly points to the weakness of legislation in social engineering where 
the influence of opponents far outweighs that of the supporters. Considering that questions of 
change are closely linked to questions of power, it can be argued that these opponents benefit 
from the institutional arrangements that perpetuate the political underrepresentation of women 
(Kenny, 2007: 92). Convergence thus becomes difficult to achieve, due to the absence of a 
substantial number of members interested in changing the status quo. 
A similar experience is shared by women in Loitokitok, Kajiado South and those in 
Keekonyokie, Narok East, reminiscent of a tug of war. Despite a largely collective aversion to 
the unfair male dominance, the women have not been successful at challenging the power 
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structure. This signals the presence of a stronger factor that limits their capacity for action, as 
is the case for homogenous agents (Platteau et al., 2017). The men remain reluctant to give 
women ‘a seat at the table’, and the women keep pushing for it, a reality that is determined by 
the socio-economic positions occupied by the women. Participatory parity is therefore 
dependent upon the recognition and redistribution of cultural and socio-economic rights 
(Mackay, 2008: 132). 
In her study on changing gender roles in Sudanese households, Schultz (2005: 419) identifies 
four types of income allocation systems: main breadwinner as financial manager; allowance; 
whole wage; and shared responsibilities. She further acknowledges that households can have a 
mix of these systems. Among the Maasai, evidence suggests that most households operate under 
either a breadwinner or financial manager system (with the position being occupied by either a 
man or a woman, depending on their circumstances), or shared responsibilities system. A few 
have an allowance system, where husbands provide an allowance to their wives to take care of 
household needs. These different income allocation systems produce different outcomes on the 
political agency of women. 
Unlike their counterparts in Ewuaso Kedong who reported that their men were dependable 
providers (in a combination of allowance and main breadwinner as financial manager systems), 
the women in Kajiado South and Narok East, must work hard to meet domestic needs that the 
men would ordinarily be in charge of, but have neglected (putting them in the position of main 
breadwinner and financial manager). This increase in their scope of responsibility therefore 
provides an additional platform for exposure to existing inequalities, as they have to find means 
to meet the demands of their households. Being forced to interact in socio-economic 
environments they were previously unexposed to raises their consciousness on inequalities and 
political realities of their disadvantaged positions.  
It is these personal experiences that inform positive attitude towards the gender equality agenda 
(Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004) among women who take on the breadwinner as financial 
manager role. They are highly motivated to influence public decision making, unlike the women 
in Ewuaso Kedong who reported being satisfied with men’s decision making. Political agency 
therefore becomes an outcome of the socio-economic position occupied by women, as 
determined by their exposure to the reality of their position and the benefits that can be accrued 
from influencing financial decisions. Evidence of the benefits of this exposure is to be found in 
the statement of a respondent, who reiterated the need for men to let their wives gain exposure, 
as she has from her engagement as a community mobiliser.  
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I would ask the men to allow the women to be free, to go for group meetings and 
seminars as these open their eyes to even how a woman should conduct herself 
and manage her home. This way, things will go well, and men will notice 
changes around their homes. The women will learn from each other how to 
manage their homes, be involved in development and how to take on leadership. 
(Female Respondent, Loitokitok, Kajiado South, 07.03.2016) 
For most Maasai men however, the gender equality legislation is interpreted as a threat to their 
dominance, which is why they make all the necessary effort to ensure that the subordinate status 
of women is not changed. These tactics reiterate the argument by Kameri-Mbote (2016) that 
the capacity of the law on gender equality is mediated by other factors such as men’s resistance 
to the political engagement of women that may be interpreted as a threat. Evidence of this is in 
detailed complaints by women on being listed as development committee members but having 
no input in decision making, or even attending meetings but not being allowed to speak and 
make any contributions.  
Additionally, there are men who view the provisions on equality as a threat to not just their 
position of authority, but the fabric of family that holds the community together.  
The Constitution can bring difficulty within the family and we have to revert to 
traditions because, if a wife says, 'I must do this' and the man says the same 
thing, it might not work out well as one has to calm down so there is peace in 
the family. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
25.03.2016) 
This view points to the desire to hold on to the traditional Maasai social organisation, which is 
the foundation of Maasai identity (Coast, 2001; Llewelyn-Davies, 1978). It also confirms 
reports by many women politicians that choosing an active political life is mostly regarded as 
an abandonment of wifely duties, as politics is more demanding, making it difficult to balance 
the public and family responsibilities. An interview with Grace Oloo from Tudor Ward in 
Mombasa by Badurdeen and Mwinzi (2017) confirms this. Ms. Oloo opines that for most 
women in politics, it is a matter of choosing whether to be a good politician or a good wife, not 
both. It is therefore not uncommon that marriages fail when women are deemed unable to strike 
this balance. 
Citing the example of women nominated to the Narok County Assembly, a male respondent 
argued that the conferment of power to women was a bad idea. This he explained, could be 
 174 
 
evidenced by the action of some of the women nominated to the Narok County Assembly in 
2013 to fulfil the gender quota. He reported that of the 11, four had divorced their husbands and 
moved out of their homes.53According to him, the four had become arrogant because, like their 
husbands, they also contributed to the household income, but unlike the husbands, they were 
more powerful and influential, and could therefore not continue to be submissive. In his opinion 
therefore, the legislation was doing more harm than good, and should not be allowed to 
influence more women. 
The differential effect of the gender equality legislation on men and women is also experienced 
in other spheres of interaction. An example is to be found in the observations by Merry (2003) 
from her study on implementing women's human rights to protection from violence in Hawaii. 
She reports that in their encounter with the law, men and women responded differently to the 
effect of the law on their identities of femininity/masculinity and power. By discarding cultural 
notions of femininity and reporting their abusive husbands, women gained courage and 
appreciated the help of the law. On the other hand, being reported and therefore having cultural 
notions on their exercise of power questioned, men were surprised and even angered by what 
they considered as betrayal by their women. These views however differed by education and 
class, with the more educated and those with previous contact with legal authorities being 
considerably open to legal intervention. Male respondents in Kajiado and Narok exhibited 
similar tendencies, with the educated and those with more exposure being more supportive of 
the call to share the public space with women, going even further to suggest that the government 
considers enlisting their services in civic education within the counties.  
However, unlike the women in Merry’s (2003) study who receive support from the government, 
Maasai women that have embraced legal channels have little to celebrate. Among those that 
have tried to settle disputes which have been unfairly dismissed at the sphere of customary law, 
there is a sense of fearlessness towards unfair male authority. Sadly, few of them have 
succeeded, and those who dare to openly question decisions by men must deal with the 
reputational cost of mocking customary law. These women are therefore disadvantaged in their 
quest to work as role models and educate other women on alternative channels of challenging 
unfair male authority. The state legal sphere does reportedly little to remedy women’s position 
in society as the narrative by Neenkai,54a female community mobiliser from Loitokitok, reveals. 
 
53 Even though other respondents agreed with this claim, I could not find evidence to verify them. 
54 Pseudonym 
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Once a relative of mine was beaten up by her husband at six months pregnant. 
He took her, naked, to the woods and beat her up. When she started fainting off, 
he untied her and left her for dead. When a passer-by noticed her, he notified 
her mother who was not moved to act since it is fairly acceptable that men beat 
up their wives. When she realised that the day was ending, and she had not come 
home, she finally went for her and brought her home. They did not take good 
care of her and denied me permission to take care of her. When it seemed that 
she would die, they finally allowed me to take her with me. We took her to the 
hospital, and I took up the case with the courts. I have never been to court or 
had such a case, but I took it up anyway. That is when I approached the 
Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) for assistance. I went to the government 
offices in Kajiado and faced difficulties because the abuser was from the ruling 
clan and the woman and I from the poor clan.  
When I say the government does not help, it is because they rallied chiefs to 
come get me and I had to run away to the most rural places where they would 
not find me. They wanted to get to me and talk at me to curse me. But the Chiefs 
are government, and that is when I began losing my faith in the presence of 
government. The lady was still hospitalised. FIDA helped me throughout: the 
office hid the file since they had been bribed and when I asked for help, they sent 
me to the prosecutor who they mentioned does not talk to the people. I believed 
them as I was not knowledgeable enough on the matter. I was stranded with the 
mother and her new-born child. I took courage and decided to face the 
prosecutor myself. He was not very friendly at the beginning, but I finally 
managed to explain my case and he promised to help and bring the case closer 
to Loitokitok. We were successful, and the abuser was asked to pay KES 40,000 
or serve four years in jail. He paid the fee and was set free after spending three 
days behind bars. But we won. 
This news was widespread, but the women were afraid of being cursed should 
their husbands learn that they were seeking assistance. I was also afraid because 
the women were threatening to curse me, so I was helping out in secret. There 
was also a woman who came to me complaining of her irresponsible alcoholic 
husband. She reported to the Chief that the husband wanted to sell off their land, 
not knowing that the chief was involved in the sale and was expecting a 
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commission from it. How then will we say that the government helps? I reported 
this to another Chief in Loitokitok who put me in contact with a woman District 
Officer. The other Chief however managed to get to her and she dismissed the 
case. How then has the government helped? The woman continues to suffer, and 
her land continues to be sold off. 
I believe the government has pushed us very far away and I say this with a lot of 
pain. I am now afraid to fight for women because I lack support from top 
government levels. So even if I have the capacity, it is all in vain because women 
from my area are also very afraid. (Loitokitok, 03.03.2016) 
Situations such as this bring out the effects of heterogeneous preferences on the influence of 
legislation. Even in cases of domestic abuse as detailed by Neenkai, both the formal and 
informal institutions seem to collude in favour of men, especially those with political 
connections, even though state systems are supposed to be just and fair. It is not surprising 
therefore, that in the case of gender equality legislation among the Maasai, the issue of whether 
women should have equal socio-political powers, has created a rift in expectations between men 
and women, limiting the intended effect of the law.  
The gendered turn to the law has created a situation where women are open to formal 
alternatives, even though they are not easily accessible, but they have to contend with the social 
cost of side-lining the traditional dispute resolution system. Chappell and Waylen (2013: 601) 
note that women’s presence draws attention to the extent of male dominance and hidden 
expectations in institutional spaces, causing disruption. As the case above indicates, men do 
their best to frustrate efforts by such women and ascertain their dominance as derived from the 
informal institutional environment. Here, as in the case of homogeneous agents, failure by 
county governments to converge interests of both men and women slows down the institutional 
reforms envisaged in the legislation. 
The Deterrence Effect of the Law 
Efficient legal systems are necessary to guarantee human rights and the rule of law (Sippel and 
Wanitzek, 2010). This is expounded by Kenny and Patel (2017) who note that the regulative 
nature of laws can either incentivise or dis-incentivise norms and behaviour, through the 
provision of rewards or imposition of punishments. In instances of deterrence, the law 
introduces a payoff by making it costly to follow a certain norm (Platteau et al., 2017), 
effectively calling for rationality in decision making. Breaking the law therefore invites 
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punishment from state authorities, mainly through the court system, reconfiguring the 
implication analysis by individuals in their exercise of either personal or collective action. Law 
thus becomes a driver of change, with its effect relying heavily on enforcement. 
The criminalisation of female circumcision adopts this deterrence approach, such that, even 
though the practice prevails, there is an awareness among actors of the cost of being caught. It 
is this cost that deters many from engaging in the practice.  
…we are now against FGM because we were educated on its negative 
consequences. Many became afraid and the message spread especially since 
there was tough punishment for those who perpetrated the act. (Male 
Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 04.03.2016) 
The gender equality legislation also comes with sanctions, such as the revocation of 
nominations that do not meet the two thirds gender rule,55or enforcing the nomination of more 
members to meet this requirement. Beyond this scope however, there are no sanctions to deter 
non-compliance at, for example, the ward and village levels where the effect of the law would 
be more beneficial to the women in its application within public participation. This has allowed 
for the descriptive representation of women discussed under heterogeneous conditions, but 
without substantive engagement that would ensure the inclusivity goals of the gender equality 
legislation is met. 
The absence of effective enforcement mechanisms for gender equality diminishes impact, since 
‘‘enforcement transforms the de jure (law, mandate, command, decree or agreement) into the 
de facto and enables both women and men to enjoy rights and resources’’ (Chiongson et al., 
2011:16). This explains why gender equality for Maasai women continues to be elusive, as it 
remains written, with no relevance in practice. It is also why attitudes on equality as something 
that applies in the capital, Nairobi, prevail, as there are no efforts at enforcement, to encourage 
adherence and create resonance in the daily lives of the Maasai. This is compounded by the 
experiences of those such as Neenkai, who have sought legal redress. The negative experiences 
and consequences of their actions further dis-incentivise the pursuit of rights through formal 
channels of state law. 
 
55 Court revokes nomination of 12 Migori MCAs http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/migori/Court-revokes-
nomination12-Migori-MCAs/1183306-4251058-i70lotz/index.html Accessed: 04.01.2018 
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Important to note however, is the fact that cultural values of individual autonomy and 
egalitarianism that characterise legal norms (Licht, 2008) are inconsistent with cultural values 
of the embeddedness of an individual in a tight social fabric or one that emphasises a 
hierarchical societal order. As earlier discussions have shown, the Maasai social structure is 
inherently communal, with individual choices having to take communal codes of conduct into 
consideration. Individual rationalisation of action is therefore made subject to a communal logic 
of appropriateness. In such environments, decisions can be made even if they go against 
individual interests protected by law, demonstrating how institutions constrain actors’ interests 
(Mackay et al, 2009). This points to an inconsistency between the state and the Maasai systems, 
a position that threatens the effectiveness of enforcing legislature, due to a decoupling between 
written law and the context of its application.  
The narrative by Neenkai additionally sheds light on the lack of commitment to enforcement, 
even where sanctions are very well laid out. Women are still struggling with female 
circumcision and domestic violence, which are outlawed and whose legal consequences are 
spelt out in the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2011 and the Protection against 
Domestic Violence Act of 2015 respectively. It is therefore unsurprising that for legislation 
without clearly enforceable sanctions, there is very little to show as success in attitudes and 
behaviour towards socio-political equality among the Maasai. The dates when these laws were 
passed arguably point to the Kenyan society’s overall tolerance for customary practices that are 
unfair to women, and the reluctance by the legislature to provide strict legal guidelines to deal 
with the effects of the clash between formal and informal norms. 
It is however important to note that in some cases, legislation can also influence social norms 
with or without enforcement action. Sunstein (1995) explains that this happens when laws have 
a strong signal on acceptable behaviour, leading to a norms cascade. This is, for example, the 
case for compulsory primary school education, for example, introduced by the government 
introduced in 2003. Like all Kenyans, Maasai families were forced to send their children to 
school, instead of keeping them at home to take care of animals and domestic chores.  
Before, you would visit a home and find a lot of children but now they have to 
be taken to school or the parents will face the law, and they are properly taken 
care of. They are well dressed as opposed to before where you would find them 
poorly dressed for the cold weather or even completely naked. (Female 
Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 21.04.2016) 
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Such behavioural and attitudinal changes are motivated by the reputational incentive to comply, 
and the consequent shame of non-compliance. Sunstein (1995: 2033) explains that the success 
of legislation to achieve this is ‘‘the least controversial case for the expressive function of the 
law,’’ since there are no objections in principle. Gender equality legislation however provides 
no such compliance incentive for Maasai men, as the principle of equality threatens their 
dominance, a status they are reluctant to let go of. The perception of this provision as unjust to 
men therefore contributes to their undermining the state law, fostering non-compliance. Since 
they do this as a group that still polices customs in the community, there is no feeling of shame 
to deter their behaviour, which Licht (2008) argues to be the case for drivers of behavioural 
change. 
This analysis on how laws influence social norms points to two things; first, is the fact that the 
commitment of governments to enforce legal mandates plays a crucial role in ensuring 
compliance. This is because by passing the law, the government signals a common good, and 
one whose successful internalisation depends on the exhibition of commitment from 
government agencies and their agents. Second, the discussion shows that legal norms aimed at 
re-engineering norms elicit varied responses from different interest groups – namely men and 
women, as they perceive and react differently to the options available to them (Merry, 2012). 
In the following section, I focus on the effect of this differential response to legal norms on 
gender relations. The discussion explores how reception to the gender equality agenda by both 
groups shapes and reshapes gender relations in the Maasai community. 
7.1.2 Influence of Legal Norms on Gender Dynamics  
Even though informed by the need to improve the status of women, Teschner (2013) emphasises 
that the adoption of a gender dimension in legislation not only benefits women, but can also be 
useful in identifying how such laws influence equality between men and women. Incidentally, 
this influence could be either positive or negative. 
There were male respondents who responded positively to the push for gender equality, as seen 
among those that are ready to act as ambassadors to other men. On the other hand, female 
respondents reported that their empowerment and their increased involvement in community 
affairs has had the negative consequence of pushing men to abandon their responsibilities, 
especially those relating to the role of provider. This was a matter of reference in Kajiado South 
and Narok East, where the women complained that at any sign of financial autonomy from their 
wives, some men abandoned their responsibility as providers.  
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It is important because even at home, we need support since all the burden falls 
on women, even feeding the children. The men have abandoned all their 
responsibilities on us and do absolutely nothing. (Female Respondent, 
Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 19.04.2016). 
By abandoning their responsibilities, the men’s actions confirm Schultz’s (2005) hypothesis 
that women who choose to forego their financial autonomy do so as a trade-off. In the context 
of financial planning in Sudanese households, Schultz explains that women let their husbands 
control their income as a way of ensuring that the men continue to meet their responsibilities at 
the household. By choosing their financial autonomy, Maasai women can be seen to have 
unintentionally contributed to men’s abandonment of their responsibilities as reported in the 
excerpt above. 
When men abandon their responsibilities, avenues of gender equality turn out to be avenues for 
burden creation. This resonates with the study on rural Rwanda by Kagaba (2015), who finds 
that gender equality laws, and programs along with them, have also increased women’s burden 
as they not only have to be carers, but also providers. In this process, as in the case of the Maasai, 
gender equality laws play a significant role in reshaping traditional notions of femininity and 
masculinity, especially within the scope of financial responsibilities. This is because, with the 
push for equality, men respond by choosing to either share or abandon their responsibilities 
together with the decision-making power that comes with this decision. Unlike Kagaba’s report 
on rural Rwanda however, the inclination towards power sharing does not spread to economic 
decisions over land and livestock among the Maasai. Instead, the bargaining power of the 
women is limited to their contribution from women groups’ saving schemes and the sale of the 
traditional beadwork jewellery. 
This process of reshaping roles and bargaining power is especially relevant in this study where 
female respondents pointed out that even though their desire to acquire more knowledge and 
exercise their rights was in most cases a source of friction, it was also, albeit slowly, positively 
redefining power relations at the household level. Some men also shared this view, attributing 
it to the realisation of the benefits of running households as a team, instead of the man bearing 
sole responsibility. Such shifts towards equality at the household level, have a positive influence 
on men’s attitude towards the inclusion of women in public affairs.  
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When an African woman, a Maasai woman has the awareness and is empowered, 
and I as a man accepts, - I will give an example; there were NGOs giving water 
tanks to people and there was a man who refused it because he did not 
understand how the wife came to benefit from it. So if men understand and 
accept women's empowerment, we will go far and it will help to improve the 
economy and homes will greatly improve. (Male Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward 
– Narok East, 20.04.2016) 
Positions of responsibility and power at the household level are therefore key determinants of 
attitudes towards women’s political agency. Kenny (2007: 94) refers to this as ‘‘gender as 
practice,’’ which transcends notions of femininity and masculinity in the context of social and 
political institutions. As the experiences in the discussion on the effect of legal norms on 
homogenous and heterogeneous agents show, women that have been left to bear the burden of 
meeting household needs (itself a negative thing), are more inclined to exercise their political 
rights. On the other hand, women whose husbands assume the responsibility of meeting 
household needs (itself a positive thing), have little incentive to exercise their political rights. 
Consequently, the increased responsibility for women improves their political efficacy, as they 
are forced to engage with environments beyond the domestic realm, exposing them to 
contemporary development and political affairs. 
It is also important to note that the outward manifestation of this viewpoint, expressed in 
economic terms and livelihood conditions, provides an incentive that is difficult to ignore. Both 
male and female respondents reported that whether they supported equality or not, men take 
pride in having wives who contribute to their prosperity as it boosts their social standing in 
society, earning them respect and making them more influential.  
So I asked him whether or not he was bothered that maybe another man was 
giving me the money and he said even if it was so, he still gets all the praise 
because I am his wife. (Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward, Narok East, 
19.04.2016) 
This attitude has its roots in the Maasai structure of kinship and economic life. As Llewelyn-
Davies (1981) explains, traditionally, men have rights in women relating to both labour power 
and sexuality. Prosperity and influence thereof, ordinarily follow from how many cows, women 
and children a man owns. Whatever the woman has is under custodianship, not ownership. 
Llewelyn-Davies (1981: 334) goes ahead to elaborate, ‘‘I may write ‘the women have no 
property’ when in Maasai this would be rendered as ‘there is nothing which women own’ – 
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meeta ene-itore inkituaak.’’ This further cements the women’s position of powerlessness, 
grounded in their lack of A-itore which Llewelyn-Davies defines as being in command of, or in 
charge, as applies to both authority and property rights. Instead, women operate under A-itodol, 
which is having limited rights, mainly over domestic animals. Following this logic therefore, 
as a wife belongs to her husband, everything that she contributes to the household is considered 
her husband’s asset.  This does not however mean that they will always give women due credit 
for the contribution, as women respondents in Keekonyokie made clear.  
At the same time, men who support their wives’ risk being branded as subordinate to their 
wives,56as they are no longer regarded as the decision makers in their households. 
I have been called names: I am bad, I rule over my husband among others…My 
husband and I always cooperate, which the Maasais translate as me ruling over 
my husband. (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
The influence of gender equality laws on attitudes towards power sharing is especially 
important in the Maasai community, where support for women’s political leadership relies 
heavily on the support from their husbands. Many women who are actively engaged in public 
affairs, and politics by extension, largely depend on the support of their husbands, which is 
interpreted as proof of their capacity to lead while remaining respectful. Being respectful here 
refers to the woman’s continued respect for male authority, and therefore any disagreements 
would be dealt with in a manner that will not belittle or shed negative light on a man. On the 
other hand, the lack of a husband’s support for political engagement translates to a woman’s 
difficulty in convincing the public of her ‘balanced’ capacity, therefore increasing chances of 
failure. 
The legitimisation through husbands means that it is more difficult for unmarried or divorced 
women to gain political leadership. As Nanoi who was aspiring for the Representative position 
for Rombo Ward in Kajiado South narrated, her biggest obstacle in convincing the public to 
vote for her was the fact that she was separated from her husband. A failed marriage was 
interpreted as demonstrated inability to manage personal affairs, rendering her incapable of 
taking on a public role. For Soipan Tuya, the Women Representative for Narok County, her 
extensive experience working with the community on rights issues as a lawyer was not enough. 
Her biggest challenge was convincing her fiancé to support her political ambitions, with her 
father being equally reluctant to support her, despite being a politician himself. To them, politics 
 
56 The actual description was that the men would be regarded as having been sat on (the heads) by their wives. 
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was not a woman’s game. Ultimately however, it was their support that stamped the path to her 
success. In the case of Mary Seneta, her husband’s support from the onset went a long way in 
ensuring the success of her 2012 campaign for the Kajiado County Women Representative 
seat.57  
These narratives point to the fact that, even while not receiving adequate support from the men, 
gender equality laws are influencing how men and women relate. The increased presence of 
women in the political space is disrupting male dominance, while at the same increasing 
women’s realisation of a shift in power structures that could work to their advantage.  This has 
therefore created an environment where both parties either choose to cooperate without men 
feeling they are being subordinated (made possible by having proxies and ineffective women 
representatives), women pushing boundaries and causing conflict (at a high social cost), or men 
actively putting in effort to block women’s rights.  
Similar responses can be observed from Arpino et al.’s (2015) analysis on how a change in 
gender role attitudes influences fertility. By focusing on women’s responses, they show that 
women respond in three ways to perceived unfairness: exit, voice or loyalty. In their context, 
exit involved women foregoing marriage or reducing fertility. In this study, the strategy applies 
in an interesting manner: there were no reported cases of separation or divorce from women’s 
push for inclusion, but there was an awareness that there were limits to how much a woman can 
push before the husband punishes her by getting a more submissive wife and separating from 
her. Divorce was however not mentioned.  
What I would request is that because they are heads and we are necks, we cannot 
switch positions, and we respect them because even the Bible asks a woman to 
respect her husband, that whenever they meet, they should that encourage their 
peers to go to church, to maybe help change the hard-headed women because 
they are there. They force men to abandon their homes in search of peace, even 
if it means living with another woman who is unmarried. (Female Respondent, 
Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 07.03.2016) 
The voice strategy involves active pursuit of equality, which in the case of the Maasai is the 
conflict-causing alternative. Women fighting for equality are mostly regarded as troublemakers 
who disrespect cultural dictates on gender roles in society. On the other hand, loyalty involves 
 
57 As made obvious by reports by women respondents that they voted for her not because they knew her, but 
because their husbands recommended that they do so. 
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women foregoing their fight for freedom and emancipation, choosing instead to surrender to 
the status quo. This strategy is adopted by many women who wish not to pursue the futility of 
fighting against men as embodied by women in Ewuaso Kedong who reported that unlike their 
Loitokitok counterparts, they purposefully choose not to contradict men in fighting for their 
rights.  
As subsection 7.1.1 above explores, these differences are based on the different socio-economic 
positions occupied by women (Schultz, 2005). Women in Loitokitok and Keekonyokie are 
therefore more vocal and engaged in public affairs, as they have had to take on more financial 
responsibilities that their husbands would ordinarily be in charge of. This exposes them to 
socio-economic and political realities, raising their consciousness and with it, the quest for fair 
institutional practices. On their part, the women in Ewuaso Kedong exhibit loyalty since their 
husbands cater for all households needs, minimising exposure and incentive to engage or 
question socio-political decisions. 
These varied responses can be explained by observations that legal reforms rely heavily on 
already existing attitudinal shifts: there will be little effect where there is unanimous support 
for a certain practice, and conversely, increased effect where debates and differences of opinion 
exist on the matter (Crisman et al., 2016). This explains the different approaches by Maasai 
women in the fight for their rights, choosing to either accept subordination and move on, or 
confront the men who uphold the inequalities. Consequently, where women choose the path of 
least confrontation, there is limited awareness of what their rights are. This contrasts with the 
women who take on the fight, who are considerably informed, and channel their struggle 
towards accessing justice. Both instances nonetheless demonstrate the effect of exposure on the 
political agency of women. 
Considering the rationale, mechanisms and effects of social engineering, the following section 
delves into what informs the challenges faced by the Maasai community. It probes the issues 
that make it difficult to converge interests towards the positive reception of the gender equality 
agenda. I do this by examining the perceived justice and legitimacy of gender equality 
legislation by men and women in the community. 
7.2 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Legislation on Gender Equality  
From their rationale, gender equality laws would be characterised as an overlap between 
preference-changing and equilibrium-selection norms (Basu, 1998). The social context of their 
enforcement thus greatly influences reception and commitment to the legislation in a way that 
can have tangible effects on behaviour. Kenny and Patel (2017) go ahead to suggest that a 
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change in beliefs comes about from a change in societal values and legal changes that come 
along in the process. The success of this pattern however relies on the alignment of shared 
beliefs with the need for change. Having more gender positive laws denotes the desire to 
promote gender positive attitudes. This is true for the case of gender equality in representation 
at the national level in Kenya. Legal provisions, in their clarity on the critical number of women 
to substantiate their representation, reflect the alignment of women’s equality struggle 
described in chapter four with the global agenda on improving the status of women and their 
agency in society.  
Among the Maasai however, this alignment is generally absent, with men unwilling to accept 
the equal status of women. This resistance stands in the way of according women equal rights 
for involvement in decision making and resource control. Considering the traditional Maasai 
social organisation and the changes introduced from the colonial era onwards, it is evident that 
men are clinging on to the traditional system that supports their dominance in public decision-
making processes. This is despite the fact that Maasai women have, over the years, lost 
influence from the erosion of the traditional system of complementarity which allowed men to 
have political influence (Hodgson, 2001).  
This situation reflects the nature of informal institutions as constituting norms that are slow to 
change, as opposed to formal institutions whose norms can and do change at a faster rate 
(Roland, 2004). The resistance to change in the informal space is informed by the proximity, 
relatability and tangible effect of non-state norms in the daily lives of society members, which 
weave themselves into the fabric that shapes daily life. Employing Ekeh’s (1975) argument 
helps us understand that state norms fail to have an equally strong effect due to the continued 
othering of the state and its institutions. Among the Maasai, this othering is exacerbated by the 
physical invisibility of state apparatus, as is common across rural areas in Kenya.     
In the following subsection, I discuss the challenges introduced by the differences in proximity 
and relatability of state and non-state institutions. The focus is therefore on the consequences 
of a hybrid legal environment on the gender equality goal.  
Legal pluralism 
As the discussions have so far alluded, the Kenyan legal system recognises non-state legal 
orders in what Kameri-Mbote (2016) summarises as a juristic legal pluralism that can be found 
across Africa.  Sippel and Wanitzek (2010) explain this coexistence as the product of legal 
traditions of former colonial powers (which were later modified to fit the legal and cultural 
context of post-independence states) functioning alongside customary concepts of law in local 
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communities, determined by their socio-economic and cultural characteristics. This 
determination of norms and practices without following formal procedures or any fixed 
codification means that rule making within the informal systems is either negotiated inside a 
community or arbitrarily set by powerful actors (Neubert, 2009). The result is either consensus 
or unfairness, as can be seen in the politics of public agency among the Maasai.    
Kenya adopted the British common law system, which operates alongside informal orders that 
are mainly religious and customary. These orders must however be in consonance with the 
constitutional standards. Even though the power of customary laws is made subject to Article 
2 (4) of the Constitution, for example, the presence and impact of Article 44 (1) confers a level 
of self-determination to communities that have, over time, developed a code of conduct that 
informs norms and governs relations. It is this recognition of more than one source of law that 
gives rise to legal pluralism (Sage and Woolcock, 2012), with everyday transactions falling into 
the jurisdiction of either the state or customary and religious authorities. The different legal 
institutions with their underlying norms therefore coexist in ways that either reinforce, 
contradict or complement each other. Careful consideration of this complexity is therefore 
important in the adoption and application of legal policies to influence social norms.  
The Marriage Act of 2014 for example, allows for polygamy in Kenya, and the same may be 
conducted under the customary rites of any Kenyan community. Additionally, Kadhi courts 
retain jurisdiction over Muslim marriages, signalling recognition and respect for Shariah law. 
In this case therefore, the informal and formal norm systems work to reinforce and complement 
the institution of marriage. On the other hand, Article 60 (1) (f) eliminates gender discrimination 
in law, customs and practices related to land and property. This works to ensure that women 
are allowed to inherit land and property from their parents, which is, under customary law, a 
privilege only enjoyed by men. By extending property rights to women, the provision 
contradicts customary law, forcing a change in attitudes and behaviour towards the inheritance 
and property rights of women, or risk facing legal sanctions. By contradicting customary laws, 
Article 60 contributes to the promotion of the status of women by granting them equal 
inheritance rights, as confirmed by a respondent in the second FGD: 
…we said that the opportunity cannot be taken by male children, we decide that 
women would inherit their husbands and divide it among the children. (Male 
Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 04.03.2016) 
However, this legal plurality creates the potential for ambiguities, confusion, or even conflict, 
which may be compounded by an absence of, or failed mechanisms for, mediation between the 
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formal and informal institutions (Chiongson et al., 2011). Gender equality laws fall within this 
formal-informal intersection, as customary and religious laws also define boundaries and duties 
which might not necessarily favour women, as is the case in patriarchal communities. This can 
be seen in the reported attitudes towards the political engagement of women among the Maasai, 
which are grounded on customary norms that are more focused on maintaining the dominant 
position of men. Kameri-Mbote (2016) points out that as an underlying principle of customary 
law in Kenya, patriarchy remains a hindrance to the realisation of gender equality.  This 
assertion is proved by the experiences described in chapters four, five and six.  
Overall, the social meaning attached to a law is a function of social norms more than the 
intention of the law maker (Sunstein, 1995). It is imperative therefore, that there is deliberate 
effort at synchronisation, to minimise conflicts and promote coexistence. This is important 
considering the powerful position of informal institutions that are governed according to a 
community’s accepted ‘living law’ (Sippel and Wanitzek, 2010). Calls by women, and some 
men, for civic education to increase awareness on the benefits of supporting the political 
inclusion of women in the Maasai community point to the importance of this synchronisation. 
Understandably, Chiongson et al. (2011: 25) warn that trying to force multiple systems into 
uniformity by only focusing on one system minimises impact and might even alienate 
individuals whose social life is ‘‘embedded in a particular, localized set of norms and values.’’  
Evidence of this is found in the case of maternal healthcare in parts of Kajiado County, where 
the government was forced to build modern Manyatta, to encourage pregnant women to seek 
medical care.58This became necessary because, despite education efforts and investment in 
upgrading medical facilities, pregnant Maasai women from certain rural areas were reluctant to 
seek medical care from government facilities as they found them foreign and cold. Additionally, 
pregnant women had difficulties accepting care from young nurses, as it is taboo for younger 
women to see the nakedness of older women, considered their mothers. Incorporating a housing 
style that was familiar to them was therefore a huge step in encouraging them to visit medical 
facilities. 
This case demonstrates that positive attitude cannot be expected from knowledge dissemination 
on the positivity of something new or foreign to a society. A legal statement informing 
individuals that gender discrimination and inequality is a rights violation for example, is 
 
58  Innovative modern manyatta maternity saving lives in Kajiado https://citizentv.co.ke/lifestyle/a-modern-
manyatta-maternity-in-kajiado-161897/ Accessed: 27.03.2017 
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unlikely to have tangible influence on their attitudes if they do not place great value on the 
matter. Institutional patterns among the Maasai do not place cultural value on women ‘‘as 
legitimate political actors with legitimate interests and differentiated interests and concerns’’ 
(Mackay, 2008: 132); thus subordinating their status. Efforts to push for attitude change on this 
is therefore increasingly difficult. 
Crisman et al. (2016) argue that the cultural embeddedness of a practice signifies the limited 
role of state intervention to change in behaviours. Based on the case of fighting FGM, they note 
that the success of similar campaigns relies on cooperation with local leaders who understand 
community practices, together with the culture and identity perceptions. These leaders come in 
handy in steering change as they can navigate the cultural terrain better than outsiders. At the 
same time Crisman et al. point out that this localisation supports the identification of external 
threats, so state laws will be ignored, and undesired practices prevail where there is no change 
in underlying notions of identity. This can once again be seen in attitudes towards female 
circumcision, outlawed by the state, but still a part of the Maasai cultural identity: 
The men push for it because they refuse girls that are not circumcised…My 
daughter will not be married if I do not circumcise her. She will remain in my 
house forever…She will not even be recognised by her agemates…She will be 
an outcast…They will say she is just a girl, not a woman. (Female Respondents, 
Ewuaso Kedong Ward - Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
Positioning Maasai men in these two debates makes it clear that the success of the gender 
equality campaign relies on their cooperation, as they are the community’s culture ‘gatekeepers’. 
The role of the men will be discussed in-depth in the next chapter.  Kameri-Mbote (2016) points 
out that as a basic principle of customary law in Kenya, patriarchy remains a hindrance to the 
realisation of gender. Support from men for the equality agenda would mean that they would 
willingly give up their control over decision making, which informs their identity as leaders. 
Alternatively put, they stand to lose, what Connell (2005) terms as their collective patriarchal 
dividend. It is not surprising therefore, that most men exhibit a reluctance to accept and support 
the legislation. 
It is also not just the women, even the men have not accepted being led by women 
because women are still under the authority of men…If the woman is unmarried, 
it is even more problematic. So it is these perceptions that create a barrier in 
the election of women. (Male Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
07.03.2016) 
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This excerpt points to a rejection of women’s leadership due to the double consequence of men 
losing dominant authority and being made to be answerable to women. What this makes clear 
is the reality that proposed legislation is most likely to be unsuccessful when it carries a negative 
connotation to what is considered socially acceptable by a dominant group. Bilz and Nadler 
(2014) explain that since customs are chosen by intrinsically conservative authorities, they tend 
to be elitist and favourable to dominant groups. In the context of the Maasai, norms that guide 
gender relations in public decision-making favour men over women, pushing the men to make 
adjustments so they can retain their influence in the face of state laws that threaten their position. 
This has been done, respondents pointed out, through the inclusion of a woman or two whenever 
a council of elders was called upon, without conferring any meaningful power to them. In so 
doing, the men are able to maintain control over decision making, even though women 
constitute the decision-making bodies. 
Complete adoption of norms that contravene the traditional set-up is understandably liable to 
elicit more negative than positive reactions from target groups. Soss and Schram (2007) thus 
postulate that when an official government policy affirms dominant values, rewarding those 
who comply and punishing those who deviate from them, this reinforces patterns of opinion 
and behaviour. The opposite is also true, as is the case with gender equality which challenges 
traditional arrangements and acts in favour of women. As chapters five and six demonstrate, 
the lack of rewards and sanctions as evidence of the government’s commitment to gender 
equality have contributed to the continued dominance of traditional values of men’s superiority. 
Additionally, the statement being made that the dominant position held by men reinforces 
undesirable negative values fuels their desire to protect themselves from both criticism and a 
loss of power. This is done through the vindication of their actions – in the name of culture and 
tradition – while protecting the status quo. This is in line with the argument that an assessment 
of social consequences informs the expressive approach to law where favour follows an 
expected positive outcome (Sunstein, 1995). Among Maasai men, the expected outcome is 
perceived as negative, thus eliciting resistance.  
Men’s control over public decision making therefore continues to be supported by cultural 
dictates of public engagement. Women are not allowed to publicly criticise men, especially 
those in a similar age-sets with their husbands and older. Doing so contravenes enkanyit, the 
foundation of Maasai social relations. Responding to a woman’s fear of speaking out against 
men in a public meeting, a male respondent rationalised it thus: 
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In such a scenario, it might be that the man speaking is the woman's father's age 
and she might, as it happens sometimes, have a slip of the tongue. When this 
happens, then it would not be good. So she decides to respectfully keep quiet in 
front of her father. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
24.03.2016)  
This points to the continued influence of the age-set system, with its dictates on conduct and 
respect for one’s seniors (Coast, 2001). Applying this logic to a public participation forum 
founded on guaranteed equality of representation and freedom of expression therefore means 
that women’s political agency is curtailed. Even though it is well within their rights under state 
laws, their actions have to be within customary order, or invite a social cost many cannot afford 
to bear.  
This challenge as faced by women in navigating the different spheres means that they are unable 
to take advantage of the plurality of legal opportunities available to them. Within the context of 
forum shopping (Maloy, 2005; Merry, 2012 and Sippel and Wanitzek, 2010), women would be 
tempted to circumvent customary authority to seek legal justice (as in the case of domestic 
violence as narrated by Neenkai), guided by the value of a court’s favourable judgement. Value 
judgement therefore becomes crucial at this point, as a woman has to decide whether the 
favourable decision sought is really worth it. As Platteau et al. (2017) point out, the cost 
implication goes beyond monetary costs incurred in going to court, to include the cost of 
ignoring the decision of the customary authority. For a community where the customary 
authority is more visible, and whose effects are more tangible in daily life, women have to 
decide whether to live by an unfair decision, or bear the cost of challenging what is, in this case, 
traditionally legitimised male authority. This can be seen in the case of Ayola who, by taking 
her father to court to protest his choice of a partner, defied her father and the elders, causing her 
to be stigmatised and ostracised (Hodgson, 1996).   
Understandably, many female respondents reported that they were not ready to bear such 
consequences. As with curses, the reputational cost implication does not stop at an individual 
woman, but extends to her children and future generations as well. This perception is reinforced 
by the strong community-centred sense of identity among the Maasai, as opposed to an 
individual-centred one which benefits much more from formal institutional arrangements. This 
community-centred sense of identity also explains why women sometimes revisit their 
decisions due to the cost of having made individually centred decisions. Going back to the case 
of female circumcision, for example, married women in Uganda are reported to undergo the 
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procedure just so that they can qualify as real women by being allowed to do things like 
attending meetings and serving elders.59They are therefore forced to revisit individual decisions 
if they are to maintain their identity and properly belong to their communities.  
The choice of a normative system over another therefore requires careful consideration of 
consequences, regardless of personal convictions and even relief being sought. Among the 
Maasai, it is evident that customary norms are very influential, making them a strong 
determinant of the acceptability and support for gender equality in political decision making. 
This confirms that the powerful nature of informal norms and rules, particularly relating to 
gender, can undermine formal institutional rules (Chapell and Waylen, 2013: 603). 
Taking note of the arguments for social engineering and the challenges that this reform faces, 
the discussion now shifts to the position of gender equality as a goal among the Maasai, 
factoring in the influence of both formal and informal institutions. 
7.3 Effectiveness of Legislation in Changing Attitudes and Norms 
From the discussion so far, it is evident that the uptake and commitment to legal norms depend 
on how much the said norms influence daily lives of individuals. This reality implies the lack 
of a universal effect of legislation. Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2010) explain that the most 
affected attitudes will be of those most affected by the legal provisions in question. This can be 
seen in the widespread support for gender equality by women compared to men, as women 
understand that equality translates to their enjoyment of rights and improved status. 
In addition to the proximity in people’s lives, the effect of legislation also depends on such 
other factors as age, education background and urban or rural residence. Age is especially 
influential, as younger people are arguably more likely to change their attitudes than adults, due 
to their increased adaptability to change (Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993). These factors have been 
discussed in detail in chapter five. In this section, the discussion centres on the effect of gender 
equality legislation - in its formulation and implementation - on attitudes towards equality 
among the Maasai. To achieve this, I evaluate the legislation against factors that influence the 
success or failure of legislation as proposed by Bilz and Nadler (2014), in conjunction with 
Soss and Schram’s (2007) mass policy feedback process. I examine how these factors converge 
 
59 Why married women in Uganda are getting circumcised https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Uganda-married-
women-undergoing-circumcision/1066-4269734-6wsagyz/index.html Accessed: 19.01.2018 
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with the visibility and proximity dimensions of legislation to shape the effect of the gender 
equality legislation among the Maasai. 
According to Bilz and Nadler (2014), the source of legislation, attitude object and the manner 
of regulation are the three factors that influence the success or failure of legislation. On the 
other hand, the policy feedback process by Soss and Schram (2007) is based on dimensions of 
visibility and proximity. They hypothesise that the material design of a policy will have little 
influence on individuals’ lives when these dimensions exist as symbols that are compelling but 
distant. Accordingly, said individuals will pay little attention to the changes being introduced, 
clinging instead to their old ways of doing things. While the original framework is adopted to 
shed light on policy feedback in mass publics as a practical political strategy in political science 
theorising, I apply it here in a much simpler form, to evaluate the effect of policy characteristics 
on intended feedbacks. The focus is therefore much narrower and the application less detailed. 
The framework nonetheless provides a very useful lens to investigate the characteristics – 
effects relationship of legislation and attitude change. 
I begin the analysis with the factors as discussed by Bilz and Nadler (2014). 
7.3.1 Effects of the Source 
Even though legal norms are in most cases regarded as representing state position, the 
representation is not monolithic. Bilz and Nadler (2014: 254) point out that the appropriateness 
of specific actions varies ‘‘by subject matter, by hierarchy (local, regional, national, inter-
national), or by mode of action.’’ This variation could be extended to include the influence of 
non-state laws as well, to make sense of the phenomenon of forum shopping among Maasai 
women, especially regarding mode of action and how this influences reception to rights as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.   
Perceptions of a system’s fairness influence individuals’ recourse to justice. Women would 
therefore, for example, decide between customary law and state law to deal with a grievance, 
depending on what platform is likely to favour them. In the case of Ayola for example, Hodgson 
(1996) explains that she rejected the passive role of silent assent expected of her as a daughter, 
as it left her voiceless on the elders’ decisions. By opting for the Tanzanian state’s legal system, 
she chose a forum where she and her father would be regarded as equals and where justice 
would prevail. 
On decision making, empirical evidence points clearly to the unfairness of the customary law 
system towards women, as is the case with locking Maasai women out of decision making and 
land ownership under the group ranches and settling domestic disputes. It would be expected 
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therefore, that the women would make the rational decision to approach the government to solve 
any issues relating to property rights and rights’ violations. Reality however points otherwise.  
Perceptions of the unfairness of the state legal system are widespread among Maasai women. 
This aligns with the Afrobarometer report by Bratton and Gyimah-Boadion (2016), on the 
trustworthiness of government agencies among the public. Prevalence of a negative perception 
among the Maasai is important to note, considering the limited interactions the women have 
had with the state system courtesy of procedural ignorance and distance as will be discussed 
shortly. To make sense of this, Bilz and Nadler (2014) explain that perceptions are not only 
informed by direct interactions with legal agents and agencies, but also indirectly through 
observations of their pervasive operations. These experiences then inform perceptions of the 
legitimacy of decisions made by formal institutions and their agents. 
The case of Christine Kapaaya’s rape and subsequent death, for instance, details how both the 
police and local chief failed to facilitate the prosecution of the alleged rapists, choosing instead 
to push the family to accept the solution arrived at by the local council of elders. When the case 
of Neenkai is brought into comparison, it also shows the difficulty of earning the support of 
local state agents, due to the entrenchment of patriarchal considerations into the formal system. 
This goes against the proposition by Chiongson et al. (2011) that hybrid systems which 
incorporate aspects of formal and informal institutions are the solution to enhancing justice for 
women and other marginalised groups. Experiences of Maasai women captured in this study 
demonstrate otherwise. 
Since the chiefs and village elders constitute the bottom level of the devolution structure that is 
supposed to assist in the inclusion of women, it is only fair that women hope that as state agents, 
they would facilitate justice for women.  
For the knowledgeable who don’t believe in curses, they go report to the chief, 
letting them know that should they not take action, then the woman would report 
to higher authorities. But all this depends on local level leadership because 
should the Chief be bribed, then they don’t work. (Female Respondent, 
Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 03.03.2016) 
Hybrid systems therefore seem to only work for women who are aware of their rights and how 
to claim them, another argument that Chiongson et al. (2011) put forth. For most women in 
rural areas and with limited socio-political exposure therefore, hybrid systems do little to 
guarantee their enjoyment of rights. The case of Neenkai additionally shows that knowledge on 
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claiming rights is not enough to guarantee justice, and instead, women must be able to counter 
the influence of men in the formal institutional set-ups. This reality contradicts Chiongson et 
al.’s (2011) argument for the advantage of a hybrid system. Instead, it points to the failure of 
this system to work for Maasai women, since traditional norms founded on patriarchy extend 
to the realm of the state. Within the larger institutional framework, these norms magnify the 
‘‘constraints of the interlocking roles of the formal and informal in structuring action” (Nee and 
Brinton 1998: xvi in Mackay et al., 2009: 256). Consequently, the benefits of forum shopping are 
curtailed for many, as both avenues are equally open to injustices perpetrated by men.  
It is not surprising therefore, that many women do not trust government officials to be fair and 
are cautiously optimistic in their recourse for justice. The agents lack credibility as far as 
fairness towards women is concerned.  This is exacerbated by the neglect and lack of support 
that women report of the government, from their experiences with state development and 
resource management as discussed in chapter six regarding the management of affirmative 
action funds.  
Bilz and Nadler (2014) warn that being untrustworthy is a sure way to reduce credibility and 
with it, the authority and ability to persuade individuals to change. This reiterates observations 
that it is crucial that those charged with norm management can be trusted by those whose norms 
are at issue (Sunstein, 1995). While the government has done a lot to promote the education of 
girls, end female circumcision and early child marriages, the relationship between its officials 
and those guarding the patriarchal set-up is a huge stumbling block to its credibility on gender 
equality matters.  
7.3.2 Effects of the Attitude Object 
Characteristics of the attitude being targeted also determine the success or failure of regulation 
(Bilz and Nadler, 2014). Any perceived discrepancies between the law and what individuals 
think should be right can undermine its effect. This is made clear in the attitudes of most men 
towards the attempt to make women their equals. From their standpoint, this position merits no 
support as it not only threatens their status quo in general, but open support for the agenda by 
an individual puts them at the risk of ‘losing face’ among their peers as a female respondent 
reported on the responses to her husband’s support for her public engagement.  
Mackay et al. (2009: 255) explain that such attitudes are grounded in ‘‘understandings and 
frames of meaning that define “appropriate” action and roles and acceptable behaviour of their 
members’’ within institutions. As such, they are difficult to change since their perpetuation is 
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not guided by ‘‘purposive action’’ but ‘‘institutionalized repertoires of responses’’ (Mackay et 
al., 2009: 255). It is therefore understandable that many are reluctant to commit to its pursuit. 
Another aspect of the attitude object is how, and to what extent, individuals are involved with 
the issue. The more the issue is embedded in their daily lives, the more resistance any change 
efforts will face. Referencing the work of Linda Skitka, Bilz and Nadler (2014: 256) point out 
that ‘‘where people’s attitudes are strong, wrapped up in their personal identity, and related to 
core moral values, they will be particularly resistant to changing theme.’’ This argument points 
to a challenge the pursuit for gender equality has in common with the struggles against female 
circumcision: cultural identity informs the resistance by some men and women to abandon the 
custom. As a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood, it is an important part of the Maasai 
identity. For proponents, ‘‘the rationality of female genital operations…would seem to be in 
their connection of the individual to the ethnic group of which she is a part, as a mature, 
respected adult’’ (Howard, 1982: 50). A law that demonises this act is therefore viewed as a 
threat to the identity of women in the community.  
The strength of this identity effect can be seen in the actions of the Ugandan women who choose 
to undergo circumcision even after marriage as a mark of belonging to their communities.  Such 
strong sentiments are behind accusations that by legislating on cultural matters, the Kenyan 
parliament is stretching its mandate.60Such accusations point to the strong desire to protect 
informal norms and practices against interference by the state. 
Regarding equal socio-political rights for Maasai women, the response is far from different. 
Patriarchy defines relations in the community and male dominance along with it. For men 
therefore, being the decision makers and having women as subordinate, submissive, and not in 
opposition to what the men decide is part of what they regard as the social order. A threat to 
this organisation system is therefore subject to opposition. 
How then, does gender equality as an attitude object relate to the Maasai in their daily lives? 
The following section integrates the framework by Soss and Schram (2007) for a quick 
evaluation.  
 
60  Legalise Female Genital Mutilation, says doctor in court https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Legalise-female-
circumcision--says-doctor-in-court/1056-4267584-11ajval/index.html Accessed: 18.01.2018 
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Figure 7.1 Framework for the analysis of mass feedback processes: Policy visibility and 
proximity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Soss and Schram, 2007: 121. 
Visibility centres on the prominence of policy among the public. The more visible a policy is, 
the more capable it is of arousing mass feedback, depending on whether it provides reassurance 
or poses a threat. On the other hand, proximity concerns the tangibility of policy in the everyday 
lives of individuals, and can be measured according to geographical distance, patterns of social 
relations and time. As Crisman et al. (2016) point out, geography can have an impact on the 
effect of legal change, with regions in the periphery experiencing lessened enforcement and 
reduced media access. For communities in these regions, state law and related government 
institutions are foreign institutions, as has been demonstrated in the case of challenges arising 
from legal pluralism. 
This makes visibility and proximity important factors to consider in evaluating the effectiveness 
of legislation, since the design and effects of a policy ultimately influence the feedback process, 
especially in how they disrupt the status quo. For isolated environments, such as the rural areas 
where the presence of state agencies is not always visible, operating social norms could 
substantially slow down any norm changing state laws. 
Factoring in policy visibility and proximity therefore, I incorporate the feedback process to 
position the experiences of gender equality legislation among the Maasai. 
High Visibility but Distant 
Policies at this level are mainly distant objects of perception among citizens. These include 
foreign policies that receive wide media coverage, but whose effect is felt by a small number 
of the population. An example of this in Kenya would be the deployment of the Kenya Defence 
Forces to Somalia for peacekeeping. The decision is debated widely in the media but has little 
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significance for most Kenyans, unless their families are directly involved. Soss and Schram 
(2007) argue that even though these policies are capable of attention and powerful emotion, 
they lack concrete presence in most people’s lives and therefore slip away easily from public 
view. In this instance, feedback effects are most likely structured and conditioned by an elite 
and the media, and the prediction of feedback relies on information about accompanying 
political discourse. 
Considering these characteristics and effects, it is clear that attitude and behavioural change 
towards gender equality among the Maasai do not fit into this category. Due to the reality of 
legal pluralism, support for gender equality is not highly visible, as the governing customary 
norms do not support this norm. This situation is promoted by the existing close relationship 
between gatekeepers of the customary laws and agents of statutory law, which continues to blur 
the visibility of gender equality legislation. In addition, for most people domicile in rural areas, 
the formal system is far away, even physically, to be of timely assistance. It is therefore not 
only difficult to relate to formal policies but also to engage with them. 
High Visibility and Proximate 
At this level, policies are not only tangible in people’s lives, but also act as objects of conscious 
evaluation. Such policies therefore have the potential to enable citizens to connect their personal 
struggles with those in contemporary society. Soss and Schramm (2007) further point out that 
beyond changing the lives of individuals, policies at this level are also capable of producing 
feedback from the cues they convey to wider audiences. 
In this case, mass feedback can be derived from the impact on people’s lives, or the different 
symbolic meanings that stem from it. Together, these effects either reinforce each other or 
produce completely different feedback dynamics. The position of Women Representatives falls 
into this category, with the visibility created having an effect that reaches women at the village 
level. On having the position of a woman representative, women respondents agreed that they 
now have a role model on women’s access to political power, as the position of a women 
representative signals improved opportunities for political inclusion. 
The present situation is better than what we had before. Women are getting 
closer to political leadership. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – 
Kajiado West, 23.03.2016) 
The same holds true for the women who are actively engaged in political discourse; the county 
government assemblies can fulfil the two thirds rule through nominations, increasing the 
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descriptive representation of women. An improvement in descriptive representation increases 
the potential for improvements in substantive and symbolic representation, as argued by 
Kurebwa (2015). Even though this has not been realised at the national level, the debate goes 
on in a way that legitimises the fight by lawyers, academics and civil society actors who are 
spearheading the fight for equality in representation. For many women at the village level 
however, the discussions and debate take place far away from them, and are, for them, a matter 
of hearsay. Though a visible debate, the effects of it all are far from being tangible for most 
Maasai women. 
Low Visibility and Distant 
This happens when public awareness and proximity of effects are both at a minimum. In this 
situation, Soss and Schram (2007) expound, policies escape public notice as they either affect 
isolated constituencies or their effect is very distant as would be the case with regulations on 
emissions that advance global warming. It follows therefore that for policies in this category, 
they are less likely to influence, or be influenced by, mass opinion. 
Gender equality legislation among the Maasai clearly does not fit into this category, even after 
factoring in the effects of the attitude object (Bilz and Nadler, 2014). In their design and effect, 
these laws might not be tangible, but the effects, however minimal, cannot be ignored. The goal 
of equality disrupts the status quo maintained by men, and the public is not, per the 
characteristics of policies in this category, largely unaware and unaffected.  
We have an elected woman MP and if the MCA is a man, he has to nominate a 
woman and vice versa. The Constitution has helped, and we can see that changes 
are coming, even if it has been slow, we can see the changes and now there is 
more consensus with the women. (Male Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – 
Kajiado West, 25.03.2016) 
Even though the specifics remain questionable, there is an agreement on an ongoing power shift. 
The inclusion of women in development committees, having female (assistant) Chiefs, gender 
quotas and the position of women representatives, communicate that something is happening. 
What dims the visibility of this shift are the alliances between actors at the customary and 
statutory levels that make it difficult to understand policies and procedures, seek information 
and push for justice. 
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Low Visibility but Proximate 
In this category, policies are experienced more directly by a larger segment of the population, 
even though they may have low prominence for mass publics. Mass feedback is therefore 
expected to be closely related to the design and operation of the policy. Soss and Schram (2007) 
warn that these policies are likely to bring concealed political dynamics to the fore. This is 
because, even though they are rarely noticeable, policies of this kind influence social relations 
in daily life. Design and implementation are therefore likely to shape beliefs, expectations and 
behaviours.  
The realities of the implementation of gender equality as experienced by the Maasai fall into 
this category. Even though there is limited awareness of the specifics of what is in store for 
women per the Constitution, the ongoing political dynamics have awakened the desire for rights 
awareness and accountability from the government.   
…it would be nice for the Constitution to be brought so the women can become 
aware, know our rights, have a say and be able to decide in development, and 
at home and have a say in politics. So the Constitution should be brought to the 
Maasai. (Female Respondent, Ewuaso Kedong Ward – Kajiado West, 
23.03.2016) 
Soss and Schram (2007) explain that the tangibility of policy effects on people’s lives has the 
consequence of drawing public attention, even though the policy might be obscure. As the 
excerpt above indicates, Maasai women make it clear that something about the Constitution 
promises a power shift, even though they cannot pinpoint what it is exactly. The lack of civic 
education has contributed to this disadvantaged position, but the proximity of its effects cannot 
be ignored. Through devolution, individuals are more aware of increased formal spaces of 
interaction and political participation, with the challenge being whether the new platform 
contributes to the advancement of gender equality as envisioned. 
7.3.3 Effects of the Manner of Regulation 
Effective regulation requires an investment in awareness promotion, lobbying and coordination.  
As has earlier been discussed however, gender equality implementation beyond accounting for 
the two thirds rule is difficult to regulate due to a lack of clarity on an agreeable formula. In 
addition, the agenda remains unclear to many, despite extensive lobbying in the constitution-
drafting process. These challenges have therefore significantly contributed to limiting the 
intended influence on attitudes and behaviour towards gender equality.  
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Bilz and Nadler (2014) point out that poor coordination and a lack of resources could negatively 
impact the effectiveness of legislation. Reports by officers in charge of gender in both counties 
under study confirm the absence of efforts to promote the political empowerment of women. 
This, coupled with financial strains confirmed by budget officers, make it difficult for the 
county governments to actively promote the gender equality agenda.  
An important dimension to consider in the effectiveness of regulation, is the implementation 
strategy or strategies in place. Lépinard and Lieber (2015) emphasise that legislation rarely 
meets its goals if it relies on the voluntary compliance and self-regulation of social actors. In 
the absence of clear strategies for implementation, the pace of persuasion towards attitude 
change slows down, as can be seen from the empirical evidence provided in this study. Equality 
goals thus remain ‘‘loosely coupled to other institutional goals’’ when there is a mismatch 
between policy and performance (Mackay et al., 2009: 258). The lack of enforceable regulations 
has therefore facilitated the political dominance and influence of Maasai men even in spaces 
that are beyond their customary jurisdiction.  
Platteau et al. (2017) point out that the effectiveness of the demise of an undesired custom relies 
on the increased cost of conformity. As evidence in this study has shown, the county 
governments have not instituted any sanctions that would discourage non-conformity, so the 
gender equality goal remains elusive for both government and citizens. This loophole has 
allowed Maasai men to assert influence beyond the traditional sphere, by creating and 
maintaining strategic alliances that favour them. As Merry (2003) emphasises, establishing 
consciousness on rights is dependent on implementation. Without clear implementation 
strategies, for example through programmes as has been done in Rwanda (Burnet, 2008), gender 
equality will remain a matter of debate on goals that could be achieved. 
7.4 Informing Functional Inconsistency 
Recognition of gender-based barriers is important in understanding gendered policy 
implications (Mackay, 2008). The analysis in this chapter has explored how legislation 
influences people’s attitudes and behaviour. It points to the realisation that the effect of 
legislation depends on the status of an individual, as well as the direct influence of legislation 
on their daily experiences. This explains why men and women are affected differently by gender 
equality norms, as it has a lot to do with their socio-economic conditions and their geo-political 
location. Sunstein (1995) points out that just like preferences and beliefs, social norms are not 
pre-determined, but are a product of complex social forces that include the law. This complexity 
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introduces subjectivity to the understandings, meanings and lived experiences of gender 
equality in both formal and informal institutions.  
Experiences of gender equality legislation among the Maasai point to the failure of state law to 
translate into everyday practice. One of the reasons for this, as has been documented in previous 
chapters, is the lack of involvement of the people in drafting and discussing the legislation. 
Relevance on this can be found in other cases of social engineering. Using the case of traffic 
courts in Chicago, for example, Licht (2008) points out that compliance relies heavily on the 
perceived fairness of a process, as informed by the ability of subjects to participate and give 
input in legislation. This points to the critical role that the involvement of a targeted population 
plays in contributing to the success of attitude and behavioural change.  
A sense of ownership of the legislation increases the chances of its success, in ways similar to 
the arguments for citizen involvement contributing to the success of bottom-up approaches to 
development (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995). The lack of citizen engagement at the grassroots – 
both men and women – thus diminishes the incentive for compliance, due to a lack of detailed 
knowledge and ownership of the entire process. This shortcoming was repeatedly mentioned 
by respondents, pointing to their acknowledgement of alienation in the drafting of the gender 
equality policy that was incorporated into the Constitution. Effects of this can be seen in the co-
optation of the male elite, who have managed to maintain influence over formal institutional 
processes, demonstrating that privileged groups are able to use their resources to reinforce their 
position of power during institutional change processes, creating asymmetrical power relations 
that work to their advantage (Kenny, 2007: 92). 
On matters proximity and visibility, the driving of gender legislation by lawyers and those in 
academia has positioned the debate further from those at the grassroots. This condition is 
exacerbated by the absence of political civil society organisations at the local level (Daniel, 
2011; Kanyi, 2016). The agenda is therefore deemed successful from the macro perspective of 
looking at numbers at the national and county assemblies, which demonstrate an improvement 
in gender equality in political representation. Sadly, this has not translated to the inclusion of 
women in public deliberation exercises at the grassroots level, where transformation could have 
a greater impact on the political agency of women. The institutionalisation of gender equality 
has therefore become a rationalised myth in the Kenyan society, as it remains largely 
uninvolved in the targeted environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 346). 
Beyond involvement, Licht (2008) points out that once the regulations are in place, compliance 
relies on normative attitudes of guilt, pride, disapproval and shame. But what happens when 
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regulations do not evoke any of these strongly enough to effect change? Evidence shows that 
for many Maasai men, the passing of gender equality legislation has had little impact on their 
attitudes towards the status of women. If anything, the process of gender mainstreaming has 
provided a platform for them to guard the status quo, with the additional aid of political 
influence gained from their position of historical advantage in the public sphere. Kameri-Mbote 
(2016:47) notes that ‘‘gender equality in all realms represents a struggle for scarce resources 
and power and is vigorously resisted by those already privileged.’’ This resistance can be 
explained by the non-universalistic attitude towards equality among men. As Llewelyn-Davies 
(1978) explains, the requirement for equality challenges the existing Maasai social order and 
male hegemony. These circumstances make resistance the reasonable response to equality 
legislation among Maasai men. 
This resistance could easily be dealt with through a commitment to training and enforcement 
from the government; after all, it is in the state that resources and the wealth of a society are 
located (Oyewumi, 1997). This is however not the case. There is an apparent lack of clarity on 
what qualifies as gender equality in participation, and consequences of non-compliance further 
disincentivising compliance. It is therefore arguable that Kenya joined the global trend of 
constitutional amendments to increase the percentage of women in political spaces (Krook, 
2008), without paying attention to the contextual realities of different communities in the 
country. This oversight has created loopholes which frustrate the goal of reform envisioned by 
gender equality laws, to create environments where men and women can engage on a 
transparent and equitable basis. 
Chiongson et al. (2011) point out that the dynamic nature of laws and institutions as social 
facets is reflected in the shifting power dynamics and the formation of new alliances through 
socio-political arrangements. They therefore end up being interwoven with group and 
individual identities and are reflected in the same. As evidence so far demonstrates, it is the 
positioning of men as power brokers under customary law that has perpetuated gender 
inequality. The proximity of Maasai men to political institutions puts them in a favourable 
position, where they are able to tap into the political capital reproduced over time to find ways 
of making the new system work to their advantage. 
With the penetration of state laws that could threaten this position, men have managed to form 
alliances which ensure that their influence transcends the informal space. As a result, gender 
norms can be seen to be working with formal institutions to entrench gender inequalities, 
instead of offering new possibilities for women who have been ‘‘disadvantaged by earlier 
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institutional arrangements’’ (Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 607). This is reminiscent of 
observations by Oyewumi (1997), on how Yoruba men were better positioned to take advantage 
of the new legal system during colonialism. By finding pockets of power under the new legal 
system, influential Maasai men are able to assert influence in the formal space as well, 
perpetuating injustices against women as well as their socio-political subordination. This 
delegitimises government agents and agencies among the women (Bilz and Nadler, 2014), and 
among men who would not be inclined to cooperate in the strategic alliances.  
This confirms the argument by Ekeh (1975), that even though the civic public sphere 
subordinates the traditional public sphere, the two realms are not rigidly separate, because the 
actors are the same.  A good example of this is to be found in the connection between politicians 
and management boards of group ranches as entities governed by informal institutions. This 
has inspired protests from local communities,61 with the effects on notions of gender equality 
being ostensible:  
I want to oppose him because, if you look closely, it is our MP who is in charge 
of the Group Ranches. It is he that appoints his supporters. So if you try as a 
woman, it is difficult. …when we look keenly, it is our MPs that appoint their 
supporters to manage our Group Ranches, like ours in Olarashi. We have tried 
to kick out the chairman but failed because he has the MP’s support. So how 
will we women join in? (Female Respondent, Loitokitok – Kajiado South, 
07.03.2016) 
From the colonial interference that made the political space inherently masculine (Oyewumi, 
1997; Hodgson, 1999), Maasai men have over the years managed to assert influence in both 
customary and civil public realms. Whenever women seek to assert themselves, be it as equal 
political agents or seekers of justice, powerful men find ways of ensuring the dominance of 
their preferences. Proof of this is also found in the cases of Christine Kipaaya and Neenkai, 
where men invoked their customary power to influence decisions by government agencies, 
succeeding in frustrating access to justice. In the end, these factors converge to contribute to 
the functional inconsistency of law as a just equaliser, leaving women with unreliable forums 
for equality.  
 
61 Members of Orgulului/Olalarashi Group protest against political interference 
https://ntv.nation.co.ke/news/2720124-4872888-102q2eg/index.html?platform=hootsuite Accessed: 28.11.2018 
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As a right, the successful realisation of gender equality calls for ‘‘an interaction between 
consciousness, experience, and institutional receptivity that is critical to human rights practice’’ 
(Merry, 2003: 344). These are evidently lacking in Kajiado and Narok, where women are 
subjected to an accessible and relatable informal institutional environment that is not always 
fair, especially when it comes to issues of equality. On the other end, is the option of a formal 
alternative that is inaccessible, expensive, largely non-relatable, and most importantly, subject 
to manipulation by influential actors from the informal institutions whose decisions they would 
be trying to avoid. 
All these contribute to the characterisation of the legislation on gender equality as invisibly 
proximate (Soss and Schram, 2007) because, even though it is not being enforced in a way that 
ensures utmost feedback, it is forcing reconfigurations in a manner that forces reactions that are 
reconstructing the face of decision making among the Maasai. The nature of this reconfiguration 
is important to note, as it brings forth both negative and positive consequences. Positive 
consequences involve the readiness for cooperation by men from the realisation that the 
improved status of women benefits them as well, due to the improvements that happen from 
the household level. Conversely, the reconstruction also has negative consequences, as 
exhibited in the increased burden borne by women whose husbands abandon their 
responsibilities in response to the financial autonomy of their women.  
This evidence reiterates observations that laws that modify the status of individuals through 
increased bargaining power at the household level are bound to have consequences that either 
improve or worsen women’s conditions (Platteau et al., 2017). Another negative consequence, 
unintended but maybe foreseen, is the commitment by the elite to block women’s access to 
justice and equality, in order to protect and maintain their public dominance. This could be dealt 
with through civic education programmes, but as has been discussed earlier, neither Kajiado 
nor Narok have demonstrated a commitment to civic education on political rights and benefits 
of gender equality. 
Ultimately, the unforeseen and unintended negative consequences of gender equality legislation 
act as the largest stumbling block to the success of this legislation. These consequences are 
rooted in the disregard for the interwoven relationship between formal and informal institutions, 
and how prevalent norms in each of these could either improve or roll back developments in 
the other.  
The multidimensional nature of institutions means that their effects cannot be conceived as 
independent in either the formal or informal realm. As the empirical evidence in this study 
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makes clear, the political agency of a Maasai woman is the combined outcome of her position 
and authority at home and immediate society as a first instance, before taking shape in the civic 
public sphere. This discussion has therefore managed to demonstrate that ‘‘the complexities of 
institutional design, continuity, and change’’ are rooted in the operations and interactions of 
power structures in and between formal and informal institutional set-ups (Chappell and 
Waylen, 2013: 613). 
In the following chapter therefore, I finalise the discussion on the political agency of Maasai 
women in Kenya. Departing from the goal of institutional transformation through legislation as 
outlined in chapter one, the chapter uses the experiences of the Maasai to highlight the role of 
formal and informal institutions (with their rules, norms and practices) in the debate on gender 
and politics. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AGENCY, NORMATIVE ENVIRONMENTS AND POLITICO-
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Institutional transformation requires movement along a number of fronts: from 
individual to collective agency, from private negotiations to public action, and 
from the informal sphere to the formal arenas of struggle where power is 
legitimately exercised (Kabeer, 2005: 16). 
The aim of this study was to understand how gender norms and gender relations influence 
equality, by focusing on the interconnectedness between formal and informal institutions. 
Situated in Kenya, it explored factors that have contributed to the absence of Maasai women in 
public participation, examined how provisions of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya have 
influenced the participation of these women in the political space, and sought to understand the 
institutional frameworks that influence the realisation of gender parity in public participation. 
To achieve this, I gave a historical background on the political reforms that led to the 
institutionalisation of gender equality in Kenya in chapter four. This was followed by a focus 
on Maasai women in chapter five, which investigated contributors to their exclusion from the 
public sphere. In chapter six, I evaluated the effectiveness of public participation as a platform 
for transforming Maasai women’s political agency, and chapter seven explained the variation 
between policy and practice. These discussions have demonstrated how different norm 
functions interact to influence women’s political agency in Kenya, with evidence pointing to 
the role of actors and norms from informal institutions in influencing the realisation of gender 
equality legislation.  
Based on the study’s aim, this chapter concludes the discussion on how formal and informal 
structures converge to influence the political agency of women in patriarchal societies. I 
therefore begin by summarising findings on the reality of politico-institutional reforms in Kenya. 
This is followed by a discussion on the implication of the research findings on the political 
agency and institutional transformation discourse. The outcome of this discussion then shapes 
recommendations on how gender equality can effectively be institutionalised, with due 
consideration for the influence of norms and practices in both and formal and informal 
institutions. 
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8.1 Women and the Public Sphere in Kenya 
As I have argued in previous chapters, gender equality legislation in Kenya is evidently 
modelled on the Habermasian characterisation of a public sphere where participants engage as 
equals. In addition, participants in this sphere are not driven by the advancement of private 
interests but the common good. This is seen in the way county governments design public 
deliberation forums, based on principles of fairness, accessibility and room for equal 
representation. Men, women, the youth and persons with disabilities are therefore brought 
together to deliberate on development needs without consideration for specific group interests 
or any socio-cultural norms that might influence behaviour in public group settings. 
To effectively summarise the findings of the study’s focus on the agency of women in the public 
sphere therefore, I adopt Nancy Fraser’s (1990) Rethinking the Public Sphere, as a guide to 
understanding the process of institutionalising gender equality norms in Kenya. I employ 
Fraser’s critique of a Habermasian public sphere as a space that is neutral and free from cultural 
ethos, to make sense of the challenges to the promotion of women’s political agency as 
discussed in chapters four to seven. The question here is, how has the modelling of public 
participation alongside these assumptions on neutrality and freedom affected the realisation of 
gender equality in public forums, and the subsequent symbolic effect on the political agency of 
women in Kenya? To answer this, I refer to the research questions. 
8.1.1 Institutional Norms and Practices that Influence the Agency of Women in 
Public/Political Spaces. 
Chapter five summarises the socio-cultural as well as economic and institutional barriers to 
Maasai women’s political engagement. These factors corroborate findings on the 
marginalisation of women in the political realm, which highlight education attainments (Coffé 
and Bolzendahl, 2010; Berinsky and Lenz, 2011 and Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2017), access to 
economic resources (Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004 and Kivoi, 2014), 
and cultural factors (Norris and Inglehart, 2000 and Giavazzi et al., 2013) as key inhibitors to 
women’s political agency. The Maasai experience goes further to demonstrate how the 
community’s organisation structure has perpetuated male hegemony, affording men socio-
political capital which they then strategically deploy to legitimise the exclusion of women. 
In chapter four, the historization of the institutionalisation of gender equality in Kenya points 
to the reality of institutionalised cultural barriers to women’s political agency. The 
predominantly male political class has applied direct resistance to frustrate reforms that would 
see to the improvement of women’s political representation. Celis and Lovenduski (2018: 158) 
describe direct resistance as ‘‘the refusal, inter alia: to change rules, regulations and practices 
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that disadvantage women’s positional and active power.’’ This resistance continues to ensure 
that men maintain political dominance, effectively shaping the institutional barriers to the 
substantial representation of women in the Kenyan political sphere.  
Beyond the cultural power play, women are also victim to additional socio-economic 
disadvantages. Chapter five details how, compared to men, Maasai women have lower formal 
educational attainments, limited access to economic resources (since men control factors of 
production), and are subject to cultural norms that limit their political socialisation and 
subsequent agency. These demonstrate the interconnectedness between social and political 
structures in shaping interactions between actors and institutions (Mackay et al., 2009), the 
result of which is that women fare comparatively poorer than men in matters of political 
consciousness and engagement.   
This disparity establishes what Fraser (1990: 66) terms as a stratified society, defined as one 
‘‘whose basic institutional framework generates unequal social groups in structural relations of 
dominance and subordination.’’ Among the Maasai, the subordinate position is occupied by 
women, a situation that is exacerbated by cultural norms that have perpetuated a gendered logic 
of appropriateness that delegates women to the domestic realm. With due respect to class and 
other socio-economic differences, men as a social category continue to dominate both 
traditional and civic public platforms. This fuels the political disempowerment of women. 
These findings reiterate observations by Nzomo (1997), Kimani (2014) and Kameri-Mbote 
(2016) among others, on the overall position of women in Kenyan politics.  
The distinction of domestic versus public agency is a defining component of the exclusionary 
political practices among the Maasai. Coupled with the gendered logic of appropriateness, its 
consequences are manifested in reported incidences of women not speaking up because cultural 
norms forbid women to publicly disagree or criticise men. Krook (2010) describes this as a 
socialisation of women as private and men as public agents, maintaining an institutional 
arrangement that reflects these internalised norms (Mackay et al, 2010). Historically, the 
traditional position on disregard for this logic, as I have reported in chapters six and seven, has 
a high social cost and invites a ‘generational curse’ on the culpable subject. This belief remains 
prevalent in the face of religious teachings, as well as the trends, social movements and debates 
on equality and equal rights that have prevailed in the 21st century. This confirms the 
observation that reluctance to change or shift attitudes on deep rooted traditional cultural beliefs 
remains an obstacle to the transformation of political institutions (Norris and Inglehart, 2000).  
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This cross-over of traditional norms to logics of conduct in the civic space proves that power 
relations encompass both private and public structures (Kenny, 2007), depicting dual agency 
per Ekeh’s (1975) argument on the case of two publics across Sub Saharan African communities. 
A result of colonialism, Ekeh theorises post-colonial African societies as constituted by a 
primordial/traditional public that is treated as private, and a civic public that is considered 
public. He however notes that with time, agents who dominate the primordial public (mainly a 
male elite), have managed to assert their influence in the civic public. The colonial consequence 
of having men as public officers further ironed the position of men as de facto public agents 
and women as private, a process Hodgson (2001) and Oyewumi (1997) outline in detail based 
on experiences of the Tanzanian Maasai and Nigerian Yoruba respectively. What the 
considerations on private and public agency point to therefore, is not only a cross-public 
dominance by men, but also the cross-over of normative approaches, which reinforce and 
maintain male dominance in political institutions (Kenny, 2014).  
Legislation on devolution in Kenya and the call for gender equality in decision making 
processes therefore pose a threat to male dominance and the perpetuation of discriminatory 
norms. Many locations that now fall under Administrative Wards have historically not had 
government presence, leaving them under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. Neubert 
(2011) points out that such authorities are understandably populated by men who regard 
themselves as alternatives to the government. This modus operandi is now shaken by the 
presence of the government, whose legislation has become disruptive of the male dominance in 
socio-political institutions (Chappel and Waylen, 2013) with additional calls for a gendered 
restructuring of the traditional authorities that have now been co-opted and gained constitutional 
legitimacy as administrative structures.  
Mackay (2008) however warns that these disruptions do not guarantee change to the status quo, 
and as chapter seven reveals, men in positions of influence are resisting the loss of absolute 
authority. This is why they have deepened as well as formed strategic alliances to ensure that 
in instances where they cannot fight against the inclusion of women, they frustrate their efforts. 
These influential Maasai men have therefore managed to model systems where women are in 
representative bodies, but without any substantive influence. Celis and Lovenduski (2018) 
characterise these tactics as indirect resistance, where strategies are employed to neutralise the 
impact of transformation by ensuring that informal rules prevail. As the discussion in chapter 
seven on reasons why the constitutional provisions on equality are failing shows, the absence 
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of sanctions in the case of non-compliance makes it easier for men to further retain control of 
decision making in the political realm.  
Ultimately, men have managed to assert authority and control over both the primordial and 
civic publics (Ekeh, 1975), making it difficult to separate matters of justice and equality as 
privy and subject to normative approaches in either public. Consequently, as a debate, gender 
equality has become a construct of the interwoven relationship between private and public 
conduct. For Maasai women therefore, the conceptualisation of the civic public as a platform 
for equality is untrue as it negates Habermas’ assumption on the neutrality of the public sphere, 
upon which the Kenya public participation guidelines are founded. The legal provisions to rid 
exclusions based on gender are failing to promote equality, proving arguments that informal 
impediments to participation parity persist even if everyone has the legal right to participate 
(Fraser, 1990; Mackay, 2008). The achievement of equality thus relies on paying attention to 
these informal impediments in the design of public deliberation exercises, if political 
institutions are to reform. 
Ultimately, Maasai women’s disadvantaged position of having lesser formal educational 
attainments and fewer economic resources than men are exacerbated by the strong influence of 
cultural norms on the gendered logic of appropriateness – on belonging and public conduct. 
Once again, this confirms Fraser’s disputation of Habermas’ assumption that a public sphere 
can be neutral, and free from any cultural ethos. The political position of Maasai women reflects 
a socialisation process that has enculturated norms of inequality. While these can be reversed 
through carefully executed equality policies, the challenges of the county governments 
discussed in chapters six and seven means that Maasai women are far from fully enjoying their 
right to political participation. 
8.1.2 The engagement of Maasai Women in Decision Making within the New Devolution 
Structure and How this has Influenced Perceptions on their Political Agency. 
The devolution structure has indeed created a key platform for women to engage in political 
processes. Additionally, other platforms such as the Nyumba Kumi security initiative and the 
presence of development committees at the Ward levels that require gender equality in 
representation have created more spaces for women to engage in public affairs. Unfortunately, 
their formal engagement has remained largely descriptive, with the influential men’s reluctance 
to let go of their dominance limiting substantive representation. This confirms that the 
descriptive representation of women has no effect when ‘‘deeply embedded substantive gender 
dimensions’’ infiltrate political institutions (Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 601). Evidence of this 
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is in the reported lack of awareness among women on the state of affairs in bodies they are 
supposedly a part of, due to being locked out of decision making by their male colleagues. 
Actions by devolved government agencies have significantly contributed to the loose coupling 
between equality legislation and the meaningful inclusion of women in public participation 
forums. From methods of advertising, timelines provided, venues and the actual conduct of 
events, little attention is paid to the reality of women’s time use and logistical considerations. 
This also affects the symbolic representation of devolved units, as reported by the Administrator 
for Keekonyokie Ward: as a public servant, she has to deal with poor communication from her 
superiors, and as a woman, she is tasked to explain why she does not take into account the 
planning required by her fellow women when she expects them to attend meetings with only a 
day’s notice. It is such shortcomings that further subject women to exclusion, while minimising 
the symbolic effect of those in positions of power.  
In the case of the Narok County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) for the 2017-2022 period, 
for example, the call for participation was posted on the county’s website and in one local daily 
newspaper on Monday 12th February 2018, for meetings that were scheduled for Wednesday 
14th to Friday 16th February 2018, depending on one’s location.  In addition to this being in 
violation of the legal requirement for two weeks’ notice, the timeline not only excluded those 
that require financial planning to facilitate travel, but also those who, even with easier access 
to the venues, remained unaware as the same was not communicated in churches or local radio 
stations to facilitate wider outreach as recommended in the CPP guidelines. 
In such prevailing circumstances, Maasai women are at an overall disadvantage compared to 
men. Their circles of interaction limit exposure and awareness of political affairs, while the 
county governments make no deliberate effort to align public forums with women’s situational 
realities. These realities include for example, the inability of a number of them to deliberate in 
Swahili or English, the official languages of dialogue in public meetings, and the lack of 
exposure to informal platforms for political awareness such as the men’s daily barazas62that 
keep them informed on political affairs. Additionally, affordability means that they have limited 
access to newspapers and the internet, the two prominent information dissemination channels. 
Fraser makes reference to this, though in the context of media ownership. She explains that 
subordinated groups often lack access to the ‘‘material means of public participation,’’ further 
 
62 While barzas could be formally arranged, the daily ones are mostly informal get-togethers that take place mainly 
in the evening at spots such as pubs, restaurants, random pavements, outside a shop or even under a tree.  
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enforcing their cultural disadvantages (Fraser, 1990: 64). When all these factors are put into 
consideration, it becomes clear that unlike the men, Maasai women have less exposure to 
institutionalised patterns necessary to acquire socio-economic and political tools for public 
participation (Mackay, 2008; Krook, 2010 and Kimani, 2014). 
Some women do however manage to attend public participation forums, as was the case in the 
CIDP process in Kajiado. This is largely due to the efforts by Ward Administrators to invite 
members of the public through text messages and sometimes via WhatsApp. Nonetheless, as 
the discussion on the logic of appropriateness indicates, an improvement in the descriptive 
representation of women does not necessarily substantiate their presence in political processes. 
While there is an understanding among representatives that they are part of a wider public, 
participation does not guarantee that input will represent public interest. This might be made 
additionally difficult when those who receive personal invitations choose to either push for 
private interests, or shy from critiquing the government for fear of not being invited next time 
(and lose out on the little compensation that is thereafter distributed to cover their expenses).  
Even without accounting for shyness and private interests, the influence of the logic of 
appropriateness means that ‘we’ does not really mean ‘we’ every time it is presented as such. 
As Fraser (1990) notes, style protocols that have a correlation with inequality govern 
discussions in a public sphere. Despite being a special interest group, women find their concerns 
generalised as public concerns, even though they would benefit more from special consideration. 
This proves that the representation of women’s interests is subject to personal, institutional and 
political factors that may act as constraints (Annesley and Gains, 2010: 911). While considering 
the multifaceted nature of women’s issues, one could argue that the lack of women’s voices 
makes the deliberation outcome general, but one canvassed as incorporating women’s voices. 
This becomes evident when one considers narratives from respondents that in case of collision 
during deliberation, Maasai women find themselves in a difficult position. They must balance 
between the fight for equality as a statutory right, and the identity and social security granted 
by being members of the community and therefore governed by its customary norms. This 
dilemma is directly linked to the debate on the universalism versus cultural relativism of rights. 
Even though the particularities of this debate are beyond the scope of this study, it is evident 
that among the Maasai, the reluctance to afford women the right to political participation, as 
informed by the community’s gendered organisation structure, can be interpreted as a 
relativistic approach to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as 
the Kenyan constitutional right to political participation.  
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As stated in the introduction chapter, the adoption of gender equality policies by the Kenyan 
government is part of the global trend to institutionalise the elimination of gender 
discrimination. This is especially true when one considers that gender was not considered as 
grounds for discrimination in the repealed Constitution. Incorporating this commitment to 
equality in structures of devolution went further in legitimising Kenya’s commitment to a 
gender responsive democracy. In operationalising the same however, the Kenyan government, 
through the devolved units, can be accused of falling victim to the ‘one size fits all’ criticism 
levelled against development intervention programmes of the World Bank.63  
Itself a victim to this approach from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the 
country paid no heed to the contextual realities of different communities in the country, so as 
to design participatory approaches that would be effective at achieving participation parity. 
Binder (1999: 214) points out that ‘‘rights are based on value judgments made by culturally and 
socially situated human beings, drawing on the social norms -- and the critical perspectives on 
those norms -- that are culturally available to them.’’ It is therefore not surprising that there is 
resistance to the promotion of Maasai women’s political agency, as it does not fit within the 
community’s institutionalised value judgement (Mackay, 2008) to have women as public 
decision makers.  Similar experiences are shared in rural Rwanda, where Kagaba (2015) reports 
of women’s dilemma on whether to enjoy statutory rights even when the same might cause 
conflicts in their households. The need to balance this dual identity in the civic public sphere 
points once again to the inadequacy of Habermas’ conceptualisation of the public sphere as a 
space of neutrality and free from cultural ethos (on equality). 
This does not however mean that there is no room for change, or that relativism should be 
allowed to reign. Donnelly (1984) notes that strong practices can be overridden by stronger 
external judgements. In the case of the Maasai therefore, discrimination against women could 
be overridden by stronger enforcement of equality legislation by the government. This is very 
important because the nature of enforcement is what defines and legitimises formal institutions 
(Chappell and Waylen: 2013: 604). As chapters six and seven demonstrate however, county 
governments exhibit weakness in asserting influence over adherence to equality legislation, 
owing to both financial and capacity constraints, as well as the infiltration of traditional gender 
norms into the civic realm. As the empirical evidence shows, these gender norms support the 
 
63 By the Bretton Woods Project in ‘After 15 years, World Bank’s Doing Business Report still missing the mark’ 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/12/15-years-world-banks-business-report-still-missing-mark/ 
Accessed: 06.07.2018 
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dominance of influential men (and their female proxies where descriptive representation must 
be respected) in decision making, supporting observations by Howard (1982) and Donnelly 
(1984) that clinging on to traditional value systems is driven by the selfish interests of elites.  
Individuals however internalise and abide by these systems, as they are at the heart of their 
identity and belonging in society. According to Renteln (1988), enculturation causes people to 
prefer their way of doing things, and that there is always a point of moral convergence, even 
where values don’t match. In the case of Maasai, the point of convergence is the respect for 
women as members of the community, even though their political influence is subordinated. 
This provides an opportunity for what could be regarded as dealing with reconcilable 
differences. In the following subsection, I explore what such opportunities might be. 
8.1.3 Institutional Frameworks that Could Influence the Successful Realisation of Gender 
Parity in Public Participation. 
The functional inconsistency of gender equality laws has been demonstrated in chapter seven. 
Evidence points to the non-alignment of normative structures that make it difficult for social 
engineering in the context of gender equality to be successful among the Maasai. The dominant 
influence of Maasai men has transcended the socio-cultural space, combining with the 
disadvantages brought about by women’s lack of political capital and county governments’ 
operative and structural weaknesses to make negligible, the desired effects of gender equality 
legislation. Realistically therefore, any chance of changing attitudes and behaviour towards 
women’s political agency lies outside the boundaries of frameworks currently in place. A 
starting point on this can be found in the continued reference to the realities of women’s 
financial autonomy, and the influence this has had on power relations in the private sphere. 
The historical analysis in chapter four details women’s efforts to achieve political parity. On its 
part, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO), despite its shortcomings, has proven 
women’s ability to mobilise and achieve their goals. The MYWO model of focusing on 
improving the livelihoods of women is found throughout the country. It exists in the form of 
women’s saving and credit groups that are avenues of solidarity and self-improvement. These 
groups have allowed women to accumulate capital while at the same time strengthening bonds 
of solidarity and mutual aid (Schultz, 2004). With economic empowerment as their goal, the 
groups have been so instrumental in transforming women’s welfare, that both Kajiado and 
Narok county governments use them in leadership training and such other programs that require 
the mobilisation of women. This is made possible through their leaders, who are able to 
efficiently coordinate women from across different geographical locations. Unfortunately, these 
groups have not been utilised as a political resource despite their potential. 
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In Peru, the institutionalisation of women groups as political entities has contributed to 
significant improvements in the political engagement of women (McNulty, 2015). These groups 
have allowed members to discuss issues that they would otherwise not openly discuss but are 
nonetheless important to them. Women groups as political entities would therefore allow for 
these issues to be ‘made public,’ through what Fraser terms as alternative counter-publics. 
Referencing the 20th century feminist movement, Fraser (1990: 67) argues that in stratified 
societies, subaltern counter-publics provide subordinated groups with ‘‘parallel discursive 
arenas’’ where they can ‘‘invent and circulate counter-discourses,’’ allowing them to formulate 
their own interests and needs. The existence of these counter-publics therefore contributes to 
the achievement of participatory parity 
This approach has been attempted by the youth in Kajiado. In the December 4th 2017 CIDP 
forum, for example, there was a youth representative who wished to present the development 
priorities that the youth had separately deliberated on and wanted the county government to 
address. Unfortunately, the representative never got to present his ideas, and was told that the 
needs of the youth had been covered in the general discussion. This discussion had also covered 
women’s needs, but the needs of both social groups had been discussed within a generalisability 
steered by the county government (the discussion template can be found in Appendix III). 
Denying the youth the chance to present that which they had formulated and defined as their 
concerns, signals a probable resistance to the possibility of institutionalising women-only 
subaltern counter-publics. 
Historical evidence shows that women groups in Kenya have been a source of self-reliance for 
many women at the local level. Women who took part in the study also reported that the success 
of their lending groups has inspired men to form their own groups due to the tangible benefits 
that they could point out. At the national level, many women who have joined politics have a 
background in women organisations, signalling the potential that these institutions hold for the 
political inclusion of women. Even though there is the probability of resistance, it remains an 
alternative course of action. As Donnelly (2007) argues for the indisputable benefit of rights 
despite the debate on their universalism, alternative channels may be argued to be the only 
spaces where the inclusion of women and their priorities could receive fair attention. 
In addition, subaltern counter-publics bear the potential to deal with the organisational 
shortcomings of county governments. Designating two hours for deliberations on a four-year 
plan is very ambitious, if not an outright act of ‘shadow participation’ – inviting participants to 
a public participation forum because it is a legal requirement, and not really because of the 
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interest in getting their views. While logistics and financial challenges can be used to justify 
this approach, there is room for improvement, and having already existing structures would be 
very efficient. Women groups as subaltern counter-publics would therefore expand the 
discursive space while at the same time countering the challenges presented by cultural 
considerations on appropriateness, which act to limit women’s contributions in deliberative 
processes. While this may be argued as exclusionary and therefore contrary to the goal of 
inclusion in a deliberative democracy, it bears the potential to offset the unfair decision-making 
privilege of men among the Maasai. 
Being able to freely debate and make decisions would ensure that the political agency of women 
influences society in a way that makes their actions as crucial as those of men. This is also in 
line with CPP guidelines’ support for the organisation of citizens into groups, should they so 
determine this to be the most effective form of engagement with the county governments. Under 
the rights and duties of members of the public, the guidelines state that: Members of the public 
may participate in decision making processes as individuals or representative groups. County 
residents should determine the most effective grouping to engage the county governments. Such 
organisation may be in the form of youth and women groups, Sacco’s, chambers of commerce, 
civil society or religious entities. 
Co-opting women groups into the wider public participation framework would provide a 
supplementary means of substantive representation since ‘‘these avenues explicitly recognise 
and seek to counteract the institutionalised gender bias present in policy-making’’ processes 
(Mackay, 2008: 129). Having alternative channels that institutionalise women’s voices would 
therefore minimise the challenges of ensuring gender equality goals within public participation. 
Having understood the background to women’s exclusion in public affairs and the shortcomings 
of the public participation forums, the next section discusses what these outcomes mean for the 
debate on norms of equality, the political agency of women, and institutional reform.  
8.2 Implication of Normative Environments on Agency and Institutional 
Reform 
Through the reported experiences of Maasai women, the discussions have so far demonstrated 
the role of both formal and informal norms in influencing gender equality in the civic public 
sphere, and how this evokes varied attitudes and responses from both men and women. In this 
section, I discuss the implication of these findings on women’s political participation agenda.  
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8.2.1 Political Agency in Opposing Norm Environments 
Human agency can either be iterative, projective, or practical-evaluative. Iteratively, past 
experiences influence thought patterns and actions of actors (Goetze, 2014). Within the 
projective element, the imagination of future action trajectories influences actors to reconfigure 
their actions according to desired results. The practical-evaluative element is characterised by 
actors’ capacity to make judgement on alternative courses of action, both practically and 
normatively, with due consideration for changing circumstances. Which element then 
characterises the political agency of Maasai women? 
As the experiences in the empirical chapters illustrate, a judgment on consequences drives the 
choice of action that transcends an individual. This confirms Chabal’s (2014: 47) observation 
that African societies are not atomistic, as value is not put on an individual’s ‘‘intentional, 
purposeful and autonomous social action.’’ Maasai women demonstrate an awareness of the 
logic of appropriateness in their primordial public, which then influences their decisions on how 
and whether to assert their political agency in the civic public. For this community therefore, 
gender and power relations are highly interconnected between the formal and informal 
institutional environments (Kenny, 2007).  As evidence shows, the choice to assert agency 
comes with a readiness to bear the social costs and is therefore not taken up by those without 
the support of men in their lives, or those without the socio-economic and political influence to 
subvert the consequences.  
At the same time, men with power apply the rationale of appropriateness from the informal 
environment to ensure and protect their dominance in the formal political realm. Unfortunately, 
men with a demonstrated willingness to support the inclusion of women lack the socio-political 
influence to counter the power of the elite. Ultimately therefore, political agency in the Maasai 
community is dictated by men with socio-economic and political influence, who extend this 
opportunity to women who are, unfortunately, reduced to ineffective representatives. In their 
positions, they are unable to represent the interests of women, especially when these go against 
the interests of the men in power. This can be seen in the complaints about the lack of support 
from women in development committees, as well as in the composition of participants in public 
forums, who are in most cases personally contacted by government officials. Because ‘‘power 
begets power,’’ these women do more to reinforce the powerful position of men in political 
institutions instead of ensuring the substantive representation of women’s interests (Lovenduski, 
2011: ix) 
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The logic of appropriateness as a norm that is reproduced in the civic public sphere has thus 
influenced the political agency of women in ways similar to outcomes from the debate on 
gender-based violence. In discussing gender-based violence and instances of sexual violence, 
the debate often focuses on the conduct of women as an invitation to violence. Calls are for 
instance made for women not to agitate their husbands to avoid beatings or dress appropriately 
so as not to entice rapists. The debate therefore places the burden of care on victims, and not 
perpetrators. On matters political agency among the Maasai, non-consideration for how men 
could loosen their grip on decision making powers and respect constitutional rights means that 
women have the responsibility to evaluate their assertion of agency against the risk of 
jeopardising their social capital. 
Placing the burden of care on women is largely rooted in the non-involvement of men as critical 
actors in the agenda of women’s political empowerment. However, it is a clear demonstration 
of agency as heavily determined by social and cultural contexts. As Annesley and Gains (2010: 
4-5) point out, ‘‘it is not enough to focus on critical actors…it is necessary to place them in 
their institutional context...this both enables and constrains their ability to make substantive 
policy changes…critical actors are enabled by operating in institutions that distribute power 
and resources.’’  
While Neubert and Scherer (2014) argue that social action cannot be pre-empted from binding 
traditions and habits, Maasai women have in this case demonstrated that political agency is the 
result of iterated norms of acceptable conduct and the consequent consideration of social costs. 
This reproduction cycle is so strong, that legal norms alone are unable to ensure that the goal 
of gender equality is achieved. An analysis of the interplay between context and practical 
evaluation and the possibility of creating an alternative future off projectivity, as recommended 
by Neubert and Scherer, establishes that political agency among heterogeneous agents is a 
deliberate decision on either independence without social capital, or acceptance and belonging 
without ‘political freedom.’ 
The creation of an alternative future for Maasai women’s political participation therefore relies 
on a practical-evaluative element of human agency (Goetze, 2014). Engagement strategies in 
place at the moment show that the iterative element of agency promotes the exclusion of women 
from active engagement, as rooted in the normative logic of appropriateness in conduct at the 
traditional public sphere. At the same time, the projective element carries little promise for 
change in the normative approach to women’s political agency, as the judgement on 
consequences deters many women from being assertive. Considering the changing 
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circumstances in the civic public therefore, it is clear that practical and normative changes are 
imminent.  
Following in the consideration of counter-publics, I argue that the political agency of Maasai 
women lies in the exploration of alternative courses of action, which can be used as a starting 
point in demonstrating women’s political efficacy. There is already acknowledgement of their 
expertise on certain matters, as reported by women on their involvement in development 
committees on education and healthcare. Allowing women to make certain policy decisions 
increases the chances of acceptability of their public decision making. Unlike activities of their 
women groups, matters of healthcare and education have a wider impact on the public, which 
would make them indispensable in policy deliberations. Adopting subaltern counter-publics 
would therefore minimise conflicts in public forums, while at the same time improving 
women’s political awareness and demonstrating their capacity.  
8.2.2 Institutional Transformation 
Legislative amendments not only affect relationships among individuals as discussed above, 
but also between individuals and institutions that govern them. This is why Soss and Schramm 
(2007) point out that the introduction of new policies creates room for new politics, which could 
either have negative or positive impacts on the realisation of policy objectives. This is for 
example the case in environments where informal norms such as the politics of gender among 
the Maasai have become intertwined with formal state norms, weakening the effectiveness of 
gender equality legislation, as empirical evidence herein shows. Maasai men have crafted new 
ways to maintain their authority, while giving the impression that they are opening the political 
space to women by supporting descriptive representation. 
This reality highlights the important role that men play in the success of gender equality policies. 
It also signals the need to focus on them as ‘gatekeepers’ of norms in the community. For 
change to effectively take place, men need to be supportive of the equality agenda, since change 
cannot ‘‘take place if the status quo is not called into question’’ (Platteau et al., 2017: 19). The 
mobilisation of influential men as agents who maintain this status quo is therefore crucial in the 
efforts to change norms. As Waylen (2018) emphasises, the involvement of male critical actors 
is required for a change in gender norms to be successful. This approach has proved successful 
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in the fight against FGM, through the engagement of Morans in Kajiado as the decision makers 
on whether to marry uncircumcised girls.64  
Questioning the status quo calls for awareness creation and consensus building with the men, 
since this, more than the empowerment of women as a single target group, will ensure that 
gender equality is realised. It might be difficult to convince them of the desirability of a change 
in status quo, but it is something that must be done, especially since there are those already 
aware and supportive of the mutual benefits from the political empowerment of women. 
Mackay (2008: 130) emphasises that ‘‘institutional innovation and strategic action by actors’’ 
could contribute to the substantive representation of women. The presence of allies among men 
therefore provides a starting point for the exploration of strategic action. 
Socio-cultural and economic realities faced by women have significant consequences at both 
the household level and the political arena. As women respondents reported, the power 
dynamics at home influence how women relate in public affairs: if a husband supports dialogue 
and power sharing, he will support the wife’s public engagement, and the opposite is true. Rai 
(2012) reports the same for female politicians in India. As authority figures at home, men play 
a big role in legitimising women’s public engagement, which facilitates the process of including 
women in decision making in the civic public sphere. This argument was reiterated by men as 
well, a clear demonstration of the interconnectedness of power dynamics between the formal 
and informal institutional environments. 
Any efforts at institutional reforms therefore need to take this into account, if a comprehensive 
approach is to be adopted. As Kabeer (2005: 16) points out, ‘‘[i]nstitutional transformation 
requires movement along a number of fronts: from individual to collective agency, from private 
negotiations to public action, and from the informal sphere to the formal arenas of struggle 
where power is legitimately exercised.’’ This cannot be realised without acknowledging socio-
cultural influences such as the Maasai logic of appropriateness on agency in the traditional 
public sphere. 
Studies on reforms in political institutions therefore need to focus on individuals as products of 
socialisation processes that begin in the family setting, and not atomistic agents that can 
neutrally engage in public affairs because they have the right to do so. It is for this reason that 
the model of women’s political participation developed in chapter two (Figure 2.1) places 
 
64 Legalise Female Genital Mutilation, says doctor in court https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Legalise-female-
circumcision--says-doctor-in-court/1056-4267584-11ajval/index.html Accessed: 18.01.2018 
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emphasis on individual socio-economic realities and political socialisation as primary factors 
in the political participation feedback process that ultimately influences descriptive and 
symbolic representation.  
8.3 Addressing Gender Inequality in Kenya 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya is very clear in its call for gender equality in public deliberation 
processes. It promises to ensure that women are included in public decision-making processes, 
through forums that accommodate both men and women of different age groups and from 
different socio-economic backgrounds. With this in place, there would be optimal realisation 
of equality in citizen participation under devolution. 
Empirical evidence from this study however shows that the laws are decoupled from 
institutional practice. The most they have managed to do is successfully create an illusion of 
inclusion, characterised by an increase in the descriptive representation of women, but a 
significantly absent substantive representation. While women are represented, their voices are 
largely absent in decision making. A solution to this, as proposed by Sunstein (1995), is 
focusing on the enforcement of consequences for non-compliance, a strategy that could be 
employed by county governments to gain institutional legitimacy (Mackay et al, 2009). As 
gender equality in public participation remains expressive, it requires a consequentialist 
dimension which would give a social meaning (and cost) to non-compliance. It should therefore 
be possible for women to challenge the validity of decisions that do not incorporate their input, 
allowing them to exercise their constitutionally mandated decision-making authority. This 
would ensure a norm balance on the expressive effect of the law beyond the intrinsic value of 
its statement. But are county governments committed, and do they have the capacity to enforce 
this? 
The discussion in chapters six and seven reveal the entrenchment of private interests and deal 
making in public deliberations. Evaluating the ‘‘processes underpinning the formal adoption of 
commitments by governments…to gender equality norms in institutional forms…and the 
variable institutionalization of those reforms in norms and practices’’ (Mackay et al, 2009: 259), 
has demonstrated a lack of commitment to the promotion of equality and fairness. The 
unenforceability of gender equality legislation beyond descriptive representation also means 
that in the absence of an environment of incentives and consequences, there is little motivation 
for compliance.  
 222 
 
Regarding capacity, a stocktaking survey on decentralisation in Africa by Ndegwa (2002) 
reports of a lack of capacity at local levels, which limits efforts on citizen engagement. This is 
reflected in both Kajiado and Narok Counties where, in addition to the financial constraints 
outlined from chapters five to seven, relevant departments have had to work without policy 
guidelines on gender mainstreaming. As of March 2017, both departments had policy drafts, 
with the Kajiado office having forwarded it to the County Assembly for deliberation and review. 
This means that by the end of the Constitution’s first term in operation, the period under study, 
both governments approached gender mainstreaming in an arguably unstructured manner, 
leaving little room for accountability and process improvement.  
Taking into account the institutional realities and challenges, I argue that it is necessary to 
consider reasonable compromises, which would ensure that even though the ideal is not 
realistically achievable, alternative strategies could be adopted to redress the historical 
exclusion of women from the political arena, while at the same time incorporating their input 
in policy processes under the new governance structure. I will outline these briefly, as informed 
by the outcome of this study. 
8.3.1 Utilising Men’s Role as ‘Gatekeepers’ of Cultural Norms 
Beyond the involvement of Morans in the campaign against female circumcision, this approach 
has also been adopted in maternal healthcare campaigns, an approach guided by the recognition 
of men’s authority over their wives’ and partners’ reproduction choices (Nyandieka et al., 
2016). By educating men as a special interest group on the importance of prenatal care, hospital 
births and post-natal care, many more women have safe deliveries, thus reducing mortality rates. 
This shows that men are significant players in institutional reforms where socio-cultural norms 
are involved. 
On gender reforms, Connell (2005: 1802) points out that ‘‘the very gender inequalities in 
economic assets, political power, and cultural authority, as well as the means of coercion, that 
gender reforms intend to change, currently mean that an elite group of men (often specific 
groups of men) control most of the resources required to implement women’s claims for 
justice.’’ Among the Maasai, this specific group of men constitutes an elite group with socio-
economic influence, as well as close ties to government and political agents. These advantages 
allow them to assert influence in both the customary and civic public spaces.  
While traditions and customs were often cited as reasons for continued male dominance in 
authority and decision making among the Maasai, a male respondent in the second FGD in 
Loitokitok made it clear that this argument is only used as an excuse to perpetuate male 
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dominance and maintain the status quo. He pointed out that the community has over time 
adopted many changes that contradicted what was termed traditional, and they could also 
support gender equality, but are reluctant to let go of their position of dominance. This affirms 
arguments made in chapter two, that men, through their historical dominance of the political 
sphere, have accumulated enough capital to ensure their grip on power is maintained (Chappell 
and Waylen, 2013). There is therefore need for a strategic engagement of men if gender reforms 
are to be successful. 
Suggestions on this were made by men (not the politically influential unfortunately). On the 
political engagement of women, male respondents made suggestions to have male ambassadors 
at the community level, who could volunteer for civic education whenever an opportunity for 
public engagement presents itself. This way, they argued, more community members, and most 
especially men, would embrace the agenda as the figures of authority in the community would 
be championing it. This echoes sentiments by the women, that knowledge transmission on the 
importance of including women in governance processes should not be restricted to women 
alone, but should also include men so they can promote change starting at the home front: 
Even men need the training. They are saying that 'women do not speak' so they 
also need the training so that when both are educated, he can give me the 
freedom. I am not saying it is all of them, but without the training, he will not 
understand me when I bring an agenda to the home. For us to understand each 
other, we both need the training. (Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – 
Narok East, 21.04.2016) 
Having men as the drivers of the agenda on women’s inclusion is likely to be met with less 
resistance than when it is considered an imposition or a drive to reduce their power. With this 
strategy in place, men and women can approach roles as equals, recognising and respecting 
each other’s rights to engage in public affairs. The ensuing support structure would minimise 
confrontations, while opening the space for equity and equality. Having men as champions of 
women empowerment increases chances of the agenda’s success since as gatekeepers of Maasai 
customs, they have the power to influence the language and attitude that could ultimately 
reshape the equality landscape. This observation is in line with the Platform for Action from 
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the Beijing Declaration’s 65 call for the equal treatment of boys and girls, and the active 
involvement of men in the quest for gender equality in society. 
This can however be a difficult task. For example, Connell (2005) argues that in strongly 
gendered societies, it might be difficult for men to understand women’s experiences. A 
continued lack of involvement perpetuates the bias against women’s ability to take on public 
roles, and men’s superiority as decision makers. As the discussion on men’s responses to 
women’s majority status however shows, difficulty lies not in the lack of understanding, but 
fear of creating room for women’s experiences in a manner that could challenge men’s authority 
and dominance. It could be argued that there is unreadiness to deal with the consequences of 
disrupting the status quo (Mackay, 2008: Chapelle and Waylen, 2013). It is important therefore 
that there is dialogue to allow for knowledge exchange through which fears and biases can be 
deconstructed, allowing for cooperation and reduced resistance to gender equality legislation. 
8.3.2 Strategic Collaboration with Women Groups 
…institutionalised voice and place, through these alternative channels, provides 
a supplementary means of SRW [substantive representation of women] because 
these avenues explicitly recognise and seek to counteract the institutionalised 
gender bias present in policy-making (Mackay, 2008: 129) 
This position has been mentioned in the call for subaltern counter-publics to facilitate women’s 
political agency. I argue that giving legal recognition to women groups could provide a remedy 
for the shortcomings in general public meetings. Specifically, these alternative spaces will help 
deal with the institutional arrangements of politics as usual, which have frustrated the 
substantive representation of women, by ‘‘constraining the expression and articulation’’ of their 
perspectives (Mackay, 2008: 129). 
Such alternative channels can be found in registered and unregistered women groups which are 
spread out in Kenya. Anunobi (2002) traces the roots of these groups to the pre-colonial era, 
where women supported each other in their extended families and within their age sets. Their 
activities, though not fitting into the mainstream political classification, play a very significant 
role, as they provide excellent opportunities for mobilisation. Even though in their operations 
they do little to challenge gender norms that subordinate women, they do provide a platform 
 
65 Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace - Beijing, 1995, paragraphs 
40, 72, 83b, 107c, 108e, 120, 179. Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf 
Accessed: 12.10.2015 
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for the improvement of members’ self-confidence and welfare through peer learning, income 
generating activities and peer lending. As chapter four additionally shows, they are the grounds 
where women’s political leadership is groomed. 
Since men have no control over the groups, they are women’s power domains, allowing them 
to manage their socio-economic wellbeing. So successful have their efforts been, that they are 
introducing unintended consequences. Women’s improved welfare has caused some men to 
abandon their role as providers, as detailed in section 8.1.3. In the seventh FGD a member of a 
group that has enabled her to renovate her home explained: 
Men, and not just Maasai, will bring visitors to your home regardless of its 
status; whether or not there are seats or if the walls are crumbling down. It is 
upon you as a woman to cover your shame. You will get KES 10,000 and 
improve your house, a wall at a time…Men are not bothered; you can stay in a 
paper house if you wish. When you make improvements, they will brag about it, 
bringing in visitors so that he can be praised. (Female Respondent, 
Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 19.04.2016)  
The effect of these reconfigurations of economic power on political participation has been 
captured in chapter five, section 5.2. Considering the transformative nature of these groups, 
their incorporation as alternative platforms for political deliberation could provide alternative 
avenues for the incorporation of women’s voices in governance as successfully adopted in Peru 
(McNulty, 2015). As an informal platform for participation, women groups as recognisable 
political entities could become the channels for agenda that could not, for reasons guided by 
considerations of appropriateness and consequences, be discussed in public fora. It would also 
allow for further deliberation on agenda that are of strong standing among the women, which 
were discussed in general forums but not incorporated improving the substantive representation 
of women (Fraser, 1990; Mackay, 2008).  
Moreover, benefits of this approach would be manifold, as women groups are of great 
significance in the lives of the women, and in ways that benefit the community at large (Taeko, 
2014). Social and economic projects undertaken within these groups tend to introduce 
significant changes in not just the lives of the women and their immediate families, but to the 
rest of the community as well. Discussions with the respondents confirmed this, where they 
explained that they have transformed their lives through the knowledge and assistance they get 
from their women groups.  
 226 
 
Maasai women use these spaces not only as meeting points to support group lending and 
organise the sale of beadwork, but also for peer counselling and information sharing on public 
affairs. The women have therefore been able to learn more about community affairs and 
development agenda, in addition to meeting their culturally pre-determined mandate of care. 
They therefore take charge of domestic duties, alongside running micro and small businesses. 
For this reason, these groups have become an important space for networking and information 
sharing, especially since a woman can belong to more than one group. 
Things have totally changed today. There are village elders and among them 
are women. The women are now involved in community development and pass 
on all the necessary information to the women in the merry-go-round groups.66 
(Female Respondent, Keekonyokie Ward – Narok East, 19.04.2016) 
Being strategic collaborators of county governments would increase their legitimacy and 
provide a platform for training on political agency as well as legitimise their citizenship through 
socio-political agency (Mackay et al., 2008: 132).  
I acknowledge the threat of co-optation and elite capture as probable outcomes of this process, 
as the history of MYWO in chapter four has shown. However, the collaboration I argue for in 
this case is the recognition of informal women groups as strategic platforms that could help 
bypass the challenges discussed in chapter five. They would ensure that women ‘‘have access 
to the political resources and informal networks needed’’ for political awareness (Kenny, 2014: 
680) by acting as information-access points on political matters. Women would then be 
motivated to engage in public affairs and find alternative ways of communicating and 
influencing decisions. Most importantly, the groups would be a channel for women to 
communicate their needs without fear of prejudice or disregard from their male counterparts. 
It is also worth mentioning respondents’ acknowledgement that men and women have different 
expertise; with women being more knowledgeable on affairs related to education and healthcare, 
and men being informed on matters of economy and agriculture. Borrowing from feminist 
standpoint theorists, one could argue that ‘‘women’s standpoint grounded in everyday 
experience offers a challenge to…ruling perspectives’’ allowing them to contribute in shaping 
ruling practices within institutions (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 11). Having a platform where 
women could freely debate on matters they are aware of, and having their input incorporated in 
 
66 Women groups whereby members make deposits that are then given to individual members on a rotational basis. 
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policy decisions, could be a motivating force for their involvement in other affairs that they 
would ordinarily lock themselves out of.  
Giving political representation authority to women groups therefore presents a navigation 
system which allows free communication on matters that would otherwise remain unaired in 
mainstream participation processes. The value of this is known to government agents as well, 
as I gathered from my interview with Narok County’s Chief Officer in the Development 
Planning Department on 20.02.2017: 
Interviewer: Any areas you think need working on to make this process more 
effective? 
Interviewee: Of course everything is a learning process… This year I feel that 
it will be internalised even more, and we’re going to bring out a more inclusive, 
well thought out structure for public participation. In areas where we have 
many challenges; women and youth are not well represented, there will be no 
harm to make other arrangements to make sure that their inputs are also 
captured. 
Interviewer: What sort of arrangements would those be? 
Interviewee: You can have a women’s meeting, that way they will be free to 
speak to you from their hearts without fear. 
Even though this alternative does not rid the threat of political influence, it bears the advantage 
of an already accepted and appreciated body in the society. It is therefore likely to face little 
opposition from the men, as operations of these groups are not avenues for power contestations. 
Additionally, considering that women’s scope of action is influenced by the status and value 
attached to female spaces (Schultz, 2004), broadening the range of their activities improves 
their perceived esteem and status in society, ultimately strengthening women’s bargaining 
power. Women groups as political units can therefore allow for the navigation of both socio-
cultural and institutional challenges to the promotion of women’s political agency. 
Instead of having one general meeting such as the CIDPs therefore, I argue for the promotion 
of counter publics, as the youth of Kajiado have managed to organise separately. These can be 
adopted in preparation for deliberations in the general public participation forums. By 
facilitating discussions where men and women can separately but freely deliberate on public 
affairs, different perspectives would enrich the final deliberations. Cognisant of the financial 
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constraints on both citizens and county governments, this strategy would allow different interest 
groups to meet at their own convenience. Afterwards, representatives could present outcomes 
of these meetings in the overall forum, a presence that could be facilitated as the ward 
administrators did for the invitees to Kajiado County’s CIDP forum.  
Smaller representative units could also be effective at avoiding the challenges experienced by 
MYWO as an umbrella organisation that could facilitate the gender mainstreaming process. 
Oduol (2016) points out that despite having representation throughout the country, the 
organisation continues to depend on directives from the headquarters, political parties or even 
the government, on how they can operationalise the two thirds gender rule. Women groups can 
provide alternatives to these bureaucratic and structural challenges, as they do not rely on 
official representatives in a system that is open to political contest. The success of this 
alternative however depends on the improvement of communication from county government 
agencies. As the discussions in chapters five and six demonstrate, adequate timeliness and 
improved communication channels to ensure the breadth and depth of outreach are crucial to 
meaningful public debates.  
Consolidating different groups for the sole purpose of political deliberations can also be 
implemented. This would allow women who are members of different groups the chance to 
attend at least one session, increasing their chances of influencing policy decisions. CIDP 
forums would therefore act as consolidation platforms, and not avenues for comprehensive 
discussions hampered by poor timing and challenges of the gendered logic of appropriateness 
in public participation. While this proposition does not guarantee neutrality, the dominance of 
an influential few is minimised by the presence of several recognised and supported subaltern 
counter-publics with the right to provide input into the deliberation process.  
This proposition is also supported by the observation that ‘‘values informing the means and 
goals of political life’’ are set by formal and informal principles, making them ‘‘normative 
institutions that shape beliefs about equality and representation” (Krook, 2010: 712). Ultimately, 
consideration for this alternative would help weaken the reproduction of a male dominated civic 
public sphere, improve women’s political efficacy, and in the process, influence shifts in 
perceptions on the political agency of women. Eventually, this would contribute to 
improvements in the descriptive and substantive representation of women in political 
institutions as envisioned in legislation. 
 
 229 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
As acknowledged in chapter three, it can sometimes be difficult to generalise findings of a 
single case study. I therefore argue for the transferability of the findings from my study, guided 
by Malterud’s (2001) argument for the ability of case study outcomes to gain external validity 
beyond their context. Noting Kimani’s (2014) observation that capital accumulation by men in 
Kenya is a key contributor to the political marginalisation of women, we can see that the debate 
on challenges faced by Maasai women in their quest for public agency is well situated in the 
struggle for political agency by women across Kenya.  
By zeroing in on the Maasai community, I was able to effectively engage with how actors define 
themselves and act in institutionalised worlds (March and Olsen, 2005) where identities and 
role definitions play a big role in determining political agency. Goslin (1969) describes such 
situations as highly institutionalised, since individuals have little opportunity to deviate from 
societal expectations or make demands beyond those they are legitimately allowed to make. 
Investigating the political agency of Maasai women as a constitutional right thus presented an 
opportunity to check on the interplay between formal and informal institutions in defining 
political roles. The outcome of this study therefore makes an empirical contribution to a debate 
Chapelle and Waylen (2013) argue is under-theorised and under-played in both gendered and 
non-gendered institutionalist analyses.  
By looking into the political agency of Maasai women as actors operating in two different but 
intertwined public spheres, I was able to outline mechanisms that reproduce gender relations in 
the wider political system in Kenya. In chapters four, five and six, the discussions demonstrate 
how interests constrain the political activity of women, contributing to their continued exclusion 
(Mackay, 2008; Annesley and Gains, 2010; Mackay et al., 2010; Chappell and Waylen, 2013). 
In chapter seven, the discussion explored institutional reform aimed at realising gender justice, 
highlighting the challenges of such efforts. What I have therefore done in this study on gender 
and politics, is employ feminist scholarship approaches to understand the gendered nature of 
political institutions in Kenya, and how this influences the political agency of women. 
8.4.1 Theoretical Contribution 
The outcome of this study shows that as political actors, individuals are unique and are faced 
by different realities. Ultimately however, the reality of women’s exclusion transcends socio-
economic differences, because the life of institutions continues to be perpetuated by actors who 
embody and enact norms (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). With feminist institutionalists focusing 
on power relations within institutions, they fail to carefully consider power creation processes. 
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This calls for the need to engage with behavioural change scholarship, to better understand why 
people behave as they do. Understanding these processes will inform critical approaches to 
gender reform. As the case of the Maasai demonstrates, such reforms are largely determined by 
dynamics of gender, as constructed and perpetuated by normative environments in the family 
as well as institutions with power over identity and belonging.  
Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) aptly point out that changes in individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviour have an influence in the functioning of society. They link this argument to studies 
that have demonstrated the connection of feminist attitudes towards voting behaviour, as well 
as marital happiness and divorces. Once again, this affirms call for institutional transformation 
grounded on the recognition of the interconnectedness of different institutional set-ups in 
society (Kabeer, 2005; Kenny, 2007). Recognising and engaging with these dynamics will force 
feminist institutionalists to deal with aspects of patriarchy and power relations as key aspects 
of gender and politics. This will connect contemporary debates with earlier works on patriarchy 
and institutionalised male power, which Findlay (2012) argues is left out of current feminist 
institutionalist debates. The connection of these debates will therefore ensure that gender 
equality is addressed as both systemic and structural. 
8.4.2 Implications for Research on Gender and Politics 
The model of women’s political participation in Kenya (Figure 2.1) indicates both primary and 
secondary feedback processes. This study has focused on the primary feedback process, leaving 
unaddressed, the issue of how outputs from participation processes can influence the political 
environment. As research into the primary feedback process has shown, formal and informal 
institutions have been unable to ensure that the political agency of women is promoted without 
consideration for cultural ethos. Policy revisions on recruitment and styles of engagement are 
therefore necessary. Two of these have been proposed in subsection 8.3.1: the inclusion of men 
as critical actors, and strategic collaboration with informal women groups. For a system that 
aims at inclusivity however, these alternatives are not enough, as they do not address the root 
problem of male political dominance. 
This study has demonstrated that this dominance is perpetuated by men’s higher educational 
attainments, their increased exposure to contemporary political affairs, and their historically 
acquired capital as de facto public agents. These conditions place them at an advantage over 
women in influencing decision making in the civic public sphere. Increased commitment from 
the government could easily deal with issues of education and exposure, as they require 
resource allocation to ensure depth and breadth of outreach in communicating development and 
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political affairs, as well as the protection of school going children to reduce dropout rates. As 
the interconnectedness of formal and informal institutions has however shown, these efforts 
will not have much effect on the process of enculturation that perpetuates male dominance.  
Once again, this points to the importance of looking at gendered power relations as influenced 
by both formal and informal institutional settings. Though focused on women, the gender 
analysis in this study has duly acknowledged the role of men. However, to comprehensively 
understand the gendered nature of institutions, I argue for the need to pay more attention to the 
role and experiences of men, in order to enrich output from research on the political 
representation of women. Conceiving masculinity as an intersectional category interlocked with 
other categories like age and class will help to bring individual men into focus. This would then 
enable us to understand processes and mechanisms that sustain elite male dominance in politics, 
even where groups of men that support the ideas of equity exist. Understanding the persistence 
of this dominance is crucial in the debate on transforming political institutions because, as this 
research has highlighted, the multidimensional relationship between men and women operates 
at every level of daily experiences.  
If we are to consider men and women as two halves of a whole therefore, then opposition to 
women’s political agency could be easily explained by studying the two as distinct groups. I 
regard the female half as a whole because evidence shows that their ‘circumstantial 
homogeneity’ with men is not an expression of opposition to gender equality legislation. Instead, 
it is a reflection of their socio-economic position, which provides no incentive for active 
assertion of political agency. Answers to the opposition to equality legislation can therefore be 
understood by studying the male half, in which an approximate half is pro-equality. While 
ordinarily, an elite would constitute less than a half of the male group, I nonetheless consider it 
so due to the realities of interest-based co-optation that has actors shifting from one ‘base’ to 
another. When we combine the total supporters of equality, participation parity has the support 
of two thirds of the population, yet remains unattained. The question that needs exploration 
therefore is, how is it that a third male elite manages to maintain political dominance despite 
trends on equality and equal rights that are supported by law and the majority?  
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
Government Officials  
1. How long have you served in your current capacity as XYZ? 
2. How does your office engage in matters of public participation? 
3. What are your policy guidelines? 
• What role is your office expected to play in the exercise? 
4. Which other offices do you work often and closely with? 
• Do you work with any NGOs/Women or Religious organisations/groups? 
• How would you describe this/these working relationship(s)? 
5. Does your office pay particular concern to women inclusivity and gender equality? 
 
6. Has your office introduced/recommended any innovative approaches to achieving gender 
equality? 
• Why/why not? 
Were there any innovations introduced that conflicted with the socio-cultural values of the 
people of the area? 
• How was this received: Internally and by the public? 
• How did you deal with this? 
 
7. Are there any impediments to your office’s role in the pursuit of gender equality? 
 
8. What public communication channels does your office use? 
• How would you describe their effectiveness? 
9. What is your view on gender equality in your capacity as a government officer? 
• What is your personal standpoint? 
10. How would you describe the future of gender equality in the county and country? 
Women Representatives 
1. Describe your experiences as a woman in your position. 
2. Did you have any expectations that were not met? 
• How would you describe the gains or losses in the fight for gender equality? 
3. Have you/do you receive any institutional support? 
• If yes; which ones, how and how would you rate the support? 
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• If no; why not? 
4. Do you have any recommendations on the role of women in gender equality, and how this can 
better be approached and realised?  
 
Aspiring Female Politicians 
1. What has motivated you to join politics? 
2. How would you describe the experience? 
• Is this along or away from your expectation? 
3. Are you a member of any professional group or institution that supports you? 
4. How would you describe the support system for female politicians? 
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APPENDIX II: ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS IN RESEARCH AREAS 
 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
County Constituency Ward County Constituency Ward
Olkeri Kilgoris Central
Ogata Rongai Keyian
Nakimurunya Angata Barikoi
Oloolua Shankoe
Ngong Kimintet
Purko Lolgorian
Ildamat Ilkerin
Dalalekutuk Oloimasani
Matapato North Mogondo
Matapato South Kapsasian
Kaputiei North Olpusimoru
Kitengela Olokurto
Oloosirkon Sholinke Narok Town
Kenyawa-Poka Nkareta
Imaroro Olorropil
Keekonyokie Melili
Iloodokilani Mosiro
Magadi Ildamat
Ewuaso Kedong Keekonyokie
Mosiro Suswa
Entonet Lenkisim Majimoto Naroosura
Mbirinkai Eselenkei Ololulung'a
Kuku Melelo
Rombo Loita
Kimana Sogoo
Sagamian
Ilmotiok
Mara
Siana
Naikarra
Narok West
NarokKajiado Kajiado North
Kajiado Central
Kajiado East
Kajiado West
Kajiado South
Kilgoris
Emurua Dikirr
Narok North
Narok East
Narok South
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APPENDIX III: KAJIADO COUNTY CIDP GUIDELINE 
 
LEAD QUESTIONS FOR USE DURING THE 2018-2022 SUB-COUNTY CONSULTATIVE 
FORUMS ON 4TH DECEMBER 2017. 
S/No. Key priority Areas Lead Question 
 
1.  
 
ENABLERS  
• Infrastructure 
• Labour and employment 
• ICT 
• Science Technology and 
Innovation (STI) 
• Public Sector Reforms 
• Land Reforms 
• Security and peace 
building 
• National Values and 
Ethics 
• Ending Drought 
Emergencies 
 
 
1. Is employment within this locality fairly distributed? 
2. What are the local employment opportunities in this sub-
county? 
3. What do you think can be done to solve unemployment 
issue? 
4. What are the challenges of the following infrastructural 
aspects in this sub-county; 
a. Road network (Murram, Tarmac) 
b. Access to markets (local and international) 
c. Power connectivity 
d. Telecommunication connectivity. 
5. What opportunities exist in development of solar, wind and 
other green energy initiatives in this sub-county?  
6. What is the current situation in matters ICT in our locality? 
7. How is the internet connectivity within this area? 
8. List the opportunities in ICT and Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI). 
9. How is the current security situation in this sub-county? 
10. How can this situation be improved? 
11. What measures (programmes, projects and activities) can be 
put in place to improve all the enabling sectors? 
12. What are the land problems that you experience in your 
locality? 
13. What are the measures to improve the situation? 
14. Who are the other funding agencies supporting natural 
calamities e.g drought and other interventions within your 
area? 
 
 
General Questions 1. Are you aware of the 1st Kajiado County Integrated 
Development Plan and have you interacted with it? 
2. If yes, what can be done to improve the 2018-2022 CIDP 
3. Can you list five (5) top priority areas to be implemented in 
the county in the next five years? 
4. Suggest indicators that can be used to measure progress? 
5. How does climate change affect development in your sub-
county? 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  
 
SOCIAL PILLAR 
• Education and Vocational 
Training (Youth 
Polytechnics) 
• Health 
 
 
1. In your view what are the causes of poverty in this sub-
county? 
a. What measures can you propose to reduce 
poverty and inequality in this sub-county? 
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• Environment, Water and 
Sanitation  
• Population, Urbanization 
and Housing  
• Gender, Youth and 
Vulnerable Groups 
• Youth Training, Sports, 
Culture and Arts  
 
 
2. Discuss the situation of the following services in this 
sub-county? 
a. Pre-pry education 
b. Vocational Training (Youth polytechnic) 
c. Youth and women fund 
d. Homecraft centers 
 
3. Discuss the situation of the following services in this sub-
county? 
 
 
a. water and sanitation  
b. Housing  
c. Community based groups mobilization 
d. Services by Other non-state actors (NGOs, 
FBOs, CBOs e.t.c.) 
4.Discuss the situation of the following in the sub county: 
a. Hospitals (Tier 3) 
b. Health Centres and dispensaries (Tier 2) 
c. Community Units, Public health, Sanitation, 
Cemeteries, Ambulance / Refferal services 
d. Partners support, CSOs, private, Insurance 
(NHIF) 
5. What measures can be taken to improve the quality of health 
in: 
a. Hospitals 
b. Health centres and dispensaries 
c. Community units, public health, sanitation, 
cemeteries, ambulance/referral services 
d. Partnerships, CSOs, private sectors, NHIF 
6.What are the measures to improve  
e. Pre-pry education 
f. Vocational Training (Youth polytechnic) 
g. Youth and women fund 
h. Homecraft centers 
7. What are the measures to improve  
 
a. water and sanitation  
b. Housing 
c.  Community based groups mobilization 
d. Services by other non-state actors (NGOs, 
FBOs, CBOs etc.) 
8. What are the environmental concerns in this sub-county? 
9.What measures can be put in place to improve and facilitate 
environmental conservation initiatives in this sub-county 
10. What are the challenges facing the special groups in this 
sub-county? (youth, PWDs, women, the elderly) 
11. Propose programmes that can be implemented to mitigate 
challenges affecting these special groups. 
12. What programs can the county put in place to promote youth 
training, sports, culture and Arts? 
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General Questions 1. Are you aware of the 1st Kajiado County Integrated 
Development Plan and have you interacted with it? 
2. If yes, what can be done to improve the 2018-2022 CIDP 
3. Can you list five (5) top priority areas to be implemented in 
the county in the next five years? 
4. Suggest indicators that can be used to measure progress? 
5. How does climate change affect development in your sub-
county? 
 
 
3.  
 
ECONOMIC PILLAR 
• Tourism 
• Cooperatives 
• Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
• Trade 
• Manufacturing 
• Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) 
• Financial Services 
• Oil and Other Mineral 
Resources  
• Blue Economy 
 
1. What are the main economic activities and their potentials 
in the sub-county? 
2. What are the untapped economic activities of this sub-
county? 
3. How effective are the existing interventions/policies in 
promoting the economy of this sub-county? 
4. How has been the food security situation in this sub-county 
in the last five years? 
5. What are the challenges experienced by the livestock 
keepers and how can they be improved? 
6. What are the milestones noted by the livestock keepers? 
7. What measures (programmes, projects and activities) can be 
taken to enhance:  
a. Crop production to improve food security? 
b. Livestock to improve food security? 
c. Fisheries to improve food security? 
8. What measures (programmes, projects and activities) can be 
taken to enhance irrigation potential and other strategies to 
improve food security? 
9. What incentives need to be put in place to improve 
agricultural productivity and food security? 
10. Propose actions/measures that can be used to promote 
savings 
11. In your view, what can be done to improve financial 
institutions as a means of promoting saving and 
investment? 
12. What produce can be developed for export in this sub-
county? 
13. What measures (programmes, projects and activities) can be 
taken to promote other economic sectors such as 
manufacturing, tourism and trade. 
General Questions 1. Are you aware of the 1st Kajiado County Integrated 
Development Plan and have you interacted with it? 
2. If yes, what can be done to improve the 2018-2022 CIDP 
3. Can you list five (5) top priority areas to be implemented in 
the county in the next five years? 
4. Suggest indicators that can be used to measure progress? 
5. How does climate change affect development in your sub-
county? 
 
 
6.  
 
POLITICAL PILLAR 
• Devolution 
 
1. Discuss how Devolution has improved service delivery. 
2. What are some of the challenges facing Devolution? 
3. What are proposed measures to improve Devolution? 
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• Governance and Rule of 
Law  
 
4. How can the link between the national and county 
programmes be strengthened? 
 
General Questions 1. Are you aware of the 1st Kajiado County Integrated 
Development Plan and have you interacted with it? 
2. If yes, what can be done to improve the 2018-2022 CIDP 
3. Can you list five (5) top priority areas to be implemented in 
the county in the next five years? 
4. Suggest indicators that can be used to measure progress? 
5. How does climate change affect development in your sub-
county? 
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APPENDIX IV: NAROK COUNTY CALL FOR 
PARTICIPATION 
 
COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAROK   
  
   
PUBLIC NOTICE  
  
NAROK COUNTY PUBLIC PARTICIPATION/DIALOGUE   
IN THE PREPARATION OF   
2ND GENERATION COUNTY INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 2018-2022  AND   
COUNTY FISCAL STRATEGY PAPER FOR FY 2018/19  
   
The County Government of Narok through this notice, and pursuant to the provisions in the; Constitution of Kenya 
2010, Section 108 of the County Government Act 2012, and the Public Finance Management Act 2012, hereby 
invites members of the public; private sector organization interested parties and other stakeholders, to submit their 
proposals for inclusion in the County Integrated Development Plan for the period 2018-2022 and the County Fiscal 
Strategic Paper for FY 2018/19.  
 
To facilitate timely consultation and adequate considerations, your proposals should be delivered in hand-copies 
to the undersigned or through email to epu@narok.go.ke so as to reach us not later than 16th February 2018.   
 
Members of the public are also invited to attend public participation forums at the ward level from  
14th – 16th February 2018 at various venues as shown in the schedule below;  
  
Constituency   Wards  Venue  Date  Time   
Kilgoris     
  Kilgoris Central   Shartuka Wards Offices  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Keyian  Enosaeni –Maranatha Church  14.02.2018  10:00am  
AngataBarikoi  Oldonyorok PEFA Church   14.02.2018  10:00am  
Shankoe  Kilgoris Social Hall  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Kimintet  Sitoka AGC Church   16.02.2018  10:00am  
Lolgorian  Maranatha Church   15.02.2018  10:00am  
Emurua Dikirr     
  Ilkerin  Dikirr AGC Church  
 
 
14.02.2018  10:00am 
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Constituency   Wards  Venue  Date  Time   
 Ololmasani  Olchobosei Council of Elders Hall  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Mogondo  Soget AGC Church   15.02.2018  10:00am  
Kapsasian  Kapolecho Church of Christ  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Narok North     
  Olposimoru  Olposimoru PCEA Church  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Olokurto  Olokurto Catholic Church  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Narok Town  Narok youth Empowerment Centre  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Nkareta  Nkareta Social Hall  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Olorropil  Enengetia PAG Church   16.02.2018  10:00am  
Melili Ward  Entontol Social Hall  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Narok East     
  Mosiro  Ntulele Outreach church  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Ildamat  Eor-Ekule AIC Hall  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Keekonyokie  Nairegia enkare Catholic church  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Suswa  Suswa Baptist church  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Narok South     
  Maji Moto/ 
Naroosura  
Naroosura Catholic Church  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Ololulung'a  Youth empowerment centre  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Melelo  Olmekenyu catholic Church  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Loita  Entasekera Health Centre (CBHC Hall)  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Sogoo  Sogoo Deliverance Church   15.02.2018  10:00am  
Sagamian  Sagamian Catholic church  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Narok West     
  Ilmotiook  Mulot Catholic Church  15.02.2018  10:00am  
Mara  Maasai Discovery Centre (MDC) Aitong  16.02.2018  10:00am  
Siana  Sekenani Centre  14.02.2018  10:00am  
Naikarra  Naikarra Community Centre  15.02.2018  10:00am  
 
Ag. COUNTY SECRETARY   
COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAROK  
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APPENDIX V: LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
 
Focus Group 
Discussion 
Occupation Location  Date Remarks 
10 Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Loitokitok, 
Kajiado South 
03.03.2016 25-60 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Active in politics and 
community affairs. Engaged in 
managing households 
8 Male 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Loitokitok, 
Kajiado South 
06.03.2016 30-50 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. All active in politics 
and community affairs. Mixed 
perceptions on the equality status of 
women 
4 Male and 4 
Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Loitokitok, 
Kajiado South 
07.03.2016 25-60 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. All active in politics 
and community affairs. Women 
directly confronting men 
8 Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Kimuka, 
Kajiado West 
23.03.2016 25-40 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Uninterested in 
political engagement. OK with being 
guided by husbands 
8 Male 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Kimuka, 
Kajiado West 
24.03.2016 30-60 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Politically aware, 
some self-declared elders 
4 Male and 4 
Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Kimuka 
Kajiado West 
25.03.2016 30-50 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Politically inactive 
women and politically aware men. 
Young men supportive of women's 
equality 
8 Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Nairagie 
Enkare, Narok 
East  
19.04.2016 25-65 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Frustrated by non-
responsive government and 
irresponsible men 
8 Male 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Nairagie 
Enkare, Narok 
East  
20.04.2016 30-50 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Politically aware  
4 Male and 4 
Female 
Respondents 
Self 
employed 
Nairagie 
Enkare, Narok 
East  
21.04.2016 30-50 age bracket. Mixed primary and 
secondary level. Mix of politically 
aware an unaware women. Politically 
aware men frustrated by non-
responsive government 
Interviewee Occupation Location Date Remarks 
Officer - County 
Budget and 
Economic 
Planning 
Department 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Narok County 
Offices 
 22.04.2016 Refused to be recorded. Reported that 
the county can only reach out to nine 
locations for public participation 
forums due to financial constraints and 
infrastructural challenges 
Aspiring 
Member of the 
County 
Assembly - 
Rombo Ward, 
Kajiado South 
(Female) 
Politician Entarara, 
Kajiado South 
29.05.2016 She reported that being separated from 
her husband was her biggest challenge 
in seeking political legitimacy. She 
reported being subjected to verbal 
abuse lined with sexual innuendos, 
with men offering to marry her so she 
could stop running around 'fighting 
men' 
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Head - 
Department of 
Gender, Kajiado 
County (Female) 
Civil Servant Kajiado County 
Offices 
16.01.2017 Noted the lack of commitment to 
equality in public appointments by the 
county government. Acknowledged 
support from civil society groups. 
Reported department’s focus on 
education and economic empowerment 
of women 
Chief Officer - 
Department of 
Civil Service, 
Administration 
and Citizen 
Participation, 
Kajiado County 
(Female) 
Civil Servant Kajiado County 
Offices 
19.01.2017 Reported of equal participation. 
Acknowledged lack of civic education 
and funds to support this. Mentioned 
that focus on mainstreaming is on the 
elderly and persons with disabilities. 
Works closely with the department on 
gender 
Officer - County 
Budget and 
Economic 
Planning 
Department, 
Kajiado County 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Kajiado County 
Offices 
23.01.2017 Reports successful realisation of 
descriptive representation. 
Acknowledges that content may 
sometimes be too technical for 
ordinary citizens 
Women 
Representative - 
Kajiado County  
Politician Parliament 
buildings, 
Nairobi 
24.01.2017 Acknowledged husband's support as 
crucial for her campaign success. 
Explained the challenge in meeting 
women across the county. Opined that 
women are not as politically committed 
as men.  
Member of 
Parliament - 
Kajiado South 
(Male) 
Politician Parliament 
buildings, 
Nairobi 
24.01.2017 Reported commitment to the two thirds 
gender rule in appointments for the 
constituency development fund. 
Opined that increased literacy among 
the Maasai has increased rights 
awareness and public engagement  
Member of 
County 
Assembly - 
Ewuaso Kedong 
Ward, Kajiado 
West 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Politician Ngong, Kajiado 
North 
30.01.2017 Reported organising thematic social 
and economic forums to understand 
needs of his constituents. Noted that 
the legal system has forced men to 
accept women’s participation, as well 
as empowering women to take up the 
challenge and speak out for 
themselves.   
Ward 
Administrator - 
Ewuaso Kedong 
Ward, Kajiado 
West 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Ngong, Kajiado 
North 
30.01.2017 Reported satisfactory citizen 
participation even without efforts to 
reach out to women. Noted the 
unfortunate existence of an elite group 
to whom information gets faster. 
Reiterated the need for civic education 
Member of 
County 
Assembly - 
Rombo Ward, 
Kajiado South 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Politician Entarara, 
Kajiado South 
06.02.2017 Noted that female constituents were 
more politically vocal than men. 
Reported that economic resources are 
women's biggest challenge  
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Ward 
Administrator - 
Rombo Ward, 
Kajiado South 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Kajiado South 
Sub County 
Offices 
07.02.2017 Reported of equal and satisfactory 
citizen participation. To counter the 
lack of effort to reach out to women, he 
mentioned that special effort is put in 
moderating discussions to ensure a 
balance. Opine that devolution has 
brought the government closer to the 
people 
Ward 
Administrator - 
Kuku Ward, 
Kajiado South 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Kajiado South 
Sub County 
Offices 
07.02.2017 Noted poor infrastructure as key in 
geographical marginalisation that 
mostly affects women. Reported 
instances of verbal abuse against 
women, but also the slow acceptance of 
women's political agency 
Officer - County 
Budget and 
Economic 
Planning 
Department 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Narok County 
Offices 
15.02.2017 Reported that everything works as it is 
supposed to, taking all reasonable 
challenges into account. Referred me 
to the chief officer for 'on the record' 
information 
 
Chief Officer - 
Department of 
Gender, Youth 
and Culture 
(Female) 
Civil Servant Narok County 
Offices 
15.02.2017 Acknowledged the scarcity of 
resources and subsequent political 
sensitisation through women's 
economic empowerment groups 
especially through role models. 
Reported close cooperation with the 
national government as well as the 
county's economic and planning 
department.  
Chief Officer - 
County Budget 
and Economic 
Planning 
Department 
(Male) 
Civil Servant Narok County 
Offices 
20.02.2017 Reported adherence to the county 
public participation guidelines as well 
as personal networks. Noted that 
despite challenges, citizens attend 
public forums satisfactorily. Also 
reported that different areas exhibit 
different attitudes towards women's 
participation, so moderators are keen to 
ensure equality in opinion sharing  
Member of 
County 
Assembly - 
Keekonyokie 
Ward, Narok 
East 
Constituency 
(Male) 
Politician Narok town, 
Narok North  
20.02.2017 Reported that cultural barriers are 
evident in public forums, where 
women are too shy to speak, allowing 
men to dominate. Noted that with time 
and adequate resources, devolution is a 
transformative system 
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Ward 
Administrator - 
Keekonyokie 
Ward, Narok 
East 
Constituency 
(Female) 
Civil Servant Narok town, 
Narok North  
21.02.2017 Noted that communication timeliness 
was the biggest challenge to ensuring 
timely citizen engagement, which 
affect more women than men due to 
the nature of domestic responsibilities. 
Reported that a delegation of men 
approached Narok County's governor 
to petition for her dismissal as a 
woman should not be allowed to hold 
such a position. Legitimising her 
authority remains the biggest obstacle 
as some men would rather travel to the 
headquarters than address their 
concerns to her. 
Women 
Representative - 
Narok County  
Politician Narok town, 
Narok North  
26.03.2017 A lawyer and the daughter of a 
politician, she reported that support 
from her family was difficult to get as 
they did not believe the political arena 
is fit for a woman. Being unmarried 
was also an issue against her 
candidacy. Despite her qualifications, 
she reported that her male colleagues 
do not take her seriously, while at the 
same time her constituents expect 
personal favours. nonetheless, she 
notes that reasonable progress has 
been made in normalising women's 
political agency 
Chair - Nyumba 
Kumi Initiative, 
Nairagie Enkare 
(Male) 
Self 
employed 
Telephone 
interview 
16.02.2018 Reported that the forum was fair, 
allowing citizens to articulate their 
development needs 
 
 
